Tag Archives: epistemology

Scientific Imperialism:  What is a “fact”?

24 Monday Apr 2017

Posted by in atheism, christianity, logic, philosophy, science, Uncategorized

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I was listening to a BBC report on “The March for Science.”  And I was wondering what message they were trying to convey.  It apparently had a tie in with “earth day” and global warming.  But anyway one of the people interviewed by the BBC said that to them an important message was that a “fact” is something that is verifiable and testable.  Now I have heard this definition by quite a few others who might say it is verifiable by observation etc.   So I thought I would address the problems with that definition in this blog.

Now this may be the way scientists view what a “fact” is but I would say that is a change from what it traditionally means.   Moreover, I think adopting that definition in a more general sense means all facts are scientific facts.  And that is problematic.  I would point out that I have nothing against science and indeed I always had a higher aptitude for science than any other subject.  But I admit being somewhat annoyed by scientists who seem to know nothing other than science telling the world how everything should be.  Science is not the answer to every question.

Now before we go into analyzing her definition. (I will call it the “scientific definition” for simplicity sake).  I would like to give some idea as to a traditional and legal definition of a fact.  So for just a dictionary definition we can see this:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fact

The Blacks Law definition offers this:

“A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; and event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual happening in time or space or an event or mental or physical; that which has taken pace…. A fact is either a state of things, that is, an existence, or a motion , that is, an event.  The quality of being actual; actual existence or occurrence….” (citations omitted)

 

So you can see that the legal definition and the traditional definition have a focus on what actually happened or what actually is the case.  It is not dependent on whether this can be proven or verified or not.    So even if everyone agrees the evidence verifies that Martin Luther said “here I stand, I can do no other” in 1521.    If he did not actually say that then it is not a fact.   In other words facts are not dependent on what we can verify.

 

It was a fact that Jupiter had moons in 1510 just like it was a fact that Jupiter had moons in 1610 after Galileo saw them with his telescope.  If someone in 1510 said it is not a fact that Jupiter has moons, then I would say he got his facts wrong.  Because the moons were actually existing, they in fact existed.

 

To make facts dependent on verification actually makes them subjective.  This is because often what will be a proof (or verification) to one person will not be a proof or verification to another.  What is a proof will depend on what premises each of us accepts. (If you not sure on this check out my earlier blog here: https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/11/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-gods-existence-proven/?iframe=true&theme_preview=true)  But I think we all want facts to be objective.  So its unclear that she sees how badly she and others are botching the idea of a fact.

 

But I would point out another issue.  Not because I have a strong view on it, but just because I think it’s interesting.  Typically, in the law, a fact is something that is in the present or in the past.  Future events are not facts.   Some scientists want say certain theories are “facts” – like lets say gravity is a fact.  That might mean different things.  That gravity caused apples to fall in the past is a fact.  That gravity is causing my book to remain on my desk is a fact.  But that gravity will cause my book to stay on my desk tomorrow – is not a fact.  It would seem that is not a fact under any definition.  And in my opinion that is how it should be.  We can say with lots of certainty that certain things will happen in the future.  But they are not facts.

 

The bottom line with all of this is that certain scientists want people to place more importance on scientific views.  So what they co-opt language so they and only they can have “facts” on their side.  Changing what words mean to support your agenda almost always leads to more heat than light.  I like science and appreciate its method, but there is no need to butcher what words mean on its altar.

How Abstract Concepts can be Real

15 Wednesday Jun 2016

Posted by in atheism, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, Uncategorized

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I have noticed when I talk about abstract concepts such as morality and ask for evidence of them, I am being unclear to some. I don’t mean that morality is a physical thing somewhere that we can find like a moon orbiting Saturn. But I do mean it is real.

If I say I am taller than my daughter I am invoking an abstract concept – tallness. If I say prove tallness “exists in reality” (or provide evidence that tallness exists in reality) as opposed to our minds that might mean different things to different people. Some people would think I mean we must find an actual platonic-like form of tallness that is perfectly tall. That is not what I mean at all.

I think I “really” am taller than my daughter. That is in reality I am taller. The notion of tallness is something like, when I am standing, the highest part of my body is higher than hers (when she is standing) means I am taller than her. This tie in with reality makes the notion that I am taller than my daughter objectively true. It’s not just that I believe it is true. My belief does not make the statement true or false. Reality makes that statement true or false. That is because tallness has a tie in with reality.

Does morality have tie in with reality? If I believe something is wrong does my belief make it wrong? Or does reality determine whether my belief is true or false. The latter is what I mean when I say morality is objectively real. It is not the case that I necessarily think there is some perfectly moral good form (or perfectly evil form) somewhere that we need to find. What I am asking is 1) whether these concepts have a tie in with reality. And 2) if so, how we would know in what ways morality ties in with reality.

I think I answered the first question with respect to tallness. Yes tallness ties in with reality so we can say it is really and objectively true that I am taller than my daughter. What about the second question with respect to tallness? I think we have empirical evidence that I am really taller than my daughter. We can see me standing next to her. Even a blind person would be able to feel if we are standing, and then feel the top of my head relative to the top of her head. So we have empirical evidence of how “tallness” ties in with reality.

But what about “wrongness”? Here it seems we do not have empirical evidence.

Sure we can substitute concepts for “right and wrong” and “good and evil” and then assert that this new word is promoted by such and such conduct. But whenever I see this one of 2 things is always happening. Either they are leaving the new term so vague that it is pretty much vacuous, and thus the “definition” is vacuous. (that which makes us “thrive” or that which brings “happiness” etc.) Or they do in fact put some constraints on the definition and then I have to wonder if that is really good. I gave a hypothetical that approaches one of the latter views here: https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/12/19/a-moral-hypothetical/

In any case, I do think we can have empirical evidence of abstract ideas.  But in the case of morality the the evidence of morality is the evidence for God.  I talk more about that connection here:

https://wordpress.com/stats/insights/trueandreasonable.co

 

Emotion Reason and Truth

03 Tuesday Feb 2015

Posted by in Morality

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I had read an article a while back about the fact that political partisans mainly use emotional centers of the brain when analyzing statements and claims of various politicians. “We did not see any increased activation of the parts of the brain normally engaged during reasoning,” said Drew Westen, director of clinical psychology at Emory University. “What we saw instead was a network of emotion circuits lighting up, including circuits hypothesized to be involved in regulating emotion, and circuits known to be involved in resolving conflicts.” The title of the article states “Democrats and Republicans Both Adept at Ignoring Facts, Study Finds”

Ok this article clearly condemns these partisans when it comes to their political thinking.  The underlying assumption we all hold is that if you are using the emotional part of your brain to draw conclusions instead of the reasoning parts then your conclusions will be unreliable.     Is this just for politics?  What about science, math, religion, or morals?

