Morality: Problems with Divine Command, Subjectivism, and Anti-realism

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Divine Command Theory is the view that right and wrong is simply whatever God decides it is.  As Socrates asked in the Euthyphro Dilemma:

1) is an act pleasing to the gods because it is good,

or rather

2) is an act good because it is pleasing to the gods?

 

The Divine command theory says 2 is correct.   An act is good because it is pleasing to God.   Whatever is God’s will to be good, is good.  That is what it means to be good.  Divine command theory is really a form of subjectivism where the person whose judgement is relevant is God.

 

Russ Schaefer-Landau argued against divine command theory (claim 2) along these lines:

 

  1. God either has good reason to will the way he does or he does not
  2. If God has no good reason to will the way he does then his view is arbitrary
  3. If God has good reason to will the way he does then something is good due to those reasons not due to God’s will. Therefore, we would be looking at case 1 in the Euthyphro dilemma not 2.

 

It follows that if divine command theory is true then morality is arbitrary.

 

I actually think the problem with divine command theory runs even deeper.  (And the problems equally apply to all forms of subjectivism/relativism)    I think that if we define moral good as whatever God (or some other person or group or entity) decide is good then the very notion of having a “good reason” to believe an act to be moral or immoral is unworkable.  The issue is dealt with by subjectivists when we consider the problems they have with moral progress.  Moral goodness on the subjectivist view is whatever the relevant person or group decides is morally good.  This decision need not accord with objective reality because under subjectivism morality itself is not based in objective morality.     Divine command theory seems to be just a particular form of moral subjectivism where the relevant person or group is God.

 

On moral subjectivism we make moral progress every time the relevant person or group changes their mind.  If they go from thinking slavery (however we want to define it) is sometimes permissible to thinking it is always wrong then it is moral progress.   Why is this moral progress?  Well they used to think wrongly and now they are correct.  They are by definition always correct in whatever they now believe about morality because their beliefs define what morality is.   They used to think slavery was sometimes permissible but since their current view defines what is moral and they now think slavery is never moral they now hold the correct view.

 

Of course, if they then change their mind again, and again start thinking slavery is sometimes morally permissible, that would again be moral progress!  Why?  Because, the current beliefs of that person (or group) defines what is moral.  So now that they believe slavery is sometimes morally permissible then it is by definition morally permissible.  Therefore they were in error, in the bad old days, when they thought slavery was always wrong.

 

So to that extent anything that causes the relevant person/God/group to change their mind is always good in the sense it leads to this vacuous sort of moral progress.  I hope that seems more distasteful than satisfying.  Is there any other sense that a subjectivist could have a “good reason” to hold a belief about morality?  I think the prospects are dim here is why.

 

As I explained in an earlier blog there are generally 2 different types of good reasons to believe something– theoretical reasons having to do with evidence – and pragmatic reasons which is more focused on consequences.   I agree that logic can properly constrain a subjectivists beliefs – e.g., they should not lead logical contradiction.  But that isn’t really going to rule out much in terms of bad reasoning about morality.  Any detail of difference can be pointed to in order to avoid logical contradictions in moral views.  That murder did not happen at precisely 10:27 Am Central time at that exact location.  Therefore my believe that this killing is immoral does not logically contradict my belief this other killing was moral.   To really get to the heart of the matter we need to go beyond just logical contradiction and look at whether there can be good theoretical, and/or practical reasons for an anti-realist to believe a moral claim.

Can there be good theoretical reasons to hold subjective moral beliefs?

So lets address whether there can be good theoretical reason for the subjectivist to believe something is moral.  That is, is there evidence the subjectivist might use to embrace a moral belief?   Because morality, according to the subjectivist, is not based on objective reality but rather subjective it is impossible that there is good evidence to say something is moral. Let me explain further:

 

Let’s say on the divine theory it so happens that racism displeases God.  So on this theory racism is evil.  And saying it is evil is the same as saying it is God’s will we avoid it.  Now someone might say well God has good reasons for that being his will.  Racism causes all sorts of problems and pain etc.  And we may nod along with some of those reasons.  But here is the problem.  It doesn’t matter what the reasons are if we are going to define what is good by whatever pleases God.  If they actually led God to his current view then they are all good reasons – to the extent they led to the current view which by definition is always right.  So maybe none of the reasons we think racism is wrong are the reasons it displeases God.  Maybe God used to think racism was good but then he was kicked in the head by a mule, or he believed that his stock portfolio would increase in value if he changed his tune or he did some tasseography and the tea leaves told him racism was wrong so he just went with that.

 

Now normally we would think well I am glad God now says racism is wrong but those aren’t really good reasons to reject racism.  But this notion of good or bad reasons to believe something is just our attachment to a realist view of morality.  We think racism is wrong because of things that have to do with reality outside of God’s opinion.  But that is not how it works in Divine command theory – or any form of subjectivism.  God’s opinion decides what is in fact good or bad.  So his current view is always the correct view because that is how the correct view is defined.   It is not based on objective reality so our normal notions of saying whether a reason is a “good reason” or a “bad reason” no longer apply at all.

To better understand my point let’s consider what good and bad theoretical reasons for believing an event that occurs in objective reality.  Lets use history as an example.

If someone believes Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide up Eastern Eurpope before World War II, we might agree because based on what we read about the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact it seems that is likely true.  But what if they say no that is not why they believe it.  They believe it based on tasseography. (again based on pattern the tea leaves left in their mug) Ugh another tasseographer! (blame Richard Joyce for teaching me about this craft)

 

But why is that a bad reason to believe?  We may not be able to show such a belief contradicts other views they hold.  But that is not the problem.  The problem is that reason has no connection with the reality of Russia actually having an agreement with Germany before World War II.  The information we read about the Ribbontrop Molotov pact does in fact have a connection to the objective reality of that agreement.  That is we think the history book (or Wikipedia article) traces back to information and documents used by the people actually in leadership positions in Russia and Germany and this connection with objective reality is what makes it a good reason to believe.

