Category Archives: religion

Slavery and Christianity: The First Known Abolitionist Speech.

01 Monday Jul 2019

Posted by in apologetics, atheism, Catholic, christianity, history, law, metaethics, Morality, politics, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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Understanding the ancient world is often difficult for those who were raised in a Christian Culture.  It is very hard to believe that slavery was ubiquitous in the ancient world.  Why did they tolerate it?  It seems like they just treated it as we treat different roles.  Some people will own the restaurant some will bus the tables and some will cook etc.  People can own animals, and people are animals, so why not?   Aristotle expressed this view:

“And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life.”

Aristotle, Politics

 

At first blush Paul’s exhortation to seems take the view that being a slave is just another role people have:

 “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. “Honor your father and mother”—which is the first commandment with a promise— “so that it may go well with you and that you may enjoy long life on the earth.”  Fathers, do not exasperate your children; instead, bring them up in the training and instruction of the Lord.

 

Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ. Obey them not only to win their favor when their eye is on you, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from your heart. Serve wholeheartedly, as if you were serving the Lord, not people, because you know that the Lord will reward each one for whatever good they do, whether they are slave or free.

And masters, treat your slaves in the same way. Do not threaten them, since you know that he who is both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is no favoritism with him.”

Ephesians 6.

At one level this passage seems to accept these roles.  At that level this passage reminds me of my father telling me he didn’t care what I did just whatever I did I should, do it well.     Of course, today we don’t see slavery as just another role.

 

But, he says “And masters treat your slaves in the same way” right after he describes how a slave should treat their master.  What?!?     This is often overlooked by people when they are trying to be critical of Paul and Christianity.  So how should a master treat his slave “the same way” Paul wants a slave to treat his master?  Well let’s fill that in:

 “Obey your earthly [slaves] with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ.  Obey them not only to win their favor when their eye is on you, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from your heart. Serve wholeheartedly, as if you were serving the Lord, not people, because you know that the Lord will reward each one for whatever good they do, whether they are slave or free.”

 

Whoa, that’s pretty crazy stuff for his time.  But, of course, it naturally follows from the view that “the first will be last and the last will be first” Mathew 20:16 and “I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.” Mathew 25:40.  I mean if this is really what that God wanted us to believe you would expect him who has power over us to come and do something like wash the feet of his own creation. John 13.

 

Paul and Christ are doing much more than arguing for a change of legal codes.  They want our heart, mind, and soul to point in the direction of love for another as opposed to us seeing others as tools.  They want us to view our relationships with other people in an entirely different way that cannot be captured in law and works regardless of the laws we live under.

Clearly this passage like so many others in Christianity turns what was the common view on its head.  We are all to be servants of Christ and by that we do what he wants which is to be servants of each other.  Not because we are forced but because of the love he wants us to build for each other.

 

But slavery was accepted everywhere for so long, why did people change their view and start thinking peopled should not own other people?  We see Paul is starting to really upset the apple cart but he still seems to accept the institutional roles themselves at least superficially.    How did we start to see this differently, and start to see the institution of slavery as immoral?  Of course If morality is defined as whatever we want then it seems the change would just be arbitrary like the wind.

 

One way to at least approach an answer to this question, is to examine the reasons given by the first person we know of to argue against Slavery as flat out being immoral.     This will give us an idea of the original grounds to break from that long established but immoral tradition.

 

There were certain Stoics who took a view somewhat similar to Paul’s, in that we are meant to be free in a spiritual sense and this can be extended to the physical sense.  And indeed the Stoic Dr. Piggliucci quotes, Seneca the younger, was so loved by early Christians that he was often referred to as a proto-christian Saint by them!

 

I would liken some of these statements from Stoics to some of Paul’s.    E.g., Paul asks Philemon that he free his slave out of love rather than have him order to do what he ought to do, and there is no such thing as slave or free in Christ,  and that it is good that slaves become free and that they stay free First Corinthians 7:21-24.    Paul like these stoics stopped short of giving a giving lengthy attack on slavery itself.

 

Dr. Piggliucci says  “That said, it is certainly the case that no Stoic questioned the very institution of slavery. But it is rather unfair to criticize Stoicism in particular for this failure. Every single ancient philosophy and religion, including Christianity, has incurred in the same failure.”  He may be right about other ancient philosphys and religions but based on what I say below I think Christianity is indeed different.  Even if we don’t count the teachings of Jesus and Paul as making slavery obsolete we have at least one Ancient Christian attacking slavery.

 

I would also question Dr. Piggliucci suggesting racism had nothing to do with ancient justification for slavery.  He says:

“The Colonial idea of slavery was intrinsically racist, founded on the conceit that some people are literally sub-human, not worthy of the same consideration as the rest of us. That was not the case in Ancient Greece and Rome, where one could become a slave by losing a battle.”

 

Consider this quote from Plato:

“…nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.”

 

Plato, Gorgias

 

Moreover, Aristotle specifically addressed this case and said that if a person who was not naturally a slave was made a slave after being captured in battle (a legal slave) it would be wrong for them not to be freed.  And if a person who was a natural slave was freed by law that would also be wrong not to re-enslave him.  See politics book 1 part 6.

 

What made someone naturally a slave and another naturally a ruler?  That is somewhat unclear but he seems fairly sympathetic to the view that “Helenes” (Greeks) are fit to rule.  Whereas non-Greeks “barbarians”  have no one fit to rule as they are all natural slaves. “But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female.” Politics book one part 2.

 

Aristotle also talks about the inability to understand certain things would make someone more fit to be a slave.    But whatever the details it is fairly clear he sees the natural slaves as inferior to the natural masters.  Here is a quote that also gives us some insight as to some other moral views Christianity inherited from the ancient world:

“And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.”

