We see everyone claiming to be rational but then we find that they view being “rational” as having a mindset that leads to their conclusions. My second blog was on what it means to be rational in general terms here.
Those views seem correct now just as they have for decades before I wrote that blog. But there is still a tension in what it means to “believe” something that I have been thinking about for decades and I have ultimately concluded that the term “belief” has two different meanings that are essential to our understanding of the term but can sometimes conflict. This blog is intended more as one that explains a problem that I see rather than provide a solution. Hopefully others will have a decent solution or at least understand the problem so their discussions can be a bit nuanced. Here are the two essential aspects of belief that I think most philosophers would at least agree are valid considerations as being part of the term “belief”:
- The second view is that a belief is something you properly hold if you believe the evidence supports the conclusion that the claim is more likely than not true.
Although I agree the second definition is a view that seems to capture an essential part of the term “belief” I also think it has problems that I think never get enough press in professional philosophy. I want to discuss the problems I see with the second view but then, in the end, will explain why I think it is, nevertheless, hard to just do away with it.
I think this second view of belief leads people to think rational people should be constantly weighing the evidence of each individual belief and then trying to banish those where the evidence does not measure up. Our beliefs are much more complicated than that. That simplified view does not even give us an idea of what beliefs should be examined and which shouldn’t or the pragmatic considerations. For example under that view a rational person could be memorizing facts out of a phone book as much as they investigate whether they should believe it is ok to have an abortion. Obviously being rational means more than just filling our heads with random facts which the evidence suggests are more likely than not true and expunging those beliefs that seem not to have that evidence.
But there is another problem. A logical problem with this view is that many decisions are not exactly binary. Either the Christian God exists or he doesn’t. That’s true. But that doesn’t mean, unless we think the evidence supports that the Christian God exists is more likely than not true, we are irrational for believing in that God. We have to consider the alternatives. And there seem to be many alternatives to believing in the Christian God. There are Gods as explained by other religions. There is the possibility to believe in a God that is not explained by a religion. All of these are possible beyond just either the Christian God exists or no God exists.
So lets analyze a hypothetical situation. Let’s just say I believe:
- Christian God is 30%
- non-Christian God(s) aggregate to 40% but all individually are less than 30%
and
- no God is 30%?
Sometimes people say that if we don’t have evidence that supports any of those beliefs are more likely than not true then we should “withhold belief.” Sometimes people say that means you are “agnostic” and some people would say that an “atheist” might fit that description as well. The arguments about the terminology seem more pedantic than helpful so I won’t address them.
But ultimately I still have to decide things like:
- Am I going to Church Sunday morning?
- Am I going to treat human life as though it is a sacred gift from God?
- Am I going to treat all humans as though they are made in God’s image?
- Am I going to teach my children these things?
These are a few Christian teachings that you are either going to live your life by or you are not. You need to act now.
If you can pause life then ok. But I can’t. So in the meantime my actions are going to reflect my beliefs. And it is hard to understand what it would mean to be agnostic here. Would that mean I sometimes go to church on Sunday? Should I try to go 30% of the time? If I never go to church on Sunday or act in accordance with the Christian teachings then am I not adopting the belief that the Christian God does not exist? And other religions are even less likely so I would act as though there is no God. But in my hypothetical the evidence doesn’t support that belief as being more likely than not true either! Does the agnostic know how to pause his life? Can he teach me how to do that?
Notice these issues arise before I even start to get into the fact that this is only dealing with “theoretical rationality” and not “pragmatic rationality.” It is irrational to ignore pragmatic reasons which can effect what views we should adopt, but these problems arise when we just consider the theoretical model on its own.
But let’s dig a bit deeper. Some say we can act as though something is true even though we don’t believe it is true. That sounds a bit like lying to yourself. But let’s go along with this a bit. We still need to ask which way should I choose to act when the evidence doesn’t support any relevant belief is more likely than not true? Should I just act and adopt views however I feel like at the moment? Ok but are we going to claim that is rational?