Well I don’t have all the answers or really the full answer on any of them.  But I think it is quite clear when it comes to morals we say the opposite of politics.  That is when people don’t primarily use emotional centers of the brain when drawing moral conclusions their conclusions are unreliable.

Where is the evidence?  It is coming in droves thanks to the use of MRI scans of the brain.   In particular when we compare the psychopaths brain with that of normal people. There have been numerous studies of psychopaths.  Psychopaths are people who distinguish themselves in society by at times behaving horrendously immorally.   It’s not only the murders, but also the extensive lying, and lack of guilt for their actions, that help separate them out.    MRI studies have found that they lack certain emotions that normal people experience.  It is not necessarily a complete lack of emotion but it is shown to be substantially diminished in test after test. (although it does appear they can turn on these emotions when they want)

However generally as a group psychopaths do not lack any ability to reason.  In fact, they seem to use the reasoning portion of their brain more than normal people.  So for example when psychaths were compared with normal people and asked to determine the emotional state of a protagonist they both were equally able to determine that person’s emotional state.  But psychopath used reason where as normal people used more of their emotional brains.

The study stated in its abstract: “The results emphasize that although psychopathic patients show no deficits in reasoning about other people’s emotion if an explicit evaluation is demanded, they use divergent neural processing strategies that are related to more rational, outcome-oriented processes.” This article discusses this study and others.

There are other philosophers who have drawn similar conclusions: http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/Papers/PsychopathsFinal.pdf http://www.usfca.edu/fac-staff/mrvargas/Papers/VNFinal.pdf

One of the best known psychologists to draw this conclusion is Dr.  Haidt.  He published an article called “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail”, 14 years ago.  His thesis seems to be continually bolstered by later mri testing.

In the end I still maintain that reason and logic can play a part in moral decision making.   But the empirical evidence is quite overwhelming that, for most of us, we are primarily basing our moral views on emotional mechanisms.

Why is this relevant to Christianity?  Well mainly I think it is just interesting in it’s own right.  But also if you have read my other blogs you will see there is a view held by some that our moral judgments are the result of reasoning processes just like the reasoning that brings us scientific advances.   They argue that since our reasoning is a reliable mechanic to truth finding, we can rely on our “moral reasoning” for moral truth. Well as it turns out this idea of “moral reasoning” is for the most part a myth that science is debunking every day.

I would maintain that if naturalism is correct we shouldn’t think emotional responses will bring about truth beliefs in morality any more than it will bring about truth in politics.    If however, you think God wrote the moral law on our hearts, then you have a good reason to trust your moral emotions.  The fact that our moral views are driven by emotions fits quite well with Christian thought.

Pascal’s wager without God and without Hell

02 Wednesday Apr 2014

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This blog is a response to some questions posed by David W in my earlier blog. I drafted this response and decided I should put it up as a separate blog, because it covers an important point of how I am coming at these questions. 

 

 I think you will understand where I am coming from if we first drop the idea of God all together.   My strongest reasons for believing in God come out of my understanding of morality.  So you can’t really gloss over my views on morality and start asking about my reason to believe in God.  So let’s just think about morality and specifically whether the moral realist’s position is true.  For example is it a moral fact that what Hitler did to millions of Jews was evil regardless of what anyone thinks?

 

It seems the holocaust either was really wrong or it wasn’t.  Now in general I think the actual “evidence” of moral realism is pretty weak.   For example I think there is *no* empirical evidence that the moral realist view is correct.  Sure we all might see the photos of corpses or even have seen the corpses or the families of those Hitler killed directly.   Looking at this might cause us to be repulsed.  That emotional response might somehow yield a strong belief that what Hitler did was morally wrong.     I do not think strongly believing something (especially when it’s due to an emotional response) is itself evidence for what we believe.    There is no empirical indicia of wrongness that the moral realist can see, and point out to a Nihilist. 

 

A nihilist will look at the same pictures and there is no reason to think he does not experience the same emotional response of repugnance.    His emotional response would lead to him to try to prevent that sort of thing from happening.  In fact a moral nihilist might take more actions to prevent it from happening.   But if the nihilist is consistent, he would not claim he is trying to prevent the holocaust because it is morally wrong.   Why he would try to prevent is an interesting question that might have a variety of answers.  Richard Joyce is as philosophical nihilist (although he doesn’t like the term “nihilist”) who I agree with on many issues and have allot of respect for.  He has given glimpses into his views on this but never really fully explored this. 

 

But I would say though that if I were to accept the view that no one should ever believe anything unless they have empirical evidence to support it, then there is no way I could be a moral realist.  But I think rational people consider more than empirical evidence and indeed more than the probability of a belief being true when deciding whether or not to accept it.  They also consider the consequences.   

 

Let’s think this through with respect to moral realism.  I have no empirical evidence that moral realism is true.  But I also understand that it might still be true because it is really not the type of thing I would expect to have empirical evidence for.  So what to do?  Well I think there are people who would tend to say I must reject moral realism until I have evidence of it being true.  Others would say they don’t know what to make of it.  But some people would say they are going to believe it anyway.   For me I will consider the consequences of believing or not believing.   

Now moral realist’s view either corresponds with reality or it does not.   I.e., it is either a true view or a false view.  And let’s just say we either accept moral realism or we reject it.  I.e., we either believe it or we do not believe it.    

 

So ok that leaves 4 possibilities:

 

Possibility 1) We believe in moral realism but in fact it is not true.  Well then I hold a false belief.  But holding that false belief is not really morally wrong.  Why?  Because if this situation holds true then there is no real moral right or wrong.    Now it might be wrong in some peoples morality that they create in their head – ie. a relativist view.  But you know what?   I don’t really care.  That consequence has no weight for me.  Not any more than whether my actions correspond with any other sort of make believe.  So the consequences of my holding the false view that morality is objectively real is basically zero.

 

Possibility 2) What if I hold the view that moral realism is false when it really is true?   Things get a bit more sticky here.  Now my holding that false belief might have some real moral implications.  Moreover I might be inclined to not be very concerned with what might or might not be really moral.  (After all, I don’t believe in it)  This might lead me to not carefully consider the different views of what is morally right and wrong or carefully consider what basis people have for giving me their moral views.  In the end I might lead a life doing things I truly should not have done and not doing things I really should have done.   I would have lived my life wrong in a real sense.  This is basically what I am trying to avoid.  And so to the extent I am trying to avoid that then rejecting a belief in moral realism seems to be a bad way to go.

 

Possibility 3) Now what if I correctly reject moral realism.  Well then yes I would have got that one right, but it doesn’t “really” matter.  Why doesn’t it really matter?  Because if moral realism is false then nothing really matters.   So again there is no good reason to reject moral realism despite the lack of evidence. 

 

Possibility 4) So the final option is that I believe in moral realism and moral realism is true.    I think this is really the possibility that we need to focus on.    Let’s accept that there is moral realism is true.  