 

If the Wikipedia article or book was a complete fabrication made up by some crazy person who decided to write down a dream, then the Wikipedia article would not be a good reason to believe there was an agreement.  Why does the evidence or reason to believe have to track/link with objective reality?    Because the claim “that Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide Eastern Europe before WW2” is a claim about what happened in objective reality.    If the claim we are considering is not itself one about objective reality then it is far from clear why any reasons to believe it must have any connection with objective reality.    So our normal theoretical reasoning as to what constitutes a “good reason” to believe something no longer applies when we are talking about anti-realist morality positions.

Can there Be Good Practical Reasons Supporting a Subjectivist Moral Belief?

So what about pragmatic reasons?  Are there any good pragmatic reasons that can lead a subjectivist to believe one action is moral as opposed to another?   I certainly agree that practical reasons can be a good reason to believe something.  Indeed I think there are good practical reasons to believe in God as that belief will lead us to live a moral life.  But again I am understanding morality as a moral realist does.  That is a very different thing than what a moral subjectivist believes.  Here  and here are earlier blogs where I talk about some of the differences:

 

If you have certain goals that the belief will serve then you may have pragmatic reasons to believe.   So for example if believing you can beat cancer were to really improve your chances of beating cancer then that would be a good pragmatic reason to believe you can beat cancer.   This practical reason is independent of theoretical good reasons based on the evidence that you actually will beat cancer.

 

But it is hard to understand how this could apply in the case of subjective morality.   How would calling something moral actually lead to more rational action/belief?   I think Professor Shaffer-Landaus point comes into particular focus here.  If we say we want to believe this conduct is moral because it will lead to happiness or less pain for myself or others, why would adding the claim that therefor this is “moral” add anything?  Why not just say I want to believe I should act this way because I  want happiness and less pain.  Should the label that this action is subjectively moral motivate us to act that way more then the underlying reasons?  Certainly I would say yes if we were considering an objective morality.  But when we are well aware that morality is a label we subjectively assign then what is the point of even using that language.  To the extent it motivates beyond the underlying reasons it would seem to do nothing but distort motivation beyond the proper reasons.

 

It would seem that since we rule out evidentiary reasons and objective reality then we are only left with motivating reasons.  But then to the extent the morality label adjusts the motivation it would seem only to distort it in a way not supported by the other reasons.    The nihilist/error theorist would seem to accept the same reasons and simply cut out the morality talk as to the extent the morality label does anything it would distort the motivation beyond the underlying reasons – which would lead to less rational action not more.

 

But there are two more problems with coming up with good pragmatic reasons.  One is that saying what we want is not really in our control rationally speaking.  It would be great if it was.  But even though I know certain foods are bad for me I still want them.  The notion that our wants are driving the ship is sort of like admitting we are giving away the keys to matters beyond our control.   Although on this point I would agree the more argument is needed.  Just because I can’t control all my desires that does not mean I can’t control any of them.  But then again what is driving my will to desires some wants and not others – if not beliefs about objective morality?  Just other wants and desires?  If so then it would seem we just say we act this way for those reasons and adding the label of moral or immoral to actions seems superfluous.

 

The second problem arises because fundamentally morality involves ultimate goals.    Morality is generally understood as the end good in itself not something we do so that we can become faster stronger smarter or even pain free etc.  To the extent I wanted to do action X because it would gave me a leg up in my career or to relieve pain, does not mean action X was moral.   It might be moral or it might not.  But an action serving some alternate goal is usually seen as an independent reason to it being moral.  Yes if your boss dies you may end up in his corner office but that does not mean killing him is less immoral.  We should be motivated to do good for the sake of doing good.   So to say some ulterior motives are a good pragmatic reason to say something is moral seems contrary to our fundamental understanding of how morality works.

 

The moral person does not act morally solely because doing so will help her pursue other goals.  To be sure the same act might be moral and it may help us achieve other goals.  But that is a coincidence that can go either way.  Sometimes acting morally can defeat those other goals but we still should act morally.   Morality is the end itself it is not the means to an end.

 

Thus in the end I think Divine Command theory as well as Subjectivism and other anti-realist views of morality generally will have difficulty explaining any sort of “good reason” to believe something is moral.   The whole anti-realism view rules what we normally think of as good theoretical reasons to believe and the combination of core concepts of “anti-realism” and “morality” also rules out the possibility that there are any good pragmatic reasons to believe a moral claim.   Thus the very notion of an anti-realist having a “good reason” to believe a moral claim is ruled out.

Sam Harris Worst Possible Misery for Everyone

In essence, Sam Harris says the worst possible misery for everyone is bad – actually the worst.  He also says suffering involves brain states and we can study brain states and learn how to avoid this.  And he seems to think this is really all we need to know and we can then scientifically establish the most moral world.       This may seem straight forward and fits well with his view of morality.  But here I would like to show how his view is drastically different than our traditional view of morality good and evil/ right and wrong.

Here is a link where he states part of the above:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nvg_V_Lv_oI

(Start about 2:15)

 

First note that although the WPME  is ”bad” it is not necessarily immoral.  That is it is not necessarily morally bad.    Natural disasters can cause horrendous suffering but we don’t normally say hurricanes are immoral.  It is only when a human makes a deliberate action that we normally say something is immoral.   Sam Harris seems to make no distinction.  This may not be an oversight bur rather due to his atypical view on free will and determinism.    To the extent an entity  has no choice in what happens we typically do not assign blame.  An event from my childhood sort of stuck with me and illustrates this point.

 

When I was a kid I would play sports with lots of different kids in my neighborhood.   I remember I was playing basketball with a sheltered neighbor who clearly didn’t understand the double dribble rule.  He would dribble grab the ball with both hands and then dribble the other way.  But that is not the most memorable part of that game.  At one point he shot and the ball, it bounced off the bottom of the rim, and immediately hit him in the face. The boy was upset and he ran after the basketball and yelled “bad basketball!” and smacked the ball with his hand.  At that point even as a child I knew his ignorance was more profound than those concerning the rules of basketball.

 

Why is blaming the basketball odd?  One big reason is that the ball has no will and so it did not willingly hit the boy in the face.  It wasn’t morally bad even though it may have caused the boy some pain/misery.  Determinists may have some problems explaining how people are not just like that basketball with no will being jostled around by outside forces.