I’m sorry but the second view (where we rationally believe something if and only if the evidence supports that it is more likely than not true) is too simplistic and just won’t work in life. Any approach to being rational in a situation must address all the different probabilities and their pragmatic consequences. Yes it’s complicated but oversimplifying rationality only masks the problems.
So I think the first view is important. But the second view does have this going for it. If I say “I believe O.J. Simpson murdered Ron Goldman”, then it seems I am saying it is more likely than not true that OJ Simpson murdered Ron Goldman. It is hard to remove that aspect of the term “belief” without doing an injustice to language. I don’t have a solution, but I think we should understand these two different meanings of “belief” especially when we talk about whether beliefs are rational or not.
True and Reasonable 
I think we need to consider that psychologists say we use two different modes of thinking – analytic, which is methodical, logical, evidence-based, etc, and intuitive, which is more spontaneous, feelings-oriented, etc.
People who think about these things would expect that analytic is the best or most reliable way to think, but this isn’t always correct. In general, if we need to make a quick decision, or if the matter is complex or if we don’t have all the data we really need, then analytical thinking can put us in a bind where we find it difficult to make a choice, and intuitive thinking actually gives better (more reliable) results. An example might be when answering a question in a quiz or a game of trivia, the first thing that pops into our head is often likely to be the right answer.
So in the case you mention where there are many different possibilities, each with 10-30% probability at most, it is possible, perhaps likely, that intuitive thinking will give a better result. And it seems that is what actually happens. Most christians and most non-believers seem to come to their view for more personal and emotional/intuitive reasons, and those of us who are more analytical seem to be in the minority.
In fact psychologist Jonathan Haidt says we make all religious, moral & aesthetic choices intuitively and then rationalise our analytical reasons later. If he’s even half right, that changes things even more.
Hi thanks you make a good point that we should not lose track of.
Haidt does some great work. I know he published an excellent paper regarding rationality of moral beliefs and I discussed that here:
I wasn’t aware he extended it to religious and aesthetic choices but that would not surprise me. The blog I list above talks about our political brains as well.
His findings don’t surprise me. But I think he is saying that this is how our minds often work. He is not saying we never can reason or have a rational view. So the present blog I wrote addresses what that would mean to have a rational belief.
I find that when we talk about what it would mean to have rational beliefs these two different views of beliefs can (but not always) lead us to different approaches. The first approach strongly links belief with our actions, the second not so much.
The second approach seems better suited for beliefs that really wouldn’t effect our actions very much. For example my life is not going to change very much if I find out the earth is actually a billion years older than science currently puts it. Scientists may change their conduct but for me it is not going to change much. So it makes sense to say I will with hold belief about the age of the universe until I have evidence that proves one way or another is more likely than not true.
I do recall some research into intuitive versus analytic decision making. I think we could establish that intuitive thinking’s accuracy with respect to empirical truths that we can objectively verify. (that is things we can directly sense the truth of the matter) But I am not sure we could do that with moral or religious claims. And it would seem to me that if we evolved without any God guiding our design then we would have good reason to treat these beliefs separately. Evolution is not going to be particularly concerned with our intuition getting beliefs that do have a physical impact correct. And indeed it may get those beliefs wrong tot he extent it may serve fitness.
Travis made some comments that I think you may be interested in below as well. I think some of the comments I give in reply to him may fit with your comments but I will put them there.
My first reaction was in a similar line of thinking as Eric’s. I’m inclined to see the content of beliefs as something like an associative network linking concepts, actions, and semantics. When we justify, explain, or examine a belief (your 2nd type), our conscious activity is focused on exploring that network and dynamically constructing propositional chains that are rough translations of the content, to produce something adequate for communication. But that same network can also interface with action controls to guide behavior with little or no conscious involvement (your first type).
As for rationality, I think it’s a word that is often abused in the God debate. As far as I’m concerned, we’re only being irrational if we’re trying to achieve a goal by knowingly acting in opposition to that goal.
Hi Travis thanks for your interesting comments.