 

So a pascal wager like analysis leads to the conclusion that we should believe in moral realism.  But now how do we know what is really moral or not?    That is our next step as a rational person right?  If what I said earlier is true then we should believe in/accept moral realism.  But what is really moral or not moral?

 

It is only at this point that God comes in.  After careful consideration it seems to me that it is impossible that we can with any reliability believe what is moral or not, if we evolved without any supernatural guidance.   I argue why this is here. 

 

From that conclusion I do a similar analysis and conclude a rational person should believe in God here.

 

Thoughts on Pragmatic Encroachment

30 Sunday Mar 2014

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Can beliefs be justified by anything other than evidence that they are true?   I think allot of people would want to say “No” to that question at some time in their lives, myself included.  Any other justification for beliefs seems somehow wrong and intellectually dishonest.   But because

1 ) Beliefs have  a causal connection with how we act,

2)  Often we have to act on uncertainty about the actual state of affairs and

3) When rational people decide how to act based on uncertainty they must weigh the likelihood and the consequences of being right or wrong as to the state of affairs

 

it may be irrational to only consider the likelihood of being right or wrong and not considering the consequences.

In this blog I would like to offer some of my thoughts on pragmatic encroachment.   But first let’s start with some observations of the traditional definition of knowledge.

There are various ways that philosophers have tried to define what Knowledge is.  The most traditional is to say that a subject S knows a proposition P if and only if:

 

1)            S believes P,

2)            P is true,

and

3)            S has sufficient reason for believing P

 

Now the third condition might be phrased differently.  For example it might be stated as “3) S is justified in believing  p.”  Or “3) S’s belief in P is properly warranted.” [1]

As it turns out I think this 3rd conditions is ambiguous in a few respects.  One way is that we often think someone might be “justified” in believing something even when we don’t think their justification is sufficient to call that belief “knowledge.”   I might have believed the Seahawks would beat the Broncos in the Super Bowl.    That belief might have been a “justified” belief based on different things I have learned about the two teams.   Hence in that sense we can call that a “justified true belief.”  We might say my belief was a rational belief.    But I don’t think most people would say I “knew” the Seahawks would win the Super Bowl – at least not before the game started.   So we can see there is “justified true belief” and there is “justified true belief.”  The “justification” required for knowledge is greater than the “justification” needed to hold mere “justified belief.”

Notice that this ambiguity remains regardless of whether we use the formulation of “justified” belief or “sufficient reason” or “proper warrant.”  What is “sufficient reason” to rationally believe something is less than the “sufficient reason” required to know something.

 

The justification that yields knowledge is stronger than the justification that allows us to simply say we are justified in believing something.   This raises a few questions:

1)            How much justification do you need to” know” something?

2)            How much, if any, justification do you need to be “justified in believing” something?

3)            Is there any difference in the forms of justification that can relate to “knowledge” versus the forms of justification that can relate to mere “rational belief.”

 

I think those questions are bit vague, and even if clarified, somewhat difficult to answer.  But here are some thoughts.    The justification for “knowledge” might require something close to 100% certainty.  We might be inclined to say mere “rational belief” would require something like a preponderance of evidence.  That is, that it is more likely than not true.   But I think the cases presented by those who consider pragmatic encroachment shows “justification” (or “sufficient reason” or “proper warrant”) can get a bit more complicated than just looking at the certainty/probability that your belief is true.

 

Let’s consider theDeRose’s “bank cases” as set forth and explained by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath in their paper “Pragmatic Encroachment”:

Some of our intuitions about specific cases seem to support the claim that knowledge can depend on practical factors   Consider DeRose’s famous (1992) “Bank Cases”:

‘Bank Case A (Low Stakes).  My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon.  We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks.  But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons.  Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning.  My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow.  Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.”  I reply, “No, I know it’ll be open.  I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday.  It’s open until noon.”

 

Bank Case B (High Stakes).  My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines.  I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon.  But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check.  If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation.  And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday.  My wife reminds me of these facts.  She then says, “Banks do change their hours.  Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?”  Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no.  I’d better go in and make sure.” (913)’

 

It looks like Keith speaks truly in Case A in attributing knowledge to himself that the bank will be open tomorrow, while he also speaks truly in Case B in denying himself knowledge.  The only thing that changes in the two cases is how important it is for Keith to be right about whether the bank will be open tomorrow.  Therefore, it looks like how important it is for Keith to be right about whether the bank will be open tomorrow is relevant to whether Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.  And relevant in a clear way: holding fixed Keith’s evidence concerning whether the bank will be open tomorrow, whether he knows it will be open varies with variations in how important it is for him to be right about this.

But here we find some odd consequences.  If this is the proper lesson to draw from the Bank Cases, it would appear to follow that two subjects can have the same evidence concerning whether the bank will be open tomorrow, even though one of them knows it’ll open tomorrow and the other doesn’t.  ……What makes the difference in knowledge has nothing to do with these traditional factors.  In fact, one subject might have more evidence than another that the bank will be open tomorrow – be better informed, have done more checking, etc. – but because much more is at stake for the more well-informed subject, the more well-informed subject can fail to know that the bank will be open tomorrow while the less-informed subject knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.  All this is hard to swallow.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDQQFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fweb.missouri.edu%2F~mcgrathma%2Fpubs-papers%2FPragmaticEncroachment.doc&ei=UJD-UoDjCoHm2AWag4D4Ag&usg=AFQjCNGMBYTohUuRYmF0oT6BsV0dlx0gCQ&sig2=YyCPP25IPEfzLjAsoyYfIA&bvm=bv.61535280,d.b2I

 

I think these cases can illustrate few different ambiguities about what it means to “know” something or be “justified” in believing something.    The first ambiguity is the one I already mentioned.   It seems to me that having gone to a bank a few weeks back and having it be open on a Saturday is pretty good justification for the belief it will be open next Saturday.  Is it certain enough that we would say we “know” it will be open this Saturday?  I think so, but it’s getting pretty close and some might disagree.   If he went there 2 years ago we probably would say it’s not enough certainty to count as “knowing” whether it will be open this Saturday.  So I think these examples are playing on that gray area of what amount of certainty we need before we call something knowledge.    Accordingly this example tends to open the door to look at other ways Keith might or might not be “justified in believing” it is open on Saturday.

 

The bank cases clearly isolate the role of justification in our beliefs that deals not with the probability of our beliefs being true, but with the consequences of their being true or false.  Let’s consider how that is working here.

First, saying that as “the stakes” increase, better evidence is required for knowledge, is not quite what this shows.  It’s not just that “the” stakes are increased, but only certain stakes.  Specifically the stakes are increased in such a way that if he acts on his belief and he is wrong he will suffer greater consequences.