 

Obviously, this is a big difference in how many Christians view morality as opposed to atheists like Harris. (although certainly some Christian thinkers have famously rejected free will as well – eg. Martin Luther).   Now atheists either agree with Harris on determinism or they do not.  I’m not going to try to address all the problems determinism causes for morality here and so I focus on the latter group.

 

If they don’t agree then they almost certainly would agree that horrible suffering can happen even though nothing morally bad happened at all.  So although they would agree that the worst suffering for everyone is bad it would not be at all clear that it is morally bad.    To establish immorality we would want to see some sort of intentionality – or mens rea as I discussed in my last blog.   Those who reject determinism are typically not going to be inclined to say suffering caused by inanimate entities involves immorality.   So that is one problem but it leads to another related problem for Harris.  We usually think that getting enjoyment from other peoples suffering is itself morally bad.  But this seems to  directly contradict his most fundamental statement.

 

Consider, the possibility that everyone but one sadistic dishonest person is in this worst misery.  Pick your Nazi to be this person (Ill choose Himmler) and imagine this person is really quite happy because by his deception he caused everyone to be in this most horrendous misery possible.  He could have very easily made it so we could all be happy including himself but he made certain deliberate choices to put the rest of us all in misery.  But he does get sadistic pleasure from knowing his own deception lead to all of our misery and his brain scan would prove this pleasure.  Are we really making moral progress?   It seems Harris is committed to the view that the holocaust wasn’t so bad since Himmler liked it. I think adding Himmler and his pleasure at how his deception made us miserable makes it morally worse.   Harris might say “I don’t know what I am talking about.”  But that is hardly convincing to someone who thinks this through.   I gave another problem for people with this utilitarian view of morality based on misery versus pleasure here:

https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/12/19/a-moral-hypothetical/

 

What do I think Harris is missing?  I think he is failing to understand that reason things are morally bad is due to our decisions.  Lots of people might die in a hurricane and that is bad.  But it is not morally bad that they die.  Things get morally bad when we willfully take actions that are evil.  It is certainly distressing and sad to see hundreds of corpses old and young alike after a natural disaster but there is no moral outrage and revulsion that we have when we see what happened in the holocaust.    We don’t yell at the hurricane “how could you?”  But we do yell that at the Nazis.

 

What is this all about?  It is based on the idea that we as humans have a right and wrong way to act.  That is we have purposes in our life and the holocaust was against that purpose and violated our nature.  That nature is best understood by understanding that God gave us life and God made us in his image and so we have no right to take that life.

 

But before we leave this topic I will at least touch on yet another problem with his reasoning.

He says the only assumption we need to make is that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad.  Is that the only assumption we need to make? Can we actually move on from there to anything worthwhile?   It is sort of like saying the worst imaginable soccer team is so bad that every single time the ball is touched by either team it results in a goal against us.   So as a coach that is the only assumption we need to make and then we can move on from there.  I’m not sure how that really gets us anywhere on how to play soccer.  Avoiding that situation at all costs might mean we don’t actually win we just keep everyone on defense.  If there is no afterlife killing every conscious being would seem the surest way to avoid his bad situation where everyone is in the worse misery imaginable.  But does saying it is bad to for everyone to be in the worst misery imaginable really tell us much of anything useful at all about morality?   It seems precious little.   Many more assumptions are needed.

 

I mean most people understand that to love someone is to make yourself vulnerable to pain.  To develop a trusting relationship means you are making yourself open to the pain of betrayal.  So do we avoid this worst situation by being as unfeeling as possible? Being unfeeling will certainly help us avoid the worst imaginable misery right?   But does morality call us to do more?  Of course it does.

 

So I think his worst possible misery scenario is both incorrect and unhelpful.

 

Mens Rea and Moral Realism

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In my blog I try to use terms in a way that fairly closely tracks with how philosophers in meta-ethics use the terms.  I want the readers of this blog to be able to join in the conversation.  Thus one of my earlier blogs sets out to explain what I still consider the basic 4 meta-ethical beliefs as understood by most philosophers.

The way I use terms there and elsewhere in my blog  will be in agreement with what I consider main stream meta-ethicist’s like Russ Shaefer Landau, who among other things is the founder and editor of the periodical Oxford Studies in Metaethics,  and Richard Joyce whose clear writings on meta-ethics has likely lead to Stanford wanting him to author several articles in their online encyclopedia regarding meta-ethics.

But often times the edges of these philosophical terms can get a bit frayed.  This is the nature of philosophy.  The issue I want to discuss here is one that I find often causes some confusion regarding the moral realist position.  To quote Richard Joyce

“Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists in a mind-independent manner (in the relevant sense of “mind-independence”)”

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/

I want to discuss that issue of the “relevant sense of ‘mind independence’” and suggest that some legal terms may actually help us understand what “the relevant sense” is.  Joyce briefly discusses this issue in the above article and I agree with what he says, but I also think using some legal terms can help people understand the issue.    So lets introduce the problem by considering two cases:

Case 1) During a play someone thought they were firing blanks when they aimed a gun and fired at an innocent person. But there were real bullets in the gun and the innocent person died.

Case 2) During a play a person believed there were real bullets in the gun and there were real bullets in the gun. The person shot an innocent person intentionally causing her death.

Certainly, we draw moral distinctions between situation 1 and situation 2.  In the law we traditionally call this mens rea. Which can be translated from the Latin as “guilty mind.”  Traditionally in order to be culpable of a crime we need to prove two things, Actus Reus (a guilty act) and Mens Rea (guilty mind).

“Actus Reus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea”  “The act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intent.”

http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/A/ActusReusNonFacitReumNisiMensSitRea.aspx

Now this common sense position is something moral realists certainly can agree with.  Certainly Christian moral realists would take this view.   Moral realists who reject free will  (like Sam Harris)  may have some difficulty here, but that is for a different blog.  For now I want to discuss how a moral realist can believe an accident is not as culpable/immoral as intentional actions.