Aristotle politics book 1 part 5.

 

It is for these reasons I would question Dr. Piggliucci’s statement suggesting the bigotry of the later centuries was not around in ancient times.

 

In any case the first known assault on the very notion of slavery comes from Saint Gregory, the Bishop of Nyssa.  He lived from @335- @395 AD.  I quote a translation of his attack on slavery from a homily on ecclesiastics where the person boasts of owning slaves.  I will offer a rather lengthy quote because it is important to get the reasoning.   The reasoning of the first people to take a different view is evidence of what caused the gradual change to our current views.  Moreover, the first known argument against slavery is in my opinion a text worth reading in its own right.

 

…..as for a human being to think himself the master of his own kind? “I got me slaves and slave-girls”, he says, and homebred slaves were born for me.

 

Do you notice the enormity of the boast? This kind of language is raised up as a challenge to God. For we hear from prophecy that all things are the slaves of the power that transcends all (Ps 119/118,91). So, when someone turns the property of God into his own property and arrogates dominion to his own kind, so as to think himself the owner of men and women, what is he doing but overstepping his own nature through pride, regarding himself as something different from his subordinates?

 

I got me slaves and slave-girls. What do you mean? You condemn man to slavery, when his nature is free and possesses free will, and you legislate in competition with God, overturning his law for the human species. The one made on the specific terms that he should be the owner of the earth, and appointed to government by the Creator – him you bring under the yoke of slavery, as though defying and fighting against the divine decree.

 

You have forgotten the limits of your authority, and that your rule is confined to control over things without reason. For it says Let them rule over winged creatures and fishes and four-footed things and creeping things (Gen, 1,26). Why do you go beyond what is subject to you and raise yourself up against the very species which is free, counting your own kind on a level with four-footed things and even footless things? You have subjected all things to man, declares the word through the prophecy, and in the text it lists the things subject, cattle and oxen and sheep (Ps 8,7- 8). Surely human beings have not been produced from your cattle? Surely cows have not conceived human stock? Irrational beasts are the only slaves of mankind. But to you these things are of small account. Raising fodder for the cattle, and green plants for the slaves of men, it says (Ps 1041 103,14). But by dividing the human species in two with ‘slavery’ and ‘ownership’ you have caused it to be enslaved to itself, and to be the owner of itself.

 

I got me slaves and slave-girls. For what price, tell me? What did you find in existence worth as much as this human nature? What price did you put on rationality? How many obols did you reckon the equivalent of the likeness of God? How many staters did you get for selling the being shaped by God? God said, Let us make man in our own image and likeness (Gen 1,26). If he is in the likeness of God, and rules the whole earth, and has been granted authority over everything on earth from God, who is his buyer, tell me? who is his seller? To God alone belongs this power; or rather, not even to God himself. For his gracious gifts, it says, are irrevocable (Rom 11,29). God would not therefore reduce the human race to slavery, since he himself, when we had been enslaved to sin, spontaneously recalled us to freedom. But if God does not enslave what is free, who is he that sets his own power above God’s?

 

How too shall the ruler of the whole earth and all earthly things be put up for sale?  For the property of the person sold is bound to be sold with him, too. So how much do we think the whole earth is worth? And how much all the things on the earth (Gen 1,26)? If they are priceless, what price is the one above them worth, tell me? Though you were to say the whole world, even so you have not found the price he is worth (Mat 16,26; Mk 8,36). He who knew the nature of mankind rightly said that the whole world was not worth giving in exchange for a human soul. Whenever a human being is for sale, therefore, nothing less than the owner of the earth is led into the sale-room. Presumably, then, the property belonging to him is up for auction too.  That means the earth, the islands, the sea, and all that is in them. What will the buyer pay, and what will the vendor accept, considering how much property is entailed in the deal?

 

But has the scrap of paper, and the written contract, and the counting out of obols deceived you into thinking yourself the master of the image of God? What folly! …

 

The Bishop’s indignation is palpable.   So while many of the ancients seemed to see people as an animal that would have value often based on traits they had no control over, such as intelligence or race etc.  Christianity and Judaism introduced a different way to understand who we are separated by God from the other animals and things of creation.

  1. Humans are priceless. God gave us everything in the world and that is priceless and so as owners clearly we are priceless.
  2. God gave us authority over animals and plants but not other people. Our God given authority does not go that far.
  3. The least shall be first and first shall be last, and how we treat the least is how we treat God himself. (This one was not in the Bishop’s text but permeates the Christian message.)
  4. And yes we are made in the image of God! Jesus built on this idea in saying we should refer to God as our Father.  Hence, we are all children of God.   We don’t try to analyze the worth of human being based on traits like race, ethnicity, intelligence or ability/disability.  We are all Children of God made in his image.    We all know we would not want our own children to be used and thought of as tools for someone else, we can rest assured God does not want that for his children made in his image either.

 

These are the seeds that lead inevitably to the assured destruction of slavery.  So long as we hold to these principles it seems impossible that people would ever treat other people as property again.   But we can also see how the reasoning of the pre-christians (that can indeed lead to our value being reduced based on certain traits) is slipping back into the ethical discourse.   As people, for whatever reason, want to distance their views from Christianity they seem to be saying personhood and our worth is based on certain traits we have rather than affirming the four principles I list above that reveal the sanctity of all human life regardless of the traits that person has.

It took far too long because our views were so different from God’s.  The Christian (or Jewish view when you consider the arguments from Genesis) view was not the view held by any other ancient people.  We believe all humans are connected to God in important ways.  For others mastery of everything was good.  So what could be better than mastery over other humans? “And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects and that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts;”  Aristotle Politics Book 1.   To the ancients, people were fungible and their value was assessed by their traits, like the value of any other animal or thing.