 

Consider case C (another high stakes case).  This case is just like case A as far as it goes.  It is not the case that any important checks will bounce as in case B.  There is nothing else that would cause any urgency for Keith to deposit that check before Monday.    But let’s add a few other facts that increase the stakes.   Keith is on his way to a very important interview.  He is sure he will get this job if he is on time, because a decision maker told him that everyone was so impressed with his credentials and past interview that so long as he shows up, on time, for this interview they will probably make him an offer.  This would be the offer of a lifetime.  And he is not sure with parking and the odd traffic around the bank, whether he will be on time for that interview if he stopped to deposit that check.

 

It seems to me the stakes are just as high in case C as they are in case B.  And I think we would still agree that Keith’s knowledge claim is just as valid as in case A.    So it’s not just that “the” stakes went up in Case B.  The stakes went up in a way that made his being wrong in his belief yield harsh consequences.  Case C increases the stakes concerning his belief as well but it increases the stakes in a way that reinforces acting on his belief.   Could we still say he knows the bank will be open on Saturday due to his going a few weeks ago?  What about 2 years ago?

 

Rather than get bogged down on how much certainty we need for “knowledge” I would rather explore how this second view of “justification” works with our belief.  The distinction is whether we are justified due to the probability of our belief being true or due to the consequences of our belief being true.

 

In an earlier blog I explained what a belief is so that we perhaps better understand how they might be “justified.”   I accepted that “[a belief] is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises.”  From W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian’s  book The Web of Belief.     This description helps us make sense of the bank cases.  Case B demands more “justification” to “respond” as if the bank will be open on Saturday.  The way we would “respond” if the bank is open on Saturday, is to simply drive past the bank on Friday night.   But that response is less justified if there is some doubt in our belief about the bank being open and we risk having an important check to bounce.

 

However the “response” of driving past the bank is not less justified if the stakes are raised in such a way that supports driving past the bank.  Should our “disposition to respond in certain ways” (i.e., our belief) be effected by the stakes we have for responding a certain way?  I think they should.   That is, I think our beliefs should be effected by the stakes we have for responding a certain way.

 

Some people will recoil from this.  They will think our beliefs should only be effected by the probabilities that they are true.    I think that view will usually work out ok for them.  However in certain circumstances this approach may lead to irrational behavior.  But we are skipping ahead too fast.  Let’s back up and think about a few things.

 

First in case C the inherent importance of holding a “true belief” seems to be overshadowed.  Since there is no urgency to have the check deposited on Saturday, the belief “that the bank will be open on Saturday” being true seems relatively unimportant.   Adding the fact that you might be late for a very important interview further decreases the concern whether that belief is actually true or false.  The consequences of your “responding a certain way” is determining your “disposition to respond in certain ways” as much as, if not more than, any inherent importance of holding true beliefs about bank hours.     The probabilities that the bank will actually be open on Saturday becomes relatively less important in Case C, because the decision is really hinging on the consequences of missing the interview.

When we look at the “justification for believing” that the bank is open on Saturday, in case A and C we tend to think he has more justification to than in Case B.  And clearly he does have more justification to be “disposed to respond” by driving past the bank.

 

In sum I think these cases do indeed indicate not only that the probability of our beliefs being true is not the only consideration to holding true beliefs.   In fact, I think we can see that given certain circumstances the probability of our beliefs being true can be relatively unimportant in whether we should hold them.

 

Now I think allot of what I said depends on how we understand “belief.”  Some might not agree with my analysis.  They might say that the belief is not better justified depending on the consequences.  Remember the definition “[a belief] is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises.” (emphasis mine)   They might say that the belief has the same justification regardless of the consequences, but the “appropriate issues” change leading to the action of Keith driving past the bank in Case A and C but not driving past in Case B.

 

They might argue that the belief should not be held more or less strongly dependent on the consequences but your actions should be change as the consequences change.  This seems a sensible way to view things.   If we were a computer program or robot that might be the best approach.  But sometimes I think we know we should act a certain way but our doubts about probabilities prevent us from following through.    But I wonder what people think of what I said so far so I will end here.

 

[1] “  A philosopher named Gettier provided some important counter examples to this definition which ends up being the subject of other important philosophical developments on this topic.  However, I don’t mean to address that now.  This idea of knowledge being “justified true belief” remains a sort of default view and its good enough for our purposes.

A Life of Make Believe

24 Monday Mar 2014

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I generally spend more time reading and commenting on atheist blogs than I do posting my own blogs.   Since a lack of a satisfactory morality is, to my mind, a real problem for the atheistic belief system, I frequently ask atheists what they make of morality. 

 

On one atheist’s blog, the author was comparing being Christian to be being like John Nash as portrayed in the movie A Beautiful Mind. Just like John Nash believed in people who weren’t real, he argued that Christians believed in an unreal God.   He also compared Christianity to Buzz Light Year’s belief that he was really on a mission from mission control.   The author thought he could relate to Buzz Lightyear because, when he was a Christian, he thought he was on a mission from mission control and had to face the hard realization he really was not.      The blogger was hoping that he could disabuse Christians of their “make believe” ideas.      

 

As it turns out this blogger replaced the idea of mission control, with the idea that when it comes to morality we create our own meaning.    I found this interesting.  He was trying to help people stop believing “make believe” but he thinks he “creates” his own meaning when it comes to morality, and presumably lives his life based on these creations.    It became clear to me that this author and perhaps a few people who follow his blog did not see the irony.   So I explained the difference between moral realism and relativism.  He clearly indicated he is a subjectivist.   That is, he is some who thinks right and wrong is dependent on our own view of what is right or wrong.  In other words morality is a creation of our mind – just like those imaginary people John Nash believed in.    

 

I am aware meta-ethical views and their implications are really not all that well known outside of philosophers interested in the field.   I did a brief introductory blog on it here https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/20/what-do-you-mean-im-wrong/  So I am not trying to be critical of the blogger, or any of the other commentators, defending him.  They were all pretty intelligent and reasonable people.   I think this is an important illustration of why gaining an understanding of these issues is critical if you want to discuss the reasonableness of believing in Christianity.  Here the blogger assumed we shouldn’t live our lives based on make believe.  Yet this person admitted he lives by a morality he made up.

 

Russ Shaefer-Landau said it best:

  <blockquote>“Nihilists believe that there are no moral truths.  Subjectivists believe that moral truth is created by each individual.  Relativists believe that moral truth is a social construct.  These three theories share the view that, in ethics, we make it all up. ”  </blockquote>  Page 11 Whatever Happened to Good and Evil. 

 

But don’t take his, or my word for it, think it through yourself.  If your morality is based on creating your own meaning you are indeed “making it up.”  Now there are several reasons people might not believe in God.  But if you reject belief in God because you fear God might be “made up”, it seems you would be contradicting this principle, to then accept some sort of relativist theory of morality.  Because there you know you are living your life based on make believe.  