I find that many non-religious people tend to prefer the second view of rationality. But your last paragraph suggests that you think shaping our beliefs or minds in a rational way is more about achieving goals and that would seem to suggest perhaps you place more emphasis on the first view. Is that correct?
From our past conversations I got the sense that you have a pretty materialist view of our mind and brains. So I wonder when you say:
“When we justify, explain, or examine a belief (your 2nd type), our conscious activity is focused on exploring that network and dynamically constructing propositional chains that are rough translations of the content, to produce something adequate for communication. But that same network can also interface with action controls to guide behavior with little or no conscious involvement (your first type).”
When you talk about networks are you talking about physical stuff like brain synapses or are you talking about mental ideas and how they interact? It seems you are talking about mental ideas to me. So what do you think is consciously focusing on these mental ideas? Do you think it is our brain or do you think there is something beyond our brain that is doing this task? Is the whole notion of you and I existing and beyond just a brain an illusion that the brain is tricking itself into? Like a computer running analysis saying this is the correct way to think based on whatever data it has? But could we ever think the computer can sort evaluate its own processes or data? Wouldn’t all of that be circular? Do you think our situation is better because we have this illusion of consciousness?
The reason I ask this is because I sometimes don’t know what I would think “I” am if I did not believe I was a soul inside of a body but really just a body. When I think of who I am and who is doing this analysis of these beliefs I do not picture a piece of meat with some electrical charges. Of course I think my brain function can effect me but I think it effects me rather than just itself. In other words I think there is something non-illusion that is Joe McCarron beyond a brain held up on a skeleton. I imagine you have thought of this a bit and would be curious what your thoughts are.
Maybe, but I don’t think there’s a clear dichotomy.
Both
Our brain, but external factors are influencing that activity as well.
Not sure how to tackle that…
Sorry, I just can’t sympathize. I don’t have any difficulty equating my body and self (while acknowledging that refering to one’s ‘body’ weakly implies a dissection of the conscious self from the material self).
I hope you guys don’t mind me butting into this conversation.
Travis, you say that you don’t have any difficulty equating your body and self. If I’m understanding you correctly, what you mean is that you are your body. You also refer to a conscious self and a material self. If you are your body, does this mean that only the material self exists? Are you your material self, your conscious self, or both?
Both. The two terms are just emphasizing two different aspects.
Hi guys
I just want to clarify that I do not think the 2 views of belief create a dichotomy. I think they often can go hand in hand. I am just pointing out that sometimes there is a conflict.
As far as the discussion of who we are and material and immaterial I don’t really have much to add of my own thoughts – even though I was asking Travis for his. But I did just listen to a pretty entertaining podcast on the immaterial soul.
I think Swinburne says he is 84 years old. I hope I am that intellectually stimulating and entertaining to listen to when I am 84 years old. At least I have a few years to learn how to be.
https://podcasts.google.com/?feed=aHR0cDovL29uZGVtYW5kLnByZW1pZXIub3JnLnVrL3VuYmVsaWV2YWJsZS9BdWRpb0ZlZWQuYXNweA&episode=aHR0cDovL2NkbmFwaS5rYWx0dXJhLmNvbS9wLzYxODA3Mi9zcC82MTgwNzIwMC9wbGF5TWFuaWZlc3QvZW50cnlJZC8xXzZtMDBoNnd4L2ZsYXZvcklkLzFfYWd2OXJ6eXgvcHJvdG9jb2wvaHR0cC9mb3JtYXQvdXJsL2EubXAzP2NsaWVudFRhZz1mZWVkOjFfamxqNDd0a3Y&hl=en&ved=2ahUKEwi4_qf34r_mAhXSKs0KHdgSASQQieUEegQIBxAE&ep=6&at=1576691777475
What do you mean when you say that you don’t have any difficulty equating your body and self? Do you think consciousness is immaterial? If the body is material and consciousness is immaterial, wouldn’t the body and self being equivalent entail that the conscious self does not exist?