 

But once we started to understand our role and that of God’s it was inevitable slavery would go.  So long as we hold onto that understanding it can never return.   Genesis was a huge part of this understanding.  Those who read Genesis as nothing but a scientific text miss so much. (or even primarily a scientific text)  It portrays us differently than other myths in important ways.  But when people just read it like any other creation myth they miss out on the most important parts.

 

Saint Gregory, the Bishop of Nyssa, offered his congregation good reasons to reject slavery when he wrote that Homily.   Many of the views would be repeated today and throughout history to provide the truest and best foundation for humanism generally.

 

If I said I am in favor of banning slavery based on the arguments presented by Saint Gregory would I be charged with “forcing my religious views on others?”

 

Scientific Knowledge is Overrated

14 Tuesday May 2019

Posted by in apologetics, atheism, Catholic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, religion, Uncategorized

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In our culture saying the title is almost like saying “I hate children.”  How dare anyone suggest that scientific knowledge is overrated?  Clearly the only acceptable view is that science could never be over-rated and it could only possibly be under-rated.   But if we would allow that it is at least possible, then I suggest we consider how highly we rate both the scope of science as well as the value of scientific knowledge.

The claim that religion was there as a “stand in” until science could take it’s place is likely the oddest claim I have heard more than once.   It reveals what I think is a bizarre bias of our time.  Some people think that science and how nature works is so important to know, that they naturally think that was what religion was there for.   God revealed himself in the bible to explain lightening and how the mountains were made.

Our current culture values these sorts of “what is” or “how does this thing work” beliefs way out of proportion so we shouldn’t be surprised that people in our culture come to such an odd view.  The assumption seems to be, of course, the most important parts of any scripture are the ones that might overlap with science.  The fact that such a small fraction of scripture even deals with anything even arguably scientific is just more proof religion is misguided.

My life didn’t really change much after finding out how mountains were made.   Getting a scientific understanding of tectonic plates changed very little in my life and to that extent is not really important to me.   The very notion that Christianity or any religion existed to help us explain the natural world reveals how off kilter the importance we place on this knowledge of the natural world.  Christianity is a religion that helps us address the more important question – “how should we live?”.  The answers science can provide are interesting and sometimes they can help us address that important question.  But science does not address that question directly.     The major religions that exist deals with that directly.    That is the point of these religions – and really it is quite obvious to anyone who knows them.

It seems some people see the question “how should I live?” as a sort of afterthought.  They are so full of reasons to believe this or that is the case and so concerned about having evidence for this or that view of the state of things that when the question comes up it’s almost like would like to wave it away.  Like oh yeah if you want to talk about that silliness then here is my view…. And what follows is often some sort of poorly thought through mantra that demonstrates how little time they spend on it compared to the scientific “what is” questions they want really to get back to.

People now seem to think the most important thing is to fill our heads with beliefs that are more likely true than not and expunge those beliefs that do not pass that evidential muster.  There seems no concern with what seems obviously just as an important question.  How should I live?   Science has taught us many things but that does not mean it is the source of the most important information.

Overrating science is also done in that people try to claim science can answer questions it clearly can not answer.  We saw some of this scientific morality with the Nazis and communists.   But even today we see scientists taking the stage to talk about morality or other philosophical issues.  I am not interested in celebrity views on politics or science or philosophy, but I can see some people are curious about the views of their favorite celebrity.  But scientists are not celebrities, yet we see them selling books or lecturing on philosophy.  Why?   Is it good philosophy?  No, it’s because the scope of that field is overrated.

Science can help us live longer.  However, it does not teach us what to do with the extra time.  Religion does.   There is such a thing as useless knowledge.  And all knowledge is on this spectrum.

I feel like a conversation with certain atheists goes like this:  Why do you collect these acorns?  So I can plant more oak trees.  Why do you want to plant more oak trees?  Because they produce more acorns.  So why do we care they produce acorns?  Well we can then collect the acorns.  Why do you …. Oh wait.  Or why do you learn science?  Science will help us survive longer.  Why should we want to survive longer?  So we can learn more science.  I want to survive longer and I like oak trees, but I hope you can see my point.  It’s fine if you want to argue King Sisyphus is happy.   But, many of these same atheists saying we should live longer for the sake of living longer, also want to convince me that there is so much evil and misery in the world, God should be indicted.

Even studying in philosophy the focus was so much on Does God exist?   And we also focus on how and what it means to “know” a proposition concerning the external world. (See Cartesian Skepticism, and the Gettier problems)  After thoroughly trying to answer those question I ultimately decided it doesn’t really matter how we define “knowledge” as the fundamental problems presented by Descartes and similar arguments still have weight.  I think this time spent in philosophy was well spent because it dealt with a my understanding of a huge amount of beliefs.  It helped me learn that life does indeed have uncertainty and we need to deal with it.   Trying to define the problems away is not helpful.    It also helped me see the obsession our culture has with knowing “what is”.

I hope that is changing.  At the time I was in college majoring in philosophy there were no classes offered in what is now called meta-ethics were we could even start to ask “How should I live?” and what do we even mean to live rightly?  I had to pursue those questions on my own.  I think and hope this is changing.  Answering the question how we should live should not be an afterthought.

Problem of Evil Answered with Logic and Scripture

01 Wednesday May 2019

Posted by in apologetics, atheism, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, religion, scripture, Uncategorized

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The problem of evil is a common objection to Christianity and with some good reason.  I would even admit that certain evils in the world seem to me to amount to some evidence against the Christian God.   But I think the evidence can be shown to be fairly weak when looked at logically and with the aid of scripture.

 

When explaining my view on this problem I always start with this question:  Does God’s omnipotence mean he can violate the rules of logic?  If we answer yes then a the problem of evil is not a problem for God because it is a logical problem – and he is not bound by logic.  So let’s say that “omnipotence” of God means something short of breaking the laws of logic.  Once we understand God is so constrained then we see cracks form in the problem of evil.