 

In the end if a rational person really wants to keep close contact with reality then rejecting a view that might be made up for one that you know is made up seems a poor approach. 

    

What Goal are We Rationally Pursuing?

12 Wednesday Mar 2014

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It seems to me that we act rationally toward a goal.  If the goal changes then it’s likely that the rational way to act will change.   I decided that my goal would be to try my best to act morally to the extent there really is a moral way to act.  That is, do real good and avoid real evil.   God, or no God, what if there is something I should be doing to make the world really better.

Now I don’t mean good as made up by someone or group, as a constructivist might think of it.  That sort of made up morality in some ways sounds good but I decided not to live my life based on make believe.  I am pursuing the real morality, if such a thing exists.   It is with that goal that I decide to consider what beliefs I should hold, to the extent I have control over my beliefs.

I decided that if I live my life trying to live as I really should, and because of that do not live by some rules a person or group of people made up, well I am fine with that.   Sure it’s possible there is no real morality, in that case, there was nothing I really should have done anyway.   But if it does really exist then I think trying to discover what it is, and trying to live by it, should be my focus.    I think everyone should give their best efforts in this regard.

Fairly early on I realized that if naturalism and evolution are true our moral beliefs are completely unreliable.    If you don’t think I am right on that point (or perhaps just don’t understand what in the world I am talking about) please share your thoughts in the comment section to my last blog.   But for this blog I want to rest on that conclusion.   I argued for it in the last blog, and now I want to draw some other conclusions.  So for this blog Ill assume my conclusion in the last blog is correct.   This also happens to be the conclusion reached by a few other philosophers including Richard Joyce, Sharon Street, and Mark Linville.

What that means is if evolution and naturalism are true our moral beliefs are completely unreliable.  From that I concluded that pursuing one set of moral beliefs is no better or worse than any other set of moral beliefs if N and E are true.  Accordingly pursuing the morality of Christianity would be no less likely to be true than any other, even if N and E are true.   Accordingly even if evolution and naturalism is true, following Christ would not be a worse moral option than any other in the rational pursuit of my goal.

It’s at this point that I think it is established that the nonbeliever has lost his case that the believer is acting less rationally – at least toward the goal of living a life that is really morally correct.   From this point forward I will try to push things a bit further and argue that the nonbeliever is less rational than the believer in pursuit of the goal to lead a really moral life.

Ok so we see that if N and E are true our moral beliefs are completely unreliable, so then it doesn’t matter what moral beliefs we choose.  But what if N and E are not true?  Since any moral beliefs, are a wash if N and E are true, I think it’s rational to focus our attention on the possibility that N and E are not true.

Specifically what if naturalism is not true.  Then it seems we might actually have reliable moral beliefs.  But how could we know what they are?  From what I (and the other 3 philosophers) have argued I am convinced that natural processes alone could not produce beings with this knowledge.  So we would need to look for something from a supernatural/non-natural confirming source that could teach us these morals.   From this it seems we should weigh the evidence of what sources of morality seem to have a supernatural/non-natural confirming source.  There are many religions that fit this bill and I would suggest the reader consider these religions and which has the best evidence.  I won’t go into that weighing here.  But I would like to point out that when it comes to weighing the religious moral schemes we are looking for evidence that the moral teachings were affirmed by a supernatural/non-natural source.

Now I anticipate a few objections to what I said.

First is to say what if there is a God who gave us our moral beliefs but he wants us to believe there is no God?

I think we weigh the evidence of this God the same way we would of any other God.  What is the evidence that this God exists?  But I think there is a second problem with continuing to not believe in this God.   It seems like a contradiction to believe in this god and follow this God’s rules.  If we believe and follow this God then we don’t believe this God.

Finally I think there is a third problem with not believing in God.  If we do not believe in God and we understand that what I and the other philosophers said is true, then the belief that there is no God would also imply our beliefs concerning morals are unreliable.  This would undermine our determination to act morally when acting morally is hard.  When it’s hard, it would be easy to rationalize and say “well the reliability of my moral beliefs are suspect anyway.”  Now I admit that reaction wouldn’t be rational based on my goal.  But I think that would happen.   When you know you are subject to irrationally immoral behavior by taking certain course of action (and here I include an action such as adopting a belief or taking actions which would lead to adopting the belief) then rational people will not take that course of action.

Here is a second objection:

So let’s say we agree to follow some God that we think has the best evidence.  But the “best evidence” is really pretty weak.  Let’s say for example we think the Christian God is more likely than Zeus but maybe just barely.   Let’s say we don’t think the evidence for the Christian God makes it more probably true than not true.  But nevertheless that God has better evidence than any other Gods.    What then?

I think we need to consider this carefully.  It seems to me that if we knew full well this God existed because we could see this God continually and literally standing over us watching our every move few of us would sin.   But that is not the case.   And so we all sin or act in ways we might agree is not how we should.  It seems to me that the firmness of our belief in God is important to how well we follow his moral laws.    And again that is our goal.  We want to find and  follow the real moral way of life.

How we should look at this depends how committed we are to our original goal of trying our best to act morally to begin with.

Let me offer an analogy involving a game.  For this scenario let’s say you are not in need of any set sum.   You want to maximize your potential return.   In fact maximizing your potential return in this game trumps all other concerns you have.    Maximizing your return in this game is in effect all that matters to you.

Let’s say there is a roulette wheel with 1,000,002 numbers.  You get $3,333.34 every month over the course 25 years.  You will receive $1,000,002.00.   You must immediately place the money on a number once you receive it.  At the end of the 25 years there will be one throw that will decide the winning number.  You can only keep the money that is on the number that the ball lands on.   You can put the money on more than one number.  So you could have one dollar put on each number.  You would be sure to get one dollar back but you also know you would only get one dollar.

Now everyone knows the number 7 is slightly rigged such that there is 3xs the possibility of the roulette ball landing there than for any other particular number.  I am not saying it is 3xs as likely to land on 7 as it is to land on any of all the other numbers combined.   I am just saying it is 3xs more likely that it will land on 7 compared to it landing on, say, 474,923 or any other particular number you pick.

How do you bet over the 25 years?

Now let’s say you went all in on 7 but the number comes up 775,957.  How do you feel?  Do you feel bad that perhaps you were irrational?

On the other hand let’s say you figured you did not have “enough evidence” to believe in the number 7.  After all, you lacked evidence sufficient to show that 7 was “more likely than not” going to be the winner so you just picked a random number like 42 and went all in on that.     And the number 7 came up.   And then you saw the other people who picked 7.   Would you disagree with them if they told you it was irrational for you to not go all in on 7?

