Some argue that real morals cannot possibly exist unless God exists. The common and I think proper response to this claim directs them to the Euthyphro dilemma. The Euthyphro was one of Plato’s dialogues where Socrates asks whether something is good because it pleases the gods, or is it pleasing to the gods because it’s good?
This is an interesting question isn’t it? Most of my readers I suspect tend to be monotheists so let’s change “gods” to “God” and consider each possibility mentioned:
1) Something is pleasing to God because it is good.
2) Something is good because it is pleasing to God.
Ok I tend to think the first prong is a contender. I tend to think it’s possible that something is pleasing to God because it is good. That position has been criticized, because it is claimed that means God can’t be omnipotent or something along those lines. That is they would argue, God is caged in by goodness, and can’t make evil into goodness and therefore is not omnipotent.
Ok my view here is to fall back to Alvin Plantinga’s exposition about God’s omnipotence when he was dealing with the problem of evil. That is we should first try to understand what we mean by “omnipotent.” If omnipotent means God is not bound by the rules of logic then none of this philosophical talk will help us understand the possibility of his existence. For example the problem of evil would go away since it at best portends to show that God’s traits contradict the possibility that he would create this world with evil. Of course, if God is not bound by logical rules (such as the rule of non-contradiction) then this argument is of questionable worth.
So by “omnipotent” I tend think God’s power is still bounded by the rules of logic. (If I am wrong so be it. He is then truly well beyond my understanding so I can only hope for the best.) This is why people who ask can God make a rock so heavy even he cannot lift it, are asking something of dubious relevance.
The other observation from this first view is that the good seems capable of existing independent of God. I do not deny that this first view explains how morality might exist independent of God.
Now let’s consider the second possibility. Something is good because it pleases God. In this situation there is a sort of relativism based on God’s subjective wants. This view is in line with what is called the divine command theory of morality. I tend to agree that this makes right and wrong a bit too arbitrary.
Now a popular philosopher and apologist, William Lane Craig, points out that this is really a false dichotomy. I think he is correct on that point. These two options are not the only possible two options. “Murray Macbeath (1982), submits that the horns of the ED are not exhaustive given the logical possibility of this scenario that represents Macbeath’s own view: God might choose actions because they maximize our happiness, which might be the reason why those commands are morally right, but God might not command them because they are right but because he loves us. Thus, both disjuncts of the ED would be false, and ought to be rejected anyway, Macbeath would say..” THEISTIC ACTIVISM AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA by DAVID BAGGET
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=fac_dis
But also as William Lane Craig says we can reject both options and say “God wills something because he is good. That is to say it is God’s own nature which determines what is the good.” Therefore morality is not arbitrarily based on God’s whims as the second prong suggests. But also the good is not external to God. It flows from God’s nature. This view of God and his nature date at least as early as Anselm.
I think William Lane Craig, Anselm and several other philosophers over the millennia are correct in pointing that the two prongs of the dilemma are not exhaustive. And I would say that this understanding of morality seems a very plausible one. I actually see no reason why I need to try to determine whether this third possibility or the first possibility holds. Clearly since I believe God created the world there might be very little difference.
What does the existence of this third possibility show? I agree that it shows that what is commonly referred to as the “Euthyphro Dilemma” is not a true dichotomy. So it’s not the case that the Christian must either accept that goodness is independent of God or arbitrary. So that much is good for the Christian.
However sometimes I think the “third option” argument gets pushed a bit farther than is warranted. This third (or 4th or 5th) possibility is sometimes used to argue that for real morality to exist there must be a God. I think this stretches things too far. After all these other possibilities do not logically eliminate the first possibility. Thanks to the first prong we can clearly conceptualize how real morality could exist independent of God. And just because there are other possibilities that does not mean the first prong is impossible, or even less likely.
In the end I think the “Euthyphro Dilemma” does indeed help us understand how real right and wrong might exist without God. It does not prove morality exists without God. But it does help us understand how real morality can exist without God.
True and Reasonable 
Nice post. I think The third way is still haunted by the spirit of Moore’s open question. God is good, but is Good, God? Likewise, I think God is troubled by the existence of an independent Good, not because it threatens omnipotence, but because it threatens universality, and that’s a claim that seems necessary to most people’s concept of a monotheistic God (even a pantheistic God). If there is such a thing as “the good”, then God operates within it’s context doesn’t he even if he wholly embodies it?
Keith I tend to agree with Nolan about God being bound by things like the law of non-contradiction. I think we actually have discussed this in the past. But I also intend to make another blog post in the future explaining my views on perfect God and a few other things in the future. In sum I don’t really find holding on to many of these views of God as omni this or that so important. I think there are certain lines to be drawn and certain issues raised but there may be room to maneuver. Moreover I am not sure I have heard convincing arguments why God’s omni qualities must dip below these lines.
Maybe I need to consider these issues more in depth but they never seemed very pressing to me. BTW the future blog will be about what I term “bottom up Christians” versus “top down Christians.” Hopefully those terms will make more sense after i post my blog.