Knowledge can’t be good and not good.

Ignorance can’t be bad and not bad.

God can’t have us know what evil is and not know what evil is.

God can’t let us be ignorant of evil and not be ignorant of evil.

We can’t know what the consequences of evil are, if there is no evil to be found.

If suffering is the result of evil then can we really know what evil is unless we know the experience of suffering?

So can we know the experience of suffering without experiencing suffering?

 

And what about the results of good which often are the opposites of suffering – peace, joy etc.?  (there seems no clear cut antonym for all the different aspects of suffering)  Can we know what they are when we don’t understand the opposite?  Can we know what it means to be taller or as tall as without also having an idea of shorter (or not as tall as)?  It seems to me we can’t know these states without knowing something of the opposites.  I can’t understand heat unless I have some concept of lack of heat, i.e., cold.

So if we think Knowledge is good then we might agree that even knowledge of evil is good.  Even if this good is logically linked to our experience of evil.   Now we may think well the good of knowing evil does not outweigh all the suffering evil brings.  God seems to agree.   But nevertheless we would still have to say knowledge is itself a good.  And if we think it is good to allow us to experience all goods then we can’t exclude some goods.  So it does seem there are logical restraints that means some goods entail evil.

So what does this have to do with scripture?

What was that tree God forbade Adam and Eve the fruit of?  Was it an apple tree or a pear tree?  No, it was the fruit of the “Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil”.   In Genesis God commands  “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die.” Genesis 2:16-17.  I mean at first that seems a very odd sort of tree, and not one I remember seeing at the arboretum.   I think this should be a sign that the author of the story is not just telling us some literal event from history but is trying to make a different sort of statement about God.    What does it even mean to taste the fruit that comes from the knowledge of evil?  The fruit/result of knowing evil is, as we have said, suffering.   Can we have knowledge of evil unless we know what it produces?  I don’t think so because such knowledge would be warped.  Some things that may be evil might sound pretty good if it weren’t for the suffering it caused.  Knowing evil without knowing suffering is not really knowing evil.  (“When the woman saw that the fruit of the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eye, and also desirable for gaining wisdom, she took some and ate it.” Genisis 3:6.)

 

Someone can’t know suffering without knowing suffering.   If someone says I know what it is like to be burned over 80% of my body – well the only way he could know that is if he was so burned or at least had that experience.  If he didn’t we would say no you actually don’t “know” that kind of suffering.

 

But this was our decision – not God’s.  He wanted to save us from this fruit.  Are we to think the author just randomly chose the name for that tree or is the author inviting the reader to explore a very deep philosophical issue?  What is “the fruit” of knowing good and evil that we wanted to taste?  When people are so caught up in literal readings that they argue whether the fruit was a pear or an apple my stomach sinks.  They are missing so much.

 

The text invites us to explore deep ideas about our experiences here in this life and our situation existing in this world as we do.    How can we know good and evil without knowing evil?  And how can we know evil if we can’t experience it?  And how can we experience something that is nowhere to be seen?    So the fruit of knowledge of good and evil implies the experience of evil.  But the Bible expresses that God did not want this for us.  But he also wanted us to be free.

 

God is portrayed as our parent who loves us.   Every parent understands this tension between wanting our children to avoid pain but also allow them to choose their own path.  Don’t go down that path, but recognizing there is value in letting us learn so giving us autonomy.

 

We can’t have freedom and not have freedom.

Freedom can’t be good and not be good at the same time.

God can’t have us overcome adversity without us overcoming adversity.

We can’t over come adversity if there is no adversity

Overcoming  adversity can’t be good and not good.

We cannot experience all that is good if we can never experience certain goods.

I can go on and on with logical constraints that imply evil is required for some goods.

 

But isn’t God overdoing it with all the evil in the world?  In other words we might agree we have to experience some evil and suffering to have certain goods but why so much suffering?   Couldn’t God have done it better?  So how should it have been done?  Well we should expect the suffering should be a finite time.  And of course all our lives are indeed finite – that is we die.    And indeed scripture explains that our life is finite –  because we chose to taste the fruit of the tree.

 

“22 And the Lord God said, “The man has now become like one of us, knowing good and evil. He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever.” 23 So the Lord God banished him from the Garden of Eden to work the ground from which he had been taken. 24 After he drove the man out, he placed on the east side[e] of the Garden of Eden cherubim and a flaming sword flashing back and forth to guard the way to the tree of life.”  Genesis 3:22-24

 

 

Beautiful language expressing that God knew it was best we not live forever in this state that the fruits of this knowledge would bring to us.  God knew that knowledge of good and evil would entail suffering.  Is it a coincidence that death was brought into the world at that time?  Some would say God having death enter the world at that time is really a punishment.  I think the opposite.  He is helping us with the mess we got ourselves in.   Making our suffering here finite is the most loving thing to do.  It is only after the time that we chose to know good and evil that God prevents them from living forever.

 

Isn’t that what we would do for those we love.  We would say ok I don’t want you to go down that path because it will cause pain.  But if you choose that path of pain, then you will learn, but we would try to limit the pain.   And then we would make our own sacrifices to help those we love get out of the rut and back on the path where evil and its fruit (suffering) is avoided.  Moreover we would want the benefits of our knowledge to be used.  Good and loving relationships can be better appreciated thanks to this knowledge.   That is the story of God and humanity in a nutshell.

 

I am reminded of a friend in college who said to get a good grade just read the first and last chapters of the book to get the overall point and then memorize a few facts in the middle that you can throw in your test or paper to impress the teacher.  This is close.  Jumping from the first 3 chapters of Genesis and then reading a Gospel will give you a decent idea of Christianity.