Here is a more interesting question.  Let’s say some people actually claimed to firmly believe that it would be 7 and went all in on 7?  Let’s say they looked at the situation and they just wanted to make sure that they acted rationally in this game.  So they reinforced the idea that it would be 7 so they would be sure not place any money outside of 7.    So for example they convinced themselves that the odds of it being 7 was much higher than it really was.   Was that irrational to the extent of pursuing their goal?

I don’t think it was irrational.  I think so long as your actions concerning an uncertain belief would not change by adding certainty to your belief it is not irrational to reinforce that belief.   That is whether a person believes that the chance of 7 winning is .0003% .3% 33% or 100% when all the other numbers are about .0001% it won’t make any difference, you should still bet it all on 7.  So none of the actions that this belief is relevant to are negatively affected by puffing up the belief.   And in fact puffing up this belief might be beneficial.

Let’s say the evidence suggested that people who did not puff up the belief that it would be a 7 often would put some money on other numbers.    Assuming your goal was to maximize your possible gains then would it be irrational not to puff up the belief that the number 7 would win?  I think it might be irrational not to puff up that belief.

How should those who reinforced their belief feel if it happened to come up 42?  Would you be able to say that their foolishness mattered?

3 Brands of Baggage that Evolution gives the Naturalist

10 Monday Feb 2014

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I find the evidence for evolution pretty convincing.   Being theist it might mean something a bit different than being a naturalist (by naturalist I mean someone who does not believe in anything supernatural, no gods, no spirits etc.) when we talk about “randomness.”  What is random to us, of course, is not random to God.  We think how dice will land is random.  But, we also know that how they land is based on the forces applied and the angles that the dice hit, combined with predictable laws of nature.  So what is random for us is not random for something with an infinite understanding.  I don’t see “randomness” of evolution in creating us as we are as much different the “randomness” of which sperm will fertilize which egg.

In an earlier blog I talked about how evolution as an explanation might carry some logical baggage for the naturalist.  Why aren’t the problems caused for the theist?  Generally it has to do with that idea of whether the events are random to everyone (naturalism)– or whether they are just random to us but not the creator of the universe (theism).   It seems to me that unless you are attached to a very literal reading of genesis, evolution does not really present any problems for the Christian.  On the other hand the way it is filling in the details for the naturalist, it might cause some logical friction with beliefs naturalists would like to hold on to.      It creates at least 2 arguments against naturalism and it tends to buttresses a third.

1.First there is the argument that if naturalism is true there is no morality. (Again as per my earlier blog when I talk about “morality” I am referring to moral realism) This argument existed before evolution was even presented as a theory so evolution didn’t create this argument.  But I do think it tends to buttress the argument.   Evolution is a convincing explanation that helps flesh out the naturalist worldview, but it fleshes it out in a way that morality seems very much a sort of odd fifth wheel.

It’s not that I think it’s logically impossible for moral realism to be true if naturalism is true.  I think the Euthyphro dilemma does tend to demonstrate how it could work.   So in my opinion it’s not logically impossible for real morality to exist if naturalism is true.  It’s just that accepting moral reality seems to have no place in the framework naturalists accept.    If you apply the same standards of reason and necessity for “evidence” that many naturalists apply to God I think many would be logically contradicting themselves to believe in moral realism.

Preserving moral realism is important because it is the only option where we reject the idea that when it comes to morals we make it all up it.  From that it logically follows that the naturalists who believe in some non-realist moral system are essentially believing in “make believe.”        That is a common accusation thrown at theists isn’t it?   In any case I am interested in believing reality not make believe.   

 

While I agree that there is no logical contradiction in believing in naturalism and moral realism.   I still think this may be a good argument to support belief in God.  Why?  Again it depends on the other beliefs that a person holds as to what sound argument might be a “proof.”  It seems to me that many atheists claim to apply standards to all their beliefs.  These standards exclude the belief that God is real, but they aren’t using those standards when it comes to analyzing whether morality is real.   For example the moral properties that moral realism posits are not directly observable by the senses.  This is why there are no labs to help us identify if this or that is immoral.  We do not devise better telescopes or microscopes,  x-ray machines, ultrasounds, stethoscopes to help us see, hear, touch, smell or taste these moral properties.[1]

Kant, and Mackie both make a sorts of “moral argument.”  Mackie chose to not believe in Morals rather than to believe in God.   But even earlier I have read at least a few historians explain that the ancients required belief in the Gods because they thought atheists would be immoral.  So the idea of a connection seems to go back to antiquity.

2.The second argument is that even if we assume morals exist without God, our understanding of natural selection makes it very unlikely that our moral beliefs are reliable.    I came to this conclusion on my own and it is a reason why I believe in God.  Of course, it takes a few steps beyond just proving that evolution would make our moral beliefs unreliable (which covers allot of ground itself) to say this “proves God exists.”  And indeed the conclusion of my argument is not “God must exist” but rather that “it is irrational not to believe in God.”   Like I said earlier at least three philosophers, Sharon Street, Richard Joyce, and Mark Linville have published articles in support of this argument.  The first two are naturalists.   They simply do not believe in moral realism.    I will write some blogs on this argument and what I think its implications are in the future.

3.  The third argument is that if evolution and naturalism is true then all our beliefs are unreliable.  Alvin Plantinga has made this argument and it is called an evolutionary argument against naturalism, or EAAN.   This argument might be sound but I don’t think it has much promise of convincing many naturalists.  I would like to give a basic overview of it, a very common objection, and why I think the common objection fails to appreciate the full effect of the argument.   That said it is not an argument I have thought a whole lot about.  So I certainly welcome and look forward to any comments on my views of the argument.

First understanding the argument.  Evolution or natural selection is “aimed” at creating creatures that are fit for survival and reproduction.  I say “aimed” in quotes because evolution is not really “aimed” at anything, but the general effect is still as if it were aimed at traits with higher fitness in those areas.  To the extent the results of evolution are not just random that is a trend we can identify.

Now we should note at the outset that this model of how we came to be, does not directly claim it would create creatures that tend to hold reliably true beliefs.   Plantinga quotes Darwin, “the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?'”  Charles Darwin, to William Graham 3 July 1881

Now I think Darwin’s quote goes some of the distance but it doesn’t quite go all of the distance.  We shouldn’t just think of the beliefs of monkeys, but really the potential beliefs of any living thing under this model.  I mean we certainly tend to believe monkeys would have a lot of true convictions since they are like us.  But there are plenty of other living things that have evolved today and perhaps many times others that did not.  And if we want to objectively look at the types of belief systems this process might develop we might as well replace monkeys with “jellyfish like” creatures that have some sort of mental function they use to spend most of their time dreaming.  OK let’s move on.