I doubt that consciousness is immaterial (though immaterial is not clearly defined), but I’m also not going to solve the “hard problem of consciousness” today. So it was a bit of an exaggeration to say that I don’t have any difficulty equating the body and self because it is correct to note that I don’t have a well defined, purely physical explanation of consciousness. A more precise statement would be something like “I see many reasons to equate the body and self and I do not find that the hard problem of consciousness is sufficient to overcome those reasons.”
I’m trying to come up with a definition of material. How would you define material? (I’m assuming the definition of immaterial would be the negation of the definition of material.)
How would you describe your view of consciousness? Is it aligned with Daniel Dennett’s view that consciousness is some sort of illusion?
When you refer to equating the body and self, do you mean the brain and self?
This recently came up in another discussion and I used “always empirically detectable”, with the caveat that detection can be direct or indirect, and the understanding that there are probably some edge cases that would make this problematic. But no definition ever seems to be perfect when put under sufficient scrutiny.
Physicalist, mostly undefined, and yet still highly provisional.
To be determined. I am sympathetic with the “illusion for who” response, but have recently encountered perspectives that clarify “illusion” in ways that avoid that issue.
No, the brain is part of the body and its operation depends on other parts of the body, and some non-brain systems have brain-like functionality, so I don’t think we can make a clean break. But it does seem that the consciousness you’re currently interacting is almost exclusively in my brain. Are you familiar with the embodied cognition paradigm?
“This recently came up in another discussion and I used “always empirically detectable”, with the caveat that detection can be direct or indirect, and the understanding that there are probably some edge cases that would make this problematic. But no definition ever seems to be perfect when put under sufficient scrutiny.”
What is your view on philosophical zombies? Are they logically possible? Metaphysically possible?
The neural activity correlated with consciousness would always be empirically detectable, but whether that means consciousness is always empirically detectable depends on your view of consciousness.
“Are you familiar with the embodied cognition paradigm?”
No, I hadn’t encountered it before.
Yes to logically possible. I could be wrong and dualism could be true. And I’m not sure there’s a difference between metaphysical and logical possibility.
Agreed
I agree that philosophical zombies are logically possible.
I don’t think there’s a difference between metaphysical and logical possibility. I just asked about both because I didn’t want to assume that you thought there was no difference.
The SEP entry titled “The Epistemology of Modality” draws a distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility:
“For those that accept the reality of metaphysical inquiry, metaphysical modality is often understood as being the modality concerned with metaphysics as opposed to logical modality, which concerns itself with logical relations or physical modality, which concerns itself with physical relations. In addition, on the standard model of the relation between these kinds of modalities the logical possibilities are the most inclusive; they include any proposition that sheer logic leaves open, no matter how otherwise impossible it might be. The metaphysical possibilities are the logical possibilities that are also allowed by the natures of all of the things that could have existed. The physical possibilities are the logical and metaphysical possibilities that are also allowed by the physical laws of nature.”
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/
The difference between metaphysical and logical possibility depends on the things that could have existed having certain natures. I don’t think things have natures beyond what the physical laws of nature give them, so I don’t think there’s a difference between metaphysical and logical possibility.
I know you mentioned not having an answer to the hard problem of consciousness, but how would you approach such a problem? Do you think there is an answer to the question “Why are we not philosophical zombies?”
A distinction that I’ve only recently been considering (as in the last couple days) is the difference between explaining the subjective in objective terms, and explaining why we are unable to explain the subjective in objective terms. This second issue is essentially Chalmer’s “meta-problem”. The first explanation seems like it’s probably intractable, but the second seems less probably intractable. So I’m inclined to think that any explanation we arrive at is more likely to be the second kind.
Hi Travis,
I’ve been thinking and reading about logical and metaphysical possibility. Do you think it is logically but not metaphysically possible for something to be the cause of its own existence? The example comes from this post:
https://structureoftruth.wordpress.com/2017/08/19/metaphysical-modality/
I’m on the fence about whether attempts to formalize possibility are reflecting any mind-independent truths about reality. Logic may very well be best understood as something like “the boundaries of human cognition” rather than universal axioms about an ultimate reality. Or maybe the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics should define possibility. I don’t know. Any distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility ultimately comes down to the definitions and axioms that we decide to associate with those concepts. Having read up on it, do you see a consensus on how philosophers are distinguishing between those?