 

Two final notes:

Scripture is not saying knowledge is to be avoided.  Remember the metaphor of a tree of the knowledge of good and evil was the *only* tree we were forbidden to eat from.  “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; 17 but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die.” Genisis 2.  So only the tree that allows us to know these particular opposites was off limits.  This suggests that any other sort of knowledge (science history etc.) would be good and not have a negative trade off.  It is only this particular tree of knowledge that is off limits.  That fruit logically had to be packed in a can of worms.   Not necessarily the fruits of other knowledge.

 

Also, notice that God warns of the actions he will take – that they will die.   However, he does not go into detail about why he will take that action or why knowledge of Good and evil will cause so many problems.  Of course, for any such considerations to be appropriately understood by them he would need to give them knowledge of good and evil – exactly that which he was trying to avoid.

Answering the Many Gods Problem

10 Wednesday Apr 2019

Posted by in apologetics, atheism, Athesism Christianity, Catholic, christianity, philosophy, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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One of the common questions Christians run into is this:  Even if you think God does exist how could we possibly know the Christian God is the correct one?  This might come up when addressing Pascals wager but it comes up in other contexts as well.   They will sometimes then go about naming every type of god or spirit that they can find on the internet. (Let’s call these hitherto unknown gods “the gods of the internet”).  This appears to be an invitation to start wasting much more time than this argument should take.   It also seems like an attempt to overwhelm us.   Don’t be waste time or be overwhelmed.  This question can actually be a great invitation to explore how quite a bit of evidence supports the Christian God.

 

If we get to the point that for whatever reason we accept we should believe there is a God, but we need to which god it is, then we should consider “good reasons” to believe one way or another.  As I indicated before, “good reasons” to believe something generally fall into one of three categories.  1) It is theoretically rational to believe (ie. There is evidence that the belief is true.); 2) It is pragmatically rational to believe (that is, weighing the consequences of being wrong or right on this issue favors belief); and 3) It is logically consistent to believe.  With this criteria we can start comparing the gods/religions and see which one wins.

 

What we should not do is try to talk about some imagined “burden of proof” and then try to think if the evidence for this or that god “meets the burden” or does not.  This is not a rational way to choose between multiple different exclusive alternatives.  (You can argue for exclusivity later.  I won’t do it here.)  This is because when we are choosing between multiple exclusive choices we do not necessarily choose the one that is more likely than not true.  It is rational to choose the one that is simply best supported by good reasons even if it is not more likely than not true.  In other words if at the end of the day we say the Islamic God has a 15% chance of being true the Jewish (non-christian) God has 30% of being true the Christian God has a 31% chance of being true and several other gods add up to the remaining 24% we can still say we should choose the Christian God.  Of course pragmatic and logical considerations can come into play but to the extent those are equal then it would be rational to choose the Christian God even though we only give the Christian God a 31% chance and not over a 50% chance of being correct.

 

Getting back to proper reasoning one thing rational people should do in determining whether to believe in one God versus a different God would be to compare the evidence for each.   Of course I think pragmatic rationality can play a role in this as well, but lets set that aside for now and focus on theoretic rationality.   What sort of thing would even be “evidence” for a particular God?

 

Well lots of things could be evidence for God for different people.  If the atheist refuses to believe anything could be evidence for God then ok you are probably dealing with a mind so closed no amount of rational discussion will help.  If that is the case maybe you could use pragmatic reasons.    But let’s say they are at least willing to agree some things could be evidence, what would evidence of God be?

 

Miracles are the thing asked for as proof of God most often.  I know it is what I would want.  Asking for “signs” (the bible’s term for miracles) seems to have been around since at least Judaism itself.  The Gospel of John couldn’t be more clear that he is relating the signs in his Gospel for this very purpose.  He flat out says:

 

“Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of [his] disciples that are not written in this book. But these are written that you may [come to] believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through this belief you may have life in his name. “

John 20:30-31

So the God that offers the best evidence of miracles would seem to me to be the main consideration if not the dispositive one.  What sort of evidence do we have of miracles supporting Zeus or the God of Islam or the Christian God or the other “gods of the internet”?

 

People may have had a miracle in their own life (or the life of someone they know well and trust) which can serve as evidence.  And considering the application of such an event would seem to be very rational thing to do.  But what if you don’t think you, or anyone close to you, has had a miracle happen or even if it did, you don’t know that it points to one God as opposed to another?  Then I think we should look at history and how such miracles are evidence for a particular religion.

 

As far as the miracles actually being proof of one God or another.  It should be clear the miracles done by Jesus himself would support the Christian God.  As it would be clear that miracles done by Mohamed would support the Islamic God.  But even if we grant that lightening striking a particular ship at sea is a miracle, why should we think it is proof of Thor?  So we would need to consider that when looking at the evidence.

 

Now then we have different historical miracle claims that are assigned to different religions.  How do we analyze the competing historical claims?  I suggest we use the same analysis historians generally use.  Bart Ehrman gives several criteria that historians consider when evaluating whether something in history occurred.  Using this criteria seems like a good way to evaluate different miracle claims.

 

Dr. Ehrman says these are the typical criteria historians use in evaluating historical claims:

1)            Multiple sources

 

2)            Preferably Independent sources

 

3)            Non biased sources

 

4)            Contextual credibility

 

5)            Close in time to the events

 

6)            No contradictions/internally consistent

 

They seem to be rational criteria.  So I would suggest that people when considering what God is most likely “the true God” take these criteria into account in evaluating the various historical miracle claims.