Although Plantinga disagreed, I think this argument is fairly well follows from Descartes comments from the quote I gave in an earlier blog:

“Some, indeed, might perhaps be found who would be disposed rather to deny the existence of a Being so powerful [God] than to believe that there is nothing certain. But let us for the present refrain from opposing this opinion, and grant that all which is here said of a Deity is fabulous: nevertheless, in whatever way it be supposed that I reach the state in which I exist, whether by fate, or chance, or by an endless series of antecedents and consequents, or by any other means, it is clear that the probability of my being so imperfect as to be the constant victim of deception, will be increased exactly in proportion as the power possessed by the cause, to which they assign my origin, is lessened.”

When Descartes refers to “deception” I think he is generally just saying that our senses and beliefs might be misguided or unreliable.  The process of evolution is just another way in which I reach this state without the idea that God did it.

The most common response I see to the EAAN is something along these lines that Travis raises in his blog.   http://measureoffaith.wordpress.com/2013/12/28/a-few-comments-on-plantingas-where-the-conflict-really-lies/

Travis states:

“As I read through the EAAN, I was eagerly anticipating Plantinga’s response to the following objection: evolutionary theory claims that well before any creature was conscious there were sensory systems that triggered responses which selected the population. Selection is dependent on beneficial interactions with the external world. If those interactions do not consistently and properly map to the outside world then they are less likely to be beneficial.”

To address this objection we need to first understand how an “undercutting defeater” works.  In contrast, a “rebutting defeater” is one where we get evidence that contradicts our belief.  That’s not what an undercutting defeater is.  An undercutting defeater is where we accept a model where our beliefs are not justified, but not because other evidence rebuts them, but because we recognize they were formed in an unreliable way.

Here is an example of an undercutting defeater from a philosopher named Pollock: You are visiting a factory and you see a bunch of red parts sitting in a room. You look at them and they appear red so you believe they are red. But then the supervisor comes up and tells you that the parts you see actually have a very strong red light shining on them so they can better detect if any defects exist in the parts. He tells you they would appear red regardless of whether they were red or not.

So the supervisor does not tell you they are not red; it’s still possible they are red. But your justification for believing they are red just dropped off because you see that the model by which you acquired the belief that they are red, is not a reliable one as to beliefs about the redness of the parts. So that is the basic idea of an undercutting defeater. It’s not that it’s impossible that they are red, but given that model any such beliefs about their redness would be completely unfounded.

Let’s consider an undercutting defeater that would undercut all of our beliefs.  Let’s say you accept the skeptical scenario/model of your existence such that you are a brain in a vat being manipulated by an evil genius in some other solar system on planet called Ork.   This evil genius can instantly give you any beliefs he wants.   Let’s call this “model A.”  And let’s say you believe this “model A” is how you came to exist.

It is important to note that this would not mean that the majority of your beliefs are false.   In fact we might be able to imagine a situation where at least the vast majority are true.  Let’s say there is a body (let’s call the body “Bob Dole”) on earth and the evil genius gives you beliefs based on what the Bob Dole’s body sees.  Now you know you are not Bob Dole.  You know you are the product of a brain in a vat on a different planet, Ork.  Your location is not where Bob Dole is you are just given sensations and beliefs based on what Bob Dole’s body sees, smells hears feels etc.  At least it’s possible that the body “Bob Dole” is actually there on earth making all the movements you believe he is making seeing smelling etc all the same scenes that the brain in a vat gives you.   It’s logically possible that what you see and believe is happening on earth through Bob Dole’s eyes, is actually happening.    Thus on this model A, it’s logically possible that your beliefs are largely true.   Just like it is possible that the parts are red in Pollock’s example.    It’s just that nothing in model A directly requires that your beliefs are necessarily reliably true.

Well let’s say you accept that “model A” is how you came to exist.  Now under Model A though you also come to believe that all your beliefs are reliable and mostly true.   How?  It doesn’t really matter.  But for example, let’s just say, on earth you see through Bob Dole’s eyes that there are evil geniuses manipulating brains in vats there on earth.   Now it seems those brains in vats create minds that believe that they are observing people on some other planet as well.  Maybe Ork or other parts of earth or wherever.  But the thing is this.  You very strongly believe that the evil geniuses who give the brains in the vats unreliable beliefs tend to die off quickly often even immediately.   Therefore you come to believe that most minds created by brains in a vat have reliable beliefs.  Therefore you conclude that even though you are a brain in a vat you can reasonably think your beliefs are reliable.

Ok that might not seem the most convincing tale, but there is a very clear problem with all of the reasons given in the paragraph immediately above.  Namely, all of the beliefs expressed in the above paragraph would have been produced through “model A”.    It seems to me that once you accept “model A” you have a defeater for all your beliefs.  Sure you might develop beliefs like the one that “most evil geniuses give reliable to beliefs due to reasons xyz”  but those are all  beliefs secondary to the original model that does not guarantee reliability.     Once you accept something like Model A all your beliefs that form from it have an undercutting defeater.

Plantinga argues that the based on such a model the likelihood of our beliefs being reliable is “either low or inscrutable” I think “inscrutable” is an important idea to understand.  It means that we cannot even rationally investigate or evaluate the probabilities.  Since all of our beliefs are affected by these pulls to something that is not necessarily true, and we can’t step outside our beliefs and see what is really going on, it would seem the reliability is in fact inscrutable.   In the example of the red widgets we can sort of see what is happening with respect to our beliefs regarding the redness of the widgets.  But when something like evolutionary forces are effecting all of our beliefs we can’t gain that vantage point.   We have no beliefs that would not have been influenced by evolutionary pulls from which we can reason about the probabilities.   In a way all of our beliefs have the red light tinting them.

Is the Evolutionary model  (“model E”) like model A?  I think it is.  The evolutionary model is at best “aiming” at survival/reproduction.   This is not necessarily the same as aiming at reliably truth tracking mental systems.  We, of course, might come to believe they are related.  For example we might hold a set of beliefs like those Travis stated.  The problem is those are beliefs we came to hold secondary to the Model E, which does not necessarily produce reliably true beliefs.  Both Model A and Model E have the same flaw.  The model itself does not explicitly indicate that the creatures it creates will have reliable beliefs.  Accordingly once we say we were created from that model then taking beliefs XYZ and saying these logically yield the conclusion our beliefs are reliable will be irrational.   This is because beliefs XYZ are just the product of the model that we agreed at the outset would not explicitly produce reliable beliefs.  Both model A and model E share that unfortunate quality.

Can we include those beliefs that I quoted from Travis and make them part of the Evolutionary model?  Yes I suppose we can but they are not part of the model now.  Just like we can change model A to be Model B.  Model B could be I am created by brain in a vat that is controlled by an evil genius *and* that evil genius gives me reliable beliefs.   So Model E could become Model F.  Model F is that I came about from a process that selected for things that survived, reproduced, and had reliably true beliefs.   But until that is done I think those who adopt the view that they were created by a completely natural selection do indeed have a defeater for all their beliefs.