However, we should recognize that these cases do demonstrate the morality of an action is not completely mind independent – in all senses.    So the mind of the person committing the action being considered moral (or not) can be relevant to the question of whether it is moral or not moral.  Then in what sense is the morality of the action a mind independent fact?

Consider that the state of mind of the person who did the shooting was itself a fact.  If the after the second case occurred the shooter said “at the time I fired I believed the gun had blanks in it.”  His statement about his belief would be factually incorrect.   He did believe it had real bullets and he is likely lying about what he believed at the time.   It would still be factually incorrect if he later somehow really came to believe he always believed they were blanks – say through a brain injury or however.  Even if everyone believed that at the time of the murder he thought the gun had blanks – it would not change the fact that he did believe they were real bullets and he did intentionally kill the person.  In the second scenario he believed the gun had real bullets and that is an objective fact that will not change depending on people’s later points of view.  The fact that he knew there were real bullets in the gun and he intended to kill the victim are a relevant facts in our consideration of whether his action was in fact immoral.

Let me introduce two more legal terms that I think can help clarify this matter.  One is called the “totality of circumstances” and the other is “all relevant facts.”   These terms help us to envision a set of facts as they occurred in history.   Here the actor’s state of mind (mens rea) is a relevant fact that makes up part of the totality of circumstances that should be considered when we decide if action was moral or not.  But once the totality of circumstances relevant to the question of morality is established the moral realist would say they determine whether the action was moral or not and our opinions no longer effect the truth of the matter.

Can moral realists have disputes about what is a relevant fact?  Yes.  Do you have all of the relevant facts that would make up the totality of circumstances necessary to answer whether something is moral or not?  Sometimes.  I would point out that morality is very much like tallness.  We tend to acknowledge that somethings are more evil or good than others.  Nevertheless, I doubt we as humans ever have the full knowledge we need to accurately determine the exact culpability of any action.  How immoral is someone who kills someone due to an accident while negligently driving a car while drunk?  Is it more immoral than when someone negligently drives drunk but luckily makes it home without killing anyone?  Etc.   A moral realist may not be able to fully sort out the exact degree of moral culpability here but they can still say the person who deliberately ran an innocent person over with their car is likely more culpable.    Of course, this does not mean I am not a moral realist just like the fact that I can not say exactly how many millimeters tall my grandfather was at the time he died means I do not think he was a certain height at the time he died.   And, of course, it doesn’t mean he was as many millimeters tall as we decide he was by virtue of our deciding that.

So in sum, when we consider all the relevant facts in the totality of circumstances, we can try to judge whether an action is immoral (or not) but we do not think our judgement after the event actually effects whether the action was in fact moral.   No persons after the fact judgments will ever effect whether an action was in fact moral or not at the time it occurred.  Unlike the subjectivist the moral realist thinks these “after the fact” judgments are irrelevant to the truth.

Now let’s talk about what are the “relevant facts.”   Of course, there are many disagreements here.  But one in particular really ties in with this topic.  Is it relevant that the person really thought he was acting morally?  So lets say a person really thought there was nothing wrong with owning slaves, or bestiality etc.  Lots of times people are mistaken about the morality of their actions.  Does this influence the morality/culpability of their actions?  In a sense it would seem that a moral realist could not agree to this, as it would seem to directly contradict his view that whether something is moral or not is independent of our or anyone’s beliefs about it being moral.  But I think the moral realist can even say the actor’s beliefs about whether he or she is acting morally can effect their culpability.

How can I do this and maintain my moral realism?  By explaining that at least arguably that would be part of the mens rea.  And as part of the mens rea it is a relevant fact in the totality of circumstances considered.    But, of course, our after the fact views of the morality of the situation is not part of the mens rea. (assuming we had nothing to do with the actions)  So it is not the case that the beliefs of anyone trying to judge the situation is a relevant fact.  For the subjectivist the key to what is moral is what does a certain person or group doing the judging think.

Moreover just because the person who committed the crime thought it was moral at the time, that does not mean it was moral.    That would not be a view a moral realist could hold IMO.  Rather the moral realist believes that given all the relevant facts, including whatever the mens rea of the person was at the time, an action was either moral or not.  An acter’s view of what was moral or immoral at the time can influence how immoral their action was but it is certainly not always dispositive.

To be sure I think there can be a bit more argument along this extreme edge of understanding what moral realism means.  But hopefully, this blog helped explain the basics of  “relevant sense of mind-independence” for those who are new to the subject.  A moral realist can properly account for mens rea, without buying into a moral subjectivism by believing that morality is entirely determined by the judgements of some person or group.

Sam Harris and Fundamental Beliefs

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I listened to a podcast recently by Sam Harris.

 

https://samharris.org/podcasts/108702/

 

As some of you may know arguments might be sound but that does not mean they prove anything to anyone.    Why?  Because people might not believe the premises.   I blogged about the difference between a proof and sound argument here:

 

https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/11/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-gods-existence-proven/

 

The limitations on these premises presents the questions what are our ultimate goals or beliefs?  This was somewhat explored in that podcast starting around 50 minutes in.   Rebecca Goldstein I think correctly identifies some beliefs that we can’t give up without becoming incoherent – such as belief in the rules of logic.  But beyond that what fundamental beliefs would she hold?

 

She mentions belief in an external world and the laws of nature.   That was interesting to me because I have considered that one myself and rejected as not as important as the belief that a rational person can reliably find out what I am supposed to do in life.    I want to explore why I think that here.

 

They also mentioned belief in moral realism as one that is fairly fundamental.   I think this sort of belief is what religious people will often adopt.  I think non-religious people will often try to reduce the importance of morality in forming our beliefs.  I think that is error.

There is a motivational aspect as to how we shape our beliefs and consciences.     I would offer two noble goals in what we want our beliefs to be:

1) People want to believe what is true

2) People want to believe things that lead them to do the right thing

Both of these are noble motivations.  And we obviously should try to form our beliefs with both of these in mind.  But what if certain beliefs lead you to the conclusion there is no right way to act?  That is certain beliefs lead you to believe what is wrong is not wrong because nothing is wrong?  Does a rational person have a good reason to reject that belief?   I think they do.

Now that might violate the first noble motivation.  But let’s think about that motivation just a bit and I think we will see it really is subservient to the second.