 

So, for example, let’s take the “close in time to events.”  Sometimes people argue that those who wrote the new testament did not themselves see Jesus.  They at best could have seen elderly eye witnesses who saw the event.  Ok Ill grant that for argument’s sake.  But now let’s compare that to Zeus.  Who saw Zeus perform a miracle and how long was it between the person who saw Zeus and the person writing about the event?   As we start to go through the list of criteria we may wish the Christian God was better supported but when we compare it to gods like Thor or the various gods of the internet well we see that the Christian God really does do quite well.   Jesus performed many miracles proving his religion.

 

If for example we have records that say someone on a clear day said “Let Thor’s power Strike this ship!” and then the ship was struck by lightening, ok, I would agree that would indeed be some evidence of Thor.  But how do such accounts hold up under historical criteria?   Who claims to have seen it and  when was it recorded in relation to the event, are there multiple independent sources? etc etc.   Encourage your atheist interlocutor to rationally compare these various gods of the internet against Christ’s multiple miracles using this criteria.  Let them decide for themselves whether the Christian God is the most rational God to believe in.   Let them see for themselves that there is good reason to believe in the Christian God.

 

I think that any rational person who actually takes the question of what God is the true God, seriously and pursues the matter in a rational way will almost certainly end up with only a few Gods if not one. Whether a rational person will be left with 4 or 2 or 1 well I am not arguing that right now but clearly there will not be this bewildering number of gods.

 

So just by considering the theoretical rationality we are likely to narrow down the number of Gods dramatically.  We should of course also consider practical rationality.  This might or might not further sort out some Gods.  And then you have the more narrow questions of deciding between the few remaining Gods and in the case of Christianity you have to sort out all the different denominations.  And of course you should do this in a rational way as well.   But we can leave that for another blog.

 

 

“Love” Versus Selfish “Emotional Empathy”

09 Tuesday Apr 2019

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, Catholic, christianity, Morality, philosophy, religion, Uncategorized

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When I speak with atheists about morality they tend to want to talk about Empathy rather than Love.  Maybe empathy seems more “scientific” or exact and, of course, it is less Christian sounding.    It is true that “Love” has many different meanings and the Christian view of Love, agape, is only one sense of the term.  Here I will again offer the Aquinas definition as being good enough for our purposes:

“To love is to will the good of another.”

 

Empathy also has a few different meanings.  Generally, it seems that there are about 3 general types taking shape in the literature:  Emotional (aka, affective), Cognitive, and Compassionate.

 

“Cognitive empathy” is the ability to figure out what someone else will feel.

 

“Emotional empathy” is the one found especially lacking in sociopaths.   Emotional empathy is actually feeling the feelings of others.  With this empathy our brains actually fire in the areas as though we are directly feeling a pain when see someone else being hurt.

 

“Compassionate empathy” is mostly marked off by including a desire to help when someone is suffering.  It may start out from the emotional empathy but it then brings about a will to act.    In short Compassionate empathy basically adds Christian love to the equation.  And indeed, we can do exercises called, unsurprisingly “loving-kindness” meditation that may improve our compassionate empathy.

 

So what should we make of these three types of empathy from a moral perspective?

 

As Christians we are called to love each other and compassionate empathy in the literature is what is most closely associated with that term as understood by Aquinas.  Compassionate empathy adds willing the good of another into the mental state, which as we know is basically Christian love.    Love is a root, if not the root, of Christian Morality, so yes, I am all for that.

 

Cognitive empathy seems fine enough just like any sort of knowledge.  It might have practical benefits in helping us serve others.  However, it is also the type of empathy that allows sociopaths to manipulate others as they seem more adept at this type of empathy than they are at the other two.  But, on the whole, I would say simply having knowledge is not itself morally meritorious.   Like all knowledge I think it is good to have this knowledge but not necessarily morally good.

 

But what about the emotional empathy?  That is the form of empathy where you feel what someone else feels.    It is the form of empathy I think most scientists would refer to, unless they specify otherwise.  (And from this point forward I will just refer to emotional empathy as empathy.)   This is the empathy that most clearly separates the sociopath (who is lacking in this form of empathy) from the normal person.  Sociopaths are, of course, traditionally seen as morally deficient people.    But our new scientific understandings of emotional empathy makes it tricky from a moral perspective.     Let’s dig deeper into what science tells us about this type of empathy.

 

 

Emotional Empathy is a feeling we get.  And as such it is not necessarily meritorious or culpable in itself.  It can help us to love, and to that extent it can be beneficial.   But there are some important points to make.

Empathy Mitigates our Good Deeds by Making them Self Centered

First it seems that emotional empathy makes many moral actions, well, less “selfless.”

 

“As kids, we are told not to hurt others, and we are told not to speak with our mouth full. Kids quickly come to feel very different about violating these two types of rules. Empathy is what makes the difference. Each time you hurt someone, that person’s distress becomes your pain, and you start to associate your vicarious pain with harming others. Violence then starts to feel intrinsically bad. Helping others, on the other hand, makes you feel their happiness, and will start to feel good.”

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-empathic-brain/201307/inside-the-mind-psychopath-empathic-not-always

 

When we avoid hurting others due to empathy, in a real sense, we are actually avoiding hurting ourselves.  When we bring others joy we are bringing ourselves joy.  To the extent we have more empathy we are acting in our own interest when we avoid hurting others.  Sociopaths do not have this pain when they hurt others so they are not restrained by their own self centered desires.