Is the person who accepts naturalism and evolution any worse than everyone who has to deal with the skeptical scenarios?  Yes I think they are.  They not only have to deal with the possibility that a skeptical model might be the case, they actually believe one is the case.

Now perhaps someone would say that it’s not really that the evolutionary model comes before our belief that our beliefs are reliable.  First we believe our senses and beliefs are reliable and it’s only after that we accept the evolution model.  My response would be what if someone came to believe model A in the same way?  That is they looked around the world around them and for whatever reason they too decided they must be a brain in a vat.  I don’t think it matters how you get the model in your beliefs, once it’s there it works as a defeater.

[1] At least not directly.  Sure science might help us understand what actions might be moral or immoral indirectly.  So for example we may find out that certain people have mental disorders and our understanding of those mental disorders might help us understand the level of their culpability.  Also some Catholic Church scholars thought that our understanding of dna and the fact that an embryo’s dna was different than that of the mother seemed to inform their decision that abortion was wrong.   But there can be no doubt that there are cases of moral disagreement where no amount of learning the empirical facts is at issue.  Abortion might be such an issue.  It’s not as if the pro-choice community is unaware of the dna differences between a mother and the fetus she carries.

“The Burden of Proof” versus “The Flying Spaghetti Monster”

26 Sunday Jan 2014

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In the law legislatures create burdens of proof so that fact finders can be guided on how to decide a case in light of uncertainty.    The same is done for debates where a “winner” and a “loser” needs to be decided.    These burdens exist so far as we make them up.  But what I would like to talk about is the notion of a “philosophical burden of proof.”

I would suggest that such a thing does not exist and the sooner you free your mind of the notion the better off you will be.

First, let’s address what people mean when they say “you have the burden of proof.”   I think there are actually quite a few questions along these lines but let’s just try to give a statement of what they might claim it is.  Tonight’s version of Wikipedia says this:

1)      “When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim.”

I think that sounds pretty much what I hear.  I might also hear something like this:

2)      “The person asserting an affirmative claim has the burden of providing evidence for his claim”

I don’t really think there is much difference between the two.

Now the first thing I would note is that both 1 and 2 are themselves claims which are often affirmatively asserted.   Yet I do not ever hear any proof or evidence that they are true claims.   Is this yet another case of a self-defeating claim?   It seems so.

But before we leave tonight’s Wikipedia I would note that it also says: “The fallacy of an argument from ignorance occurs if, when a claim is challenged, the burden of proof is shifted to be on the challenger.”  That’s true but misleading.  The Fallacy of ignorance occurs when someone argues that because you failed to provide enough evidence to convince them X is true that lack of evidence should somehow prove “Not X.”   So it should be clear that this fallacy in no way justifies a burden of proof.    If anything the fallacy of ignorance is a case where people draw faulty conclusions based on the assumption that a burden of proof exists.      If one never believed in any burdens of proof then it would be much easier to avoid the fallacy from ignorance.   Although I concede that someone can believe in some form of “the burden of proof” and not commit the fallacy of argument from ignorance, they are close relatives.

For example we can see this fallacy when we read what atheist Kieth Parsons says about Hanson another atheist writer  “According to Hanson, the same holds for the claim that God exists. To show that no compelling evidence or cogent argument can be offered in support of God’s existence is tantamount to showing that God does not exist.” Page 25 in his book “God and the Burden of Proof.”  This is about as clear a case of the fallacy of argument from ignorance as I have ever seen in a philosophy text.  And the fallacy is committed because of the author’s commitment to this imagined burden of proof.

Now, if Bigfoot or fairies existed I would expect we would have better evidence of them.   They are presumably material things that can be seen, captured, photographed, video recorded etc.    It is in part because I would expect that we would have better evidence than we do, that I do not believe they exist.   Moreover the existence of fairies or bigfoot has no other impact on my other beliefs such that I should weigh in favor of believing they exist.  Notice though I am stating my reasons why I do not think fairies or Bigfoot exists.   And indeed that is why I don’t think they exist.    I feel no need to resort to claims someone else needs to shoulder some imaginary burden of proof.  If someone believes in Big foot and I give him my reasons and he still believes ok.   I do not insist that he needs shoulder some burden to prove it to me.  He does not have any such burden.

Ok I imagine there are some readers who will want to ask me questions like “Do I believe that there are purple and yellow spotted platypuses on planets other than earth? And if not why not?”   Well the answer is no, and the reason I don’t is because it sounds made up.    Someone asked me “But what if someone who really believes it tells you this?”  I’m sorry but it still sounds made up.  Perhaps I just grew up with too many people who thought it was entertaining to fool people and so I am a bit distrustful.   When my brother first told me about quarks I thought he was making that up too.      But either way the person who believed in these platypuses would not have any burden to prove this to me.

Do I think we should have reasons for all our beliefs?  Maybe.    But I think 2 points are important here:

1) This is different than saying some “burden of proof” exists.  I might hold the belief that we should have a reason for our beliefs without alleging any sort of burden exists on others to prove anything.

2) The problem with the idea that we should always have a reason for our beliefs, is that the chain of beliefs needs to start somewhere.  If we have to have a reason for all our beliefs we would either be guilty of circular reasoning, or capable of holding an infinite set of beliefs, or believing things for reasons that we do not really believe,  or in a situation where we shouldn’t believe anything at all.   There is the logical possibility that all our beliefs stem from other self-evident truths.  But I don’t believe that is the case.

So right now although I might be sympathetic to the idea that we should have reasons for our beliefs.   It seems there are problems with even that claim.

If you are still convinced that “the burden of proof” is real, I have a few other questions:  1) What is the standard of proof? (e.g.,beyond reasonable doubt, or preponderance of the evidence or fair probability or clear and convincing evidence? Ect.)  2) To whom do I need to prove the claim? (e.g., a judge, a commission,  a jury?)   3) What are the supposed consequences of not meeting this burden?  (go to jail or not, win a money judgment, get an injunction move on to the next round of debate in the winners bracket?) These are all very clear in Courts and debates.     How does this supposed philosophical burden of proof work?

In the end however I believe the notion that others have some burden to demonstrate truths to you does indeed suggest that you are not required to figure it out for yourself.   Believing that you are somehow epistemologically justified in continuing to hold your beliefs so long as you decide some other person did not meet some imagined burden of proof is a poor way to go through life.   If two people give their reasons for believing opposing views and neither convinces the other, so be it.  Maybe one is stubborn or irrational who knows.  (see my blog giving a proof of God)  Thinking that we should insert some burden of proof never helps any discussion.    I think it is intellectually more healthy to place the burden on ourselves to investigate any sort of important question.  Don’t try to pass that off on others.

So anyway who wins “The Burden of Proof” or “The Flying Spaghetti Monster”?  In the end I think the evidence weighs in favor of “The Flying Spaghetti Monster” after all, at least we have pictures of it:

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