The idea that we are here to fill our heads with true beliefs and expunge false beliefs is odd.  If I just tried to memorize phone books few people would say that was really a good way to fill my head, or spend my time, even if I could fill my head with billions of true beliefs that way.    We all understand that knowing certain facts are more important than knowing others.  Just like some false beliefs are more problematic than other false beliefs.

 

But why?  Believing any true fact seems to fit the first noble purpose.   If it is a known fact then it has the quality of being true just as much as any other fact.   So why is it that truly believing some facts are more important, and why does it seem correctly believing other facts is extremely unimportant?   To the extent all the beliefs accord with reality, they are all true, and it is not as though some are “truer” than others.   So it is not the extent of “truthiness” that explains this.

I think ultimately the answer is that believing some facts leads us to live a good life and some falsehoods lead us to a bad life.   And I think this shows the second purpose is naturally more important.

What about some beliefs about morals being more important than other beliefs about morals?   Someone may view it as immoral to hunt deer.  The same person might also think it is immoral to round people up and kill them as was done in Poland at various times.   We do not treat the belief about hunting deer as important as the belief about killing people.  What explains this?  Again the person might believe both are immoral.  But the difference is the latter is more immoral.  So it is still the morality of the issue that makes us view the second belief as more important.  This I believe fairly clearly shows that morality is the more important goal that we want from our beliefs.

 

I think religious people tend to know this truth.  Certain atheists sometimes seem to miss it.  But then after they discuss their science, they tend to drift over to issues of morality and what we should be doing.   Science is great and it answers many interesting questions.  But having true beliefs about “what is” in the observable scientific realm, is not as important as knowing what we should do.  It is forever stuck with a supporting role to the star philosophical/religious question of what we should do.

 

 

Faith defined

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What does Faith mean?   Of course many people say “faith” is the same thing as what I would call “blind faith.”  Believing something with no evidence or even despite of the evidence to the contrary.  As a Christian we want to know what God wants us to do when he says we should “have faith” or “believe”.  So I have investigated what the New Testament authors/Holy Spirit would have meant by “faith” when they enjoin us to believe and/or have faith.   The conclusion I have reached is a fairly straightforward definition.  Faith is belief and trust in God.   It might be blind faith but that is not the expected variety of faith.  In acts we see Paul would normally reason with people to try to help them become Christian.

As was his custom, Paul went into the synagogue, and on three Sabbath days he reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and proving that the Messiah had to suffer and rise from the dead. “This Jesus I am proclaiming to you is the Messiah,” he said. Some of the Jews were persuaded and joined Paul and Silas, as did a large number of God-fearing Greeks and quite a few prominent women.” (emphasis added)

Acts 17, 2-4

Of course, there are places where it appears Paul worked miracles and people gained faith through witness of those miracles.  Which, of course, seems a perfectly rational way to gain faith and would likely be more convincing.  But as the above passage states his “custom” was to spread the faith through reason.

 

Why is there this misunderstanding of faith?   Well there are various reasons.  Obviously Christian detractors would like to label everyone of faith as being irrational so their motivation can be obvious.  But that clearly is not even close to the whole story.  Although most early church fathers and apostles were in favor or reason, some early church fathers emphasized a sort of rejection of reason such as Tertullian.  During the protestant reformation protestant churches seemed to take a hard turn against faith and reason coexisting.  Eg.,  Martin Luther “Faith must trample underfoot all reason, sense, and understanding,…”  Calvin seemed to have them operating as two completely different types of belief.  The Catholic Church has clearly emphasized that they work together and are never in conflict.  Pope John Paul II even described them as two wings for the human spirit.  It is obvious that certain evangelical faiths also want to embrace reason.

 

But lets get to scripture and what was meant.  The word that was translated as “faith” in Paul’s writing is the Greek word “Pistis”.   The word “believe” in John’s Gospel is the word Greek word  pisteuō.” I don’t intend to dive into that too much here but it is worth noting that these words had meanings and were not completely made up when the new testament was written.

 

Now I would like to look at scripture and address one interpretation that of a verse that I think is the most often cited by those who would claim Faith is irrational.  It comes from Hebrews 11:

“Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” King James version.

 

No doubt this is a rather odd wording.  And if we just examine this phrase without the context it may lead people to think the author is saying our belief itself is the evidence for our belief in God.  But in context I think it is pretty clear (albeit still admitting the passage could be more clear) that the author is saying that the faith of the people who came before, and Gods treatment of them, is evidence for us.   To understand my point ask yourself “whose faith?” is the author referring to?  If you read the entire chapter you will see he is referring to the faith of the ancient Jews and describing how they were rewarded by God.  The fact that God was trustworthy to them is evidence that he will be trustworthy for us.

 

The overall tenure of the Hebrews seems to be one of a spiritual pep talk.    In Chapter 11 the author explains how many of the earlier Jews were rewarded by God by taking his word.  Moses, Abraham, Elijah etc.  These people all had faith in God and were rewarded.  Accordingly their faith is evidence for us that God is and God can be trusted.  This is actually quite reasonable.  If someone has proven to be trustworthy time and again and several people trust (have faith in) that person, well their trust is evidence for us.  The author makes this explicit when he says:

“Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, let us throw off everything that hinders and the sin that so easily entangles. And let us run with perseverance the race marked out for us,  fixing our eyes on Jesus, the pioneer and perfecter of faith. For the joy set before him he endured the cross, scorning its shame, and sat down at the right hand of the throne of God.  Consider him who endured such opposition from sinners, so that you will not grow weary and lose heart.”  Hebrews 12.

 

Relying on the witnesses that God is trustworthy is not unreasonable and relying on witnesses is not believing with no evidence.

 

But what about my definition.  Well that definition is actually in Hebrews as well.  We see the two elements (belief and trust in God) spelled out in Hebrews 11 verse 6.

“But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.”

 

So the author identifies two beliefs both of which must be held in order to have faith.  1. “that he (God) is” and 2. “that he (God) is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.”    If you believe in God and diligently seek him,  I think this is tantamount to saying you believe he exists and trust him.