As to whether something can be the cause of its own existence? I have no idea. Causality is another troublesome concept when you start to dig below the surface, as you’re probably aware (e.g., here).
What are your thoughts on the many-worlds interpretation? I don’t know enough about quantum mechanics to really form an opinion on it.
I’m afraid I haven’t done much more reading about logical vs. metaphysical possibility beyond Structure of Truth’s post and the parts of the SEP article that I read. I think that if it is accepted that things that could have existed have natures, then Anand Vaidya’s distinction in the SEP article is uncontroversial: “The metaphysical possibilities are the logical possibilities that are also allowed by the natures of all of the things that could have existed.” Of course, the question that must be asked is if the things that could have existed have natures that can prevent certain logically possible things from existing.
Yes, causality is a very troublesome concept. I don’t have a definition of “cause” that I’m comfortable with. Structure of Truth has interesting thoughts on causality in these posts:
https://structureoftruth.wordpress.com/2017/07/22/cause-and-effect/
https://structureoftruth.wordpress.com/2017/07/29/the-nature-of-causation/
S5 modal logic is the basis of Structure of Truth’s ontological argument. I’d like to be able to understand his argument, so I intend to learn more about metaphysical modality.
The saying is that “if you think you understand quantum mechanics, then you don’t understand quantum mechanics”. MWI seems like a possibly valid interpretation. I’d probably rank it above Copenhagen and below “something we haven’t come up with yet”. But my opinion on that means very little.
I’m quite skeptical of “natures” in a Aristotelian \ scholastic sense, so I guess if I were to take on that definition then metaphysical possibility would reduce to physical possibility for physical entities, and indeterminate for non-physical entities.
On this one climb, I go up to a roof, place a piece of gear, then climb over the roof (it’s just a couple of feet). The piece of protection is good – I know its history, how to place it and its strength rating. I know the rope is good on the same basis. I understand the physics and biomechanics of a fall from the roof.
On the above basis I have a type 2 belief, to use your classification, that I am safe.
Nonetheless, I feel afraid, having a disposition to respond with fear in such a situation, and so believe that I am unsafe.
Hi Keith
Yes I think doubts can cause us to have conflicting dispositions. I may believe I am watching a 3d movie and therefore know some things will appear to be flying out of the screen that will not hurt me. Yet when I duck at what appears to be a rock flying at my head my contradictory “dispositions” are exposed.
BTW Alvin Plantinga also used some mountain climbing analogies when discussing what it would mean to have rational beliefs. As I recall he was making a different point but it does show mountain climbing is an activity that can demonstrate the importance of rational belief.
It goes beyond doubt. There are two different flavors of rationality on display. The first would be better characterized as knowledge – a zone of reliable concepts, a bit of correspondence.
The second would be better characterized as explicable assertions – coherent representations of experiences.
The first permits me to proceed. The second conceptualizes my trepidation.
If you believe in God – you believe in God!! PERIOD! 100% – not 30%.
Going to church does not make you a Christian, any more than standing in your garage makes you an automobile. Being a “Good Christian” makes you want to go to church to reaffirm your belief in your position, and to show others that you hold the same one that they do.
Hi Archon’s Den
Thanks for your comment. I tend to think I, like the vast majority of Christians, have doubts and that means our faith is not 100%. I think this is born out in our actions.
The actions of saints and Martyrs tends to show what it means to have 100% faith. (or at least more faith)
I agree going to church does not make someone a Christian. Certainly non believers and those of other faiths have set foot in Christian Churches – sometimes to steal the valuables out of them. That doesn’t make them Christian.
How we draw the line as to who is a Christian and who is not, can be difficult. But when you go to church every Sunday with a certain mindset I do think that is some indication that you are a Christian. How much of an indication is hard to say. But the polls that track behavior of those who claim to be Christian, find statistically significant differences between those who go to church regularly and those who don’t.