Thanks, I enjoy reading your stuff and am looking forward to it. As for this issue, it is not wise to argue from a base of meta-ethics, I think. We may not agree on meta-ethics, but I think we can agree that (after how many centuries?) there is still significant disagreement about what we are even discussing!
On the main issue, the arguments that Nolan references seem to me to lead to a kind of panentheism. I think that’s what Plantinga flirts with, avoiding the problems with contextualization by positing a natural epistemic gap. That’s OK. Like Wittgenstein said, you can’t shit higher than your own ass. If we know anything, that’s it.:)
Keithnobakc,
Interesting observation. I’m not certain that would be the case. This would fall into the realm of logical noncontradiction in which Alvin Plantinga (and probably William Lane Craig) argues God is bound by. This does not really pose a problem for His omnipotence because good is intimately a part of God–He cannot act against good because it is integrally a part of Him. It would be a contradiction to His nature for Him to act evilly. I do not think it posses a problem for the universality of the good either. If there is an objective good (even embodied by God), then it necessarily follows that it would be universal. Objectivity demands universality–it is when there is a subjective definition of good where universality is rejected in favor of a more existential (in whatever scope) morality.
I would like to expand on the first prong of the trichotomy (or more). You are right that the third (or fourth or whatever) prong would not show the first to be false, it just shows the dichotomy to be a false one. But, given the nonexistence of God or the lack of belief in God whether or not He exists, how might one draw objectivity in morality. J.P. Moreland, in “Scaling the Secular City,” argues against naturalistic conceptions of objectivity in morality. He addresses emotivist and cognitivist theories of morality and posses objections to them. Most effective I think is the view that moral responsibility (and so morality) is impossible due to the mind-body relations that naturalists must come to conclusions about. Assuming you are aware of the mind-body theories of naturalism, the real issue is that there seems to be no continuity of the “self” or the “I” when it comes to the mind in the naturalistic conception. So how can one be held responsible for his actions? If the self (or mental properties) do not persist, how can one say that another committed a crime or lied or cheated on his wife? To Moreland–and I agree–there seems to be no real grounding for morality in the naturalistic conception of the self.
Further plaguing the naturalist is the issues surrounding the objectivist views of the ethical naturalist. That is to say, problems abound with the view that what is moral, good, or worthy is really just reducible to a set of biological, chemical, psychological, and physical properties. For instance, reducing the statement “x is right” to “x is what is approved by most people” assumes that the majority is always right. Science has done a more than adequate job of showing that the majority can often be wrong. Further, it confuses an “is” statement with an “ought” statement. If something is morally right then it is normative, it carries an “ought” with it. But natural properties are not normative, they just are.
Trueandreasonable, sorry about the long comment, I seem never to be able to keep them short. I agree with you on all your points and thought I would “briefly” expand not he first prong a little. Cheers.
Nolan long posts are always welcome. Things should be made as simple as possible but not simpler.
I think it is correct to concede that maybe there is no contradiction in saying real objective morality can exist without God, but there will be lots of other problems. I think you agree with this.
Although perhaps Moreland gives a reason to think real morality is impossible without God. I have not read Moreland. And I am not familiar with the particular argument you make with respect to mind body problems.
But I have read many criticisms of the various non realist views of morality and find them to be convincing.(i.e., I am a moral realist) When it comes to moral realism I agree with those who argue that even if moral realism exists – if we evolved in an atheistic framework then our beliefs about what it actually requires are completely unreliable. Three philosophers have published in support of this view – Sharon Street, Richard Joyce, and Mark Linnville. The first 2 are atheists and therefore just assume atheism but argue against moral realism. The last is a Christian.
They all concede that maybe moral realism can exist but how would we have any clue what it requires. Its an epistimological argument as opposed to a metaphysical argument.
I think it is important to be clear though. Just because the Euthyphro dilemma is not a proper dichotomy, that does not mean real morals can only exist if God exists.
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OK, so i’m having some trouble here. Craig’s argument is that “God wills something because he is good. That is to say it is God’s own nature which determines what is the good.” Which leads you to conclude “Therefore morality is not arbitrarily based on God’s whims as the second prong suggests. But also the good is not external to God. It flows from God’s nature.”
My issue is the following: If I concede that “goodness” is defined by the nature of god (as opposed to the will of god), then to define goodness we must look to the nature of god. But, how is the nature of god any easier or more meaningful to understand than the will of god? Both seem equally obtuse to me.
Does that make sense? How is moving the source of good from god’s will to his nature helpful at all?
Hi Bob
Thanks for posting. The issue Craig is addressing is not whether morality would be easier to *understand* if it is based on whatever pleases god(s). That is really a separate issue from whether it is *arbitrary*.
I imagine Craig (like many Christians myself included) would say we can *understand* morality through various methods including but not limited to reading scripture and prayer. If God did not exist it seems that we would have a very difficult time understanding what any real (as opposed to subjective) morality requires.
The issue he is addressing whether it would be arbitrary. And I think his view does make morality less arbitrary because it makes it seem less changeable. Of course on a certain level whether it is God’s nature, or even the natural world that determines what is moral there *might* be a point where we say it is arbitrary. But that argument would need to be fleshed out a bit more.