The Conjunction Fallacy and the Burden of Proof

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As you know I think the philosophical burden of proof is a notion harmful to clear thinking.  My first post about it was here.  And here is a blog from someone who thinks very much the same way.  Here I will try to score some further points by undercutting common arguments used to support the view that having a burden of proof is helpful.

 

But first some background, what is the conjunction fallacy? Consider this example from Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman copied from Wikipedia:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Which is more probable?

1) Linda is a bank teller.
2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”

If you thought 2 was more probable, then you committed this fallacy.  It is a formal fallacy.  And it basically says that the probability of A+B will always lower or equal than the probability of A. As we add conditions the probability can only go down never up.

Why is this tricky to some people? (apparently most people chose option 2) Given the description of Linda many people might think she sounds like a feminist. Moreover, she does not sound like a bank teller. So the first option seems to only have what people think is unlikely.  Even though second option has what seems unlikely it also has what seem likely too. So the second option may seem preferable. But mathematically the second option will never be more likely than the first, because every time the second option holds true the first does as well.

When we add details to a claim the probability tends to drop. The probability that I am in front of my computer now, is greater than the probability that I am now in front of my computer wearing a shirt, which is greater then the probability that I am now in front of my computer wearing a brown shirt. This is just how logic works.  I think many of us know this and build this into our understanding of the world. So what does this have to do with the burden of proof?

If you go to youtube and type in burden of proof the first video to come up will be this one:

Listen to the first 20 seconds.
What is happening?  Well if you notice the person is not just asking whether “something” exists “in space” that we don’t have evidence of and whether we should believe that. Which I tend to think is true. But how would that help his case for “the burden of proof”? Of course it wouldn’t.

So he doesn’t just ask whether a general thing exists.   Instead he gets absurdly detailed with his description.  It is not something we don’t know about somewhere in space but under the surface of Pluto! And it is not just “something” its not even just some form of life, but a walrus. And of course even that is not enough. It is a “tiny” “were” walrus. But not only that it is a “psychic” tiny “wer”walrus. But no only that it is a tiny psychic werewalrus that “sends them psychic messages.” But not only that the messages come “every midnight.” And not only that but it does this while juggling skulls…..

 

Ok. So by now if you understand the conjunction fallacy  then you will know that amount of detail alone will drastically drive down the probability. There is no need to appeal any “burden of proof” to not believe in this creature. The probability is naturally driven down just by understanding the fallacy of conjunction.

It’s amazing that this video received 13,000 likes when it is really just an obvious play on this formal fallacy. Now if you are like me you will see this quite often from atheists. The other day when I said there is no philosophical burden of proof I was asked whether I believe “that there is an imperceptible penguin named “Percival” standing right across the room from me, wearing his imperceptible tuxedo and his imperceptible monocle and his imperceptible derby hat, holding his imperceptible pocket-watch.”

Now I want to point out that the proponents of a burden of proof who use these examples are not themselves committing the conjunction fallacy. But rather they just seem oblivious to its logic. It is the logic that makes the conjunction fallacy a formal fallacy that makes the probability of their examples quite low. So when you see these examples the response is not that they are committing a fallacy. Rather the response is more like yes the conjunction fallacy is indeed a fallacy so the probability of your extremely detailed scenario is low.

If you express doubts about “the philosophical burden of proof” you can expect this sort of thing. They won’t ask whether you can believe there is something somewhere we do not have evidence for. No, they will not even ask whether there is some species of life we have no evidence of yet. Rather they will ask about a particular horse that we have no evidence of. But not just a horse, but a horned horse, but not just a horned horse, but a horned horse with exactly one straight long horn coming out of its head. And often even that won’t be enough the horned horse will have to be pink.

And you might respond explaining this fallacy and ask them whether they believe there is something somewhere he/she does not yet have evidence of. I certainly believe there are things that exist that I have no evidence of. For example there very well may be a particular cricket in the southwest United States that I have no evidence of.

Which brings me to another point here. There is more than just the conjunction fallacy at work here. There are also background beliefs. There are probably crickets in the southwest United States. But when and how did a walrus get to Pluto? (forget the whole juggling psychic were bit)

Perhaps the classic example of this sort of argument is Russel’s Teapot. Russel said:
“ … nobody can prove that there is not between the Earth and Mars a china teapot revolving in an elliptical orbit, but nobody thinks this sufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice. I think the Christian God just as unlikely.”

So again, its not just something in space we don’t have evidence of.  It is something between the Earth and Mars and revolving in an elliptical orbit. It is not just something but a piece of China. And it is not just China but a China teapot. So we can see the logic of  conjunction fallacy at work reducing the probability.

But we also have background beliefs and evidence at work as well. Plantinga wrote:
“Clearly we have a great deal of evidence against teapotism. For example, as far as we know, the only way a teapot could have gotten into orbit around the sun would be if some country with sufficiently developed space-shot capabilities had shot this pot into orbit. No country with such capabilities is sufficiently frivolous to waste its resources by trying to send a teapot into orbit. Furthermore, if some country had done so, it would have been all over the news; we would certainly have heard about it. But we haven’t. And so on. There is plenty of evidence against teapotism.”

Another example might be if I say if we randomly pick a house in a New York suburb will there be three black horses in the Garage? You might say no. One reason would be conjunction fallacy. But also you would have back ground beliefs about what suburban houses likely have in their garage. If I asked does that house have light fixtures in it, well then you might say yes.

So Plantinga brings up evidence. And I think that may be a good way to describe what he is doing. But sometimes there are things that just don’t accord with our background beliefs. Now maybe these background beliefs are rational maybe they are not. Sometimes it may be difficult to completely understand or articulate why a certain claim seems true or untrue. Is there something beyond the known universe? In any case we have far more beliefs than we may even consciously realize.

For example, I never realized I believe plaid cats do not exist until last month. But I suppose I always believed it. (that is I was inclined to act in a way that accorded with the statement “there are no plaid cats”) This may be a sad fact of this kluge we call our brains. But it does not justify erecting some imagined burden of proof.  That is just piling error on top of error. When we consider 1) our background beliefs, 2) evidence and 3) the logic of the conjunction fallacy there is no reason to appeal to the burden of proof.