 

The very same parts of the brain can be triggered by emotional empathy that are triggered when we are directly hurt.  As explained by Bloom in his book “Against Empathy”:

 

“I feel your pain” isn’t just a gooey metaphor; it can be made neurologically literal: Other people’s pain really does activate the same brain area as your own pain, and more generally, there is neural evidence for a correspondence between self and other.”

https://fs.blog/2017/12/against-empathy/

 

“For example, meta-analyses on empathy for pain studies have revealed that a portion of the anterior insula and a specific part of the anterior cingulate cortex were consistently activated, both during the experience of pain as well as when vicariously feeling with the suffering of others.”

https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0960982214007702?token=471C4CEBC686EAE67A44C1DE5EC5F3248787E2DCA1A19E4841999B652AFDE1D37FBBA59721230AF2ED203630842E9246

 

So in effect Empathy is like God giving us a shock every time we hurt others.  But some people – sociopaths do not receive this corrective or it is much duller.  To the extent this is why we act morally better than sociopaths I dare say we are not more moral at all.  When our actions are simply driven by our own desire to avoid pain or discomfort we should not claim the moral high ground.  Can this empathy transition into love?  It seems it can but until we get full blown love and remain in simple emotional empathy – avoiding our own emotional pain or guilt seems to cut against what we should consider meritorious intentions.

 

Now to be clear I am not saying there is something wrong with acting in our self interest.   We should act in our own interest all things being equal.  But to the extent we are acting in self interest we shouldn’t think we can properly claim all the merit of acting selflessly for someone else.    And it is that concern for others that we traditionally find most meritorious from a moral perspective.

Empathy Spreads Suffering

The other problem for some is that empathy would seem something we want to avoid if we adopt a morality that focuses on avoiding suffering.   Empathy seems much more poignant when I see someone suffer than when I see someone celebrate.   I share some joy but I think on the whole I would rather not have any empathy experiences as opposed to several empathetic experiences where I share extreme pain or agony coupled with experiences where someone undergoes great joys.    Is it perhaps that envy is cutting into my joy of seeing others experience joy in a way that the empathy relating to pain seems undiluted?   Research supports the conclusion that negative empathy is stronger than positive empathy:

“Empathy is the ability to perceive and react to another person’s emotions. Much attention has been paid to empathy regarding negative emotions, but little is known about how (or if) we respond to positive emotions in the same way. Now, a new study reports that joy may be harder to share than distress.”

http://www.brainblogger.com/2013/01/26/joy-to-the-world-empathy-and-positive-emotions/

 

But even if, contrary to current research, positive and negative empathy were to balance out or even if empathy of positive emotions was stronger we would still need to ask if empathy of suffering was good.  That seems problematic if you want to say empathy and reducing suffering are both important.  Empathy with someone’s suffering increases the suffering in the world.  If we all see a horrible event where someone suffers pain and we have strong empathy we just magnified the amount of suffering in the world.    You have the person who is actually suffering directly and then the suffering all of us empathic people feel!  Whereas if we were all sociopaths well the person suffering would still suffer but that would be the extent of it.

 

As a Christian I certainly don’t view morality as mostly about avoiding pain/suffering so I do view empathy as a good springboard to love.  But I think those who want to view morality in more simplistic terms – as systems to avoid suffering they have a real problem.   The notions that suffering is a brain state and morality should be geared to avoid those brain states has a very hard case to say empathy with others suffering is morally good.

 

I imagine their argument will be along these lines:  Empathy makes people not want to hurt others so less people will be directly hurt by others if we all have empathy.  I would concede that may be true.  I think it would still be mitigated by laws that even selfish sociopaths would want because they protect them as well as others.  Laws would reduce the harm of sociopaths just like they do now.

 

The real problem for a morality that wants to be based on reducing suffering and yet wants to keep empathy is natural and unintentional suffering caused by natural disasters and diseases etc.  If you are all about reducing suffering it seems difficult to argue that multiplying all that suffering to everyone else with empathy is worth the slight decrease in direct harm caused by others.   It just seems that a morality based on reducing suffering would want to root out empathy.  This is one reason why we can easily think of counterfactuals to moral systems that claim to be all about reducing suffering as I presented here:

https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/12/19/a-moral-hypothetical/

 

Again, empathy is contrary to moral systems like Sam Harris’s that seem to want to claim morality is all about suffering and brain states of suffering.  I of course do not believe morality works that way.  I am not thrilled with suffering either – but the goal is love not just the ending of suffering.  So to the extent suffering (through empathy) leads to love then it is ok and even desirable.

I go more into the problems with Harris’s view here:

https://trueandreasonable.co/2019/02/11/sam-harris-worst-possible-misery-for-everyone/

 

In sum, to the extent emotional empathy removes the selfless intentions of our actions and increases suffering it can be problematic for some moral systems.  Love on the other hand seems morally desirable all the time in just about every moral system.

Morality: Problems with Divine Command, Subjectivism, and Anti-realism

15 Friday Mar 2019

Posted by in atheism, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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Divine Command Theory is the view that right and wrong is simply whatever God decides it is.  As Socrates asked in the Euthyphro Dilemma:

1) is an act pleasing to the gods because it is good,

or rather

2) is an act good because it is pleasing to the gods?

 

The Divine command theory says 2 is correct.   An act is good because it is pleasing to God.   Whatever is God’s will to be good, is good.  That is what it means to be good.  Divine command theory is really a form of subjectivism where the person whose judgement is relevant is God.

 

Russ Schaefer-Landau argued against divine command theory (claim 2) along these lines:

 

  1. God either has good reason to will the way he does or he does not
  2. If God has no good reason to will the way he does then his view is arbitrary
  3. If God has good reason to will the way he does then something is good due to those reasons not due to God’s will. Therefore, we would be looking at case 1 in the Euthyphro dilemma not 2.

 

It follows that if divine command theory is true then morality is arbitrary.

 

I actually think the problem with divine command theory runs even deeper.  (And the problems equally apply to all forms of subjectivism/relativism)    I think that if we define moral good as whatever God (or some other person or group or entity) decide is good then the very notion of having a “good reason” to believe an act to be moral or immoral is unworkable.  The issue is dealt with by subjectivists when we consider the problems they have with moral progress.  Moral goodness on the subjectivist view is whatever the relevant person or group decides is morally good.  This decision need not accord with objective reality because under subjectivism morality itself is not based in objective morality.     Divine command theory seems to be just a particular form of moral subjectivism where the relevant person or group is God.