If you are so inclined I would love it if people would post a link to this blog in the comments of the above youtube video. Perhaps we can get a discussion going and deepen everyone’s understanding of this issue.

What is the Law on these Political Issues?

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There is no law against “collusion” unless you are talking about anti-trust issues between corporations.  Basically what we are really looking for is whether there was a “conspiracy.”  Conspiracy is best understood simply as an agreement to commit a crime.

If Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump “conspired” then they must have agreed with another person to have a crime committed.    For Trump one crime might be to have hacked the DNC computers.  But it does not appear he was really involved in the actual hacking of those computers.

 

However, there is a quite broad statute preventing foreign nationals from contributing or donating anything of value to a campaign.  52 usc 30121:

 

§30121. Contributions and donations by foreign nationals

(a) Prohibition

It shall be unlawful for—

(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make—

(A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election;

(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; or

(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 30104(f)(3) of this title); or

(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national.

(b) “Foreign national” defined

As used in this section, the term “foreign national” means—

(1) a foreign principal, as such term is defined by section 611(b) of title 22, except that the term “foreign national” shall not include any individual who is a citizen of the United States; or

(2) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in section 1101(a)(22) of title 8) and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined by section 1101(a)(20) of title 8.

 

 

 

So right off the bat we can see that section 1 is extremely broad.  Honestly I am not sure this is healthy for a free society.  And would invite comments in that regard.

 

Here is 2 usc 441e

§441e. Contributions by foreign nationals

(a) It shall be unlawful for a foreign national directly or through any other person to make any contribution of money or other thing of value, or to promise expressly or impliedly to make any such contribution, in connection with an election to any political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for any political office; or for any person to solicit, accept, or receive any such contribution from a foreign national.

(b) As used in this section, the term “foreign national” means—

(1) a foreign principal, as such term is defined by section 611(b) of title 22, except that the term “foreign national” shall not include any individual who is a citizen of the United States; or

(2) an individual who is not a citizen of the United States and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined by section 1101(a)(20) of title 8.

(Pub. L. 92–225, title III, §319, formerly §324, as added Pub. L. 94–283, title I, §112(2), May 11, 1976, 90 Stat. 493; renumbered §319, Pub. L. 96–187, title I, §105(5), Jan. 8, 1980, 93 Stat. 1354.)

 

Regulations go into more detail on these terms specifically regulation

11 CFR 110.20

  1. Definitions.For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

    1. 1.Disbursement has the same meaning as in 11 CFR 300.2(d).

    2. 2.Donation has the same meaning as in 11 CFR 300.2(e).

    3. 3.Foreign national means—

      1. i.A foreign principal, as defined in 22 U.S.C. 611(b); or

      2. ii.An individual who is not a citizen of the United States and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20); however,

      3. iii.Foreign nationalshall not include any individual who is a citizen of the United States, or who is a national of the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22).

    4. 4.Knowingly means that a person must:

      1. i.Have actual knowledge that the source of the funds solicited, accepted or received is a foreign national;

      2. ii.Be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there is a substantial probability that the source of the funds solicited, accepted or received is a foreign national; or

      3. iii.Be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to inquire whether the source of the funds solicited, accepted or received is a foreign national, but the person failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.

    5. 5.For purposes of paragraph (a)(4) of this section, pertinent facts include, but are not limited to:

      1. i.The contributor or donor uses a foreign passport or passport number for identification purposes;

      2. ii.The contributor or donor provides a foreign address;

      3. iii.The contributor or donor makes a contribution or donation by means of a check or other written instrument drawn on a foreign bank or by a wire transfer from a foreign bank; or

      4. iv.The contributor or donor resides abroad.

    6. 6.Solicit has the same meaning as in 11 CFR 300.2(m).

    7. 7.SAFE HARBOR.For purposes of paragraph (a)(4)(iii) of this section, a person shall be deemed to have conducted a reasonable inquiry if he or she seeks and obtains copies of current and valid U.S. passport papers for U.S. citizens who are contributors or donors described in paragraphs (a)(5)(i) through (iv) of this section. No person may rely on this safe harbor if he or she has actual knowledge that the source of the funds solicited, accepted, or received is a foreign national.

  2. b.Contributions and donations by foreign nationals in connection with elections.A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make a contribution or a donation of money or other thing of value, or expressly or impliedly promise to make a contribution or a donation, in connection with any Federal, State, or local election.

  3. c.Contributions and donations by foreign nationals to political committees and organizations of political parties.A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make a contribution or donation to:

    1. 1.A political committee of a political party, including a national party committee, a national congressional campaign committee, or a State, district, or local party committee, including a non-Federal account of a State, district, or local party committee, or

    2. 2.An organization of a political party whether or not the organization is a political committee under 11 CFR 100.5.

  4. d.Contributions and donations by foreign nationals for office buildings.A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party for the purchase or construction of an office building. See 11 CFR 300.10 and 300.35.

  5. e.Disbursements by foreign nationals for electioneering communications.A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make any disbursement for an electioneering communication as defined in 11 CFR 100.29.

  6. f.Expenditures, independent expenditures, or disbursements by foreign nationals in connection with elections.A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make any expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement in connection with any Federal, State, or local election.

  7. g.Solicitation, acceptance, or receipt of contributions and donations from foreign nationals.No person shall knowingly solicit, accept, or receive from a foreign national any contribution or donation prohibited by paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section.

  8. h.Providing substantial assistance.

    1. 1.No person shall knowingly provide substantial assistance in the solicitation, making, acceptance, or receipt of a contribution or donation prohibited by paragraphs (b) through (d), and (g) of this section.

    2. 2.No person shall knowingly provide substantial assistance in the making of an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement prohibited by paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.

  9. i.Participation by foreign nationals in decisions involving election-related activities.A foreign national shall not direct, dictate, control, or directly or indirectly participate in the decision-making process of any person, such as a corporation, labor organization, political committee, or political organization with regard to such person’s Federal or non-Federal election-related activities, such as decisions concerning the making of contributions, donations, expenditures, or disbursements in connection with elections for any Federal, State, or local office or decisions concerning the administration of a political committee.

  10. j.Donations by foreign nationals to inaugural committees.A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make a donation to an inaugural committee, as defined in 11 CFR 104.21(a)(1). No person shall knowingly accept from a foreign national any donation to an inaugural committee.

 

So we have two main cases that seem relevant at this point.  The dirt on Hillary that “the Russians” may have offered to Trump.  And the dirt that on Trump that Steele, a foreign national, seems to have delivered to Clinton.

 

Now lets assume the dirt against an opponent is a “thing of value”  Again if this is a faulty assumption then please express that in the comment section.   If so then getting dirt from a foreign national is a crime.  Now was there an agreement to get this from a foreign national in either case?

 

In the case of Clinton it seems there was.   At least Fusion GPS seemed to hire Steele a foreign national for this very purpose.  Did Clinton know they were doing this?  Well that would need to be established.

Now what about Trump?

So this might revolve around promises from different Russians to different people in the Trump campaign.  For example the leads that George Papadopoulos seemed to be pursuing. And perhaps even what Trump Junior was up to.

 

It seems that no dirt was ever delivered in either case.  But there still may have been an agreement to deliver dirt.   Was the dirt a thing a value?  Well normally we would say yes.  But here since no dirt was actually delivered we don’t even know what the dirt was.  So it seems quite a few more dots need connecting against Trump at this point.

 

 

 

In Support of Religious Extremism

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No I don’t want to be violent.  And of course, there is no logical reason to think religious extremism means violence.

Many in religious orders give away everything they own and dedicate their lives to Christ including an oath of celibacy.  That’s extreme.   Some monks and sisters dedicate their lives to prayer, and some even take a vow of silence.  That’s extreme.  Those many martyrs present and past could avoid death by simply saying words that would run counter to their religion.  That’s Extreme.   People like Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., chose to be arrested and put their lives in jeopardy in order to act as they believed their religion required.  (Anyone who thinks his actions were not religiously motivated should listen to A Knock at Midnight.)   What about Jainism?  Some practitioners are so non-violent that they were a mask so as not to kill any bugs through breathing and sweep the floor before they walk so as not to tread on any insects.   All of this is extreme religion and has nothing to do with violence.   I could go on with examples but hopefully by now you can see that it is odd to equate religious extremism with violence.

 

So why has our language developed as if “religious extremism” is violent when obviously this does not fit?  There are at least two reasons.

 

  • It diverts attention away from Islam for the violence perpetrated in it’s name.
  • It sends the message that religion is fine just don’t take it too seriously.

Of course, these goals fit well with different agendas people have.  What’s my point?  My point is mainly that people recognize how language is being manipulated.  Hopefully, now when you read my title you will have a different and truer impression of what I am saying.

 

Finally, I will say that this post was inspired by a you tube video by Sam Harris.  Yes, I have been critical of him in many places but I think he made a good point here.

Scientific Imperialism:  What is a “fact”?

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I was listening to a BBC report on “The March for Science.”  And I was wondering what message they were trying to convey.  It apparently had a tie in with “earth day” and global warming.  But anyway one of the people interviewed by the BBC said that to them an important message was that a “fact” is something that is verifiable and testable.  Now I have heard this definition by quite a few others who might say it is verifiable by observation etc.   So I thought I would address the problems with that definition in this blog.

Now this may be the way scientists view what a “fact” is but I would say that is a change from what it traditionally means.   Moreover, I think adopting that definition in a more general sense means all facts are scientific facts.  And that is problematic.  I would point out that I have nothing against science and indeed I always had a higher aptitude for science than any other subject.  But I admit being somewhat annoyed by scientists who seem to know nothing other than science telling the world how everything should be.  Science is not the answer to every question.

Now before we go into analyzing her definition. (I will call it the “scientific definition” for simplicity sake).  I would like to give some idea as to a traditional and legal definition of a fact.  So for just a dictionary definition we can see this:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fact

The Blacks Law definition offers this:

“A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; and event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual happening in time or space or an event or mental or physical; that which has taken pace…. A fact is either a state of things, that is, an existence, or a motion , that is, an event.  The quality of being actual; actual existence or occurrence….” (citations omitted)

 

So you can see that the legal definition and the traditional definition have a focus on what actually happened or what actually is the case.  It is not dependent on whether this can be proven or verified or not.    So even if everyone agrees the evidence verifies that Martin Luther said “here I stand, I can do no other” in 1521.    If he did not actually say that then it is not a fact.   In other words facts are not dependent on what we can verify.

 

It was a fact that Jupiter had moons in 1510 just like it was a fact that Jupiter had moons in 1610 after Galileo saw them with his telescope.  If someone in 1510 said it is not a fact that Jupiter has moons, then I would say he got his facts wrong.  Because the moons were actually existing, they in fact existed.

 

To make facts dependent on verification actually makes them subjective.  This is because often what will be a proof (or verification) to one person will not be a proof or verification to another.  What is a proof will depend on what premises each of us accepts. (If you not sure on this check out my earlier blog here: https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/11/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-gods-existence-proven/?iframe=true&theme_preview=true)  But I think we all want facts to be objective.  So its unclear that she sees how badly she and others are botching the idea of a fact.

 

But I would point out another issue.  Not because I have a strong view on it, but just because I think it’s interesting.  Typically, in the law, a fact is something that is in the present or in the past.  Future events are not facts.   Some scientists want say certain theories are “facts” – like lets say gravity is a fact.  That might mean different things.  That gravity caused apples to fall in the past is a fact.  That gravity is causing my book to remain on my desk is a fact.  But that gravity will cause my book to stay on my desk tomorrow – is not a fact.  It would seem that is not a fact under any definition.  And in my opinion that is how it should be.  We can say with lots of certainty that certain things will happen in the future.  But they are not facts.

 

The bottom line with all of this is that certain scientists want people to place more importance on scientific views.  So what they co-opt language so they and only they can have “facts” on their side.  Changing what words mean to support your agenda almost always leads to more heat than light.  I like science and appreciate its method, but there is no need to butcher what words mean on its altar.