 

On moral subjectivism we make moral progress every time the relevant person or group changes their mind.  If they go from thinking slavery (however we want to define it) is sometimes permissible to thinking it is always wrong then it is moral progress.   Why is this moral progress?  Well they used to think wrongly and now they are correct.  They are by definition always correct in whatever they now believe about morality because their beliefs define what morality is.   They used to think slavery was sometimes permissible but since their current view defines what is moral and they now think slavery is never moral they now hold the correct view.

 

Of course, if they then change their mind again, and again start thinking slavery is sometimes morally permissible, that would again be moral progress!  Why?  Because, the current beliefs of that person (or group) defines what is moral.  So now that they believe slavery is sometimes morally permissible then it is by definition morally permissible.  Therefore they were in error, in the bad old days, when they thought slavery was always wrong.

 

So to that extent anything that causes the relevant person/God/group to change their mind is always good in the sense it leads to this vacuous sort of moral progress.  I hope that seems more distasteful than satisfying.  Is there any other sense that a subjectivist could have a “good reason” to hold a belief about morality?  I think the prospects are dim here is why.

 

As I explained in an earlier blog there are generally 2 different types of good reasons to believe something– theoretical reasons having to do with evidence – and pragmatic reasons which is more focused on consequences.   I agree that logic can also properly constrain a subjectivists beliefs – e.g., they should not lead logical contradiction.  So that might be a third type of good reason.  (Do these three forms of reasons account for all good reasons for belief?  Feel free to comment below.)

But logical contradiction isn’t really going to rule out much in terms of bad reasoning about morality on its own.  Any detail of difference can be pointed to in order to avoid logical contradictions in moral views.  That killing did not happen at precisely 10:27 Am Central time at that exact location.  Therefore my believe that this killing is immoral does not logically contradict my belief this other killing was moral.   To really get to the heart of the matter we need to go beyond just logical contradiction and look at whether there can be good theoretical, and/or practical reasons for an anti-realist to believe a moral claim.

Can there be good theoretical reasons to hold subjective moral beliefs?

So lets address whether there can be good theoretical reason for the subjectivist to believe something is moral.  That is, is there evidence the subjectivist might use to embrace a moral belief?   Because morality, according to the subjectivist, is not based on objective reality but rather subjective it is impossible that there is good evidence to say something is moral. Let me explain further:

 

Let’s say on the divine theory it so happens that racism displeases God.  So on this theory racism is evil.  And saying it is evil is the same as saying it is God’s will we avoid it.  Now someone might say well God has good reasons for that being his will.  Racism causes all sorts of problems and pain etc.  And we may nod along with some of those reasons.  But here is the problem.  It doesn’t matter what the reasons are if we are going to define what is good by whatever pleases God.  If they actually led God to his current view then they are all good reasons – to the extent they led to the current view which by definition is always right.  So maybe none of the reasons we think racism is wrong are the reasons it displeases God.  Maybe God used to think racism was good but then he was kicked in the head by a mule, or he believed that his stock portfolio would increase in value if he changed his tune or he did some tasseography and the tea leaves told him racism was wrong so he just went with that.

 

Now normally we would think well I am glad God now says racism is wrong but those aren’t really good reasons to reject racism.  But this notion of good or bad reasons to believe something is just our attachment to a realist view of morality.  We think racism is wrong because of things that have to do with reality outside of God’s opinion.  But that is not how it works in Divine command theory – or any form of subjectivism.  God’s opinion decides what is in fact good or bad.  So his current view is always the correct view because that is how the correct view is defined.   It is not based on objective reality so our normal notions of saying whether a reason is a “good reason” or a “bad reason” no longer apply at all.

To better understand my point let’s consider what good and bad theoretical reasons for believing an event that occurs in objective reality.  Lets use history as an example.

If someone believes Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide up Eastern Eurpope before World War II, we might agree because based on what we read about the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact it seems that is likely true.  But what if they say no that is not why they believe it.  They believe it based on tasseography. (again based on pattern the tea leaves left in their mug) Ugh another tasseographer! (blame Richard Joyce for teaching me about this craft)

 

But why is that a bad reason to believe?  We may not be able to show such a belief contradicts other views they hold.  But that is not the problem.  The problem is that reason has no connection with the reality of Russia actually having an agreement with Germany before World War II.  The information we read about the Ribbontrop Molotov pact does in fact have a connection to the objective reality of that agreement.  That is we think the history book (or Wikipedia article) traces back to information and documents used by the people actually in leadership positions in Russia and Germany and this connection with objective reality is what makes it a good reason to believe.

 

If the Wikipedia article or book was a complete fabrication made up by some crazy person who decided to write down a dream, then the Wikipedia article would not be a good reason to believe there was an agreement.  Why does the evidence or reason to believe have to track/link with objective reality?    Because the claim “that Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide Eastern Europe before WW2” is a claim about what happened in objective reality.    If the claim we are considering is not itself one about objective reality then it is far from clear why any reasons to believe it must have any connection with objective reality.    So our normal theoretical reasoning as to what constitutes a “good reason” to believe something no longer applies when we are talking about anti-realist morality positions.

Can there Be Good Practical Reasons Supporting a Subjectivist Moral Belief?

So what about pragmatic reasons?  Are there any good pragmatic reasons that can lead a subjectivist to believe one action is moral as opposed to another?   I certainly agree that practical reasons can be a good reason to believe something.  Indeed I think there are good practical reasons to believe in God as that belief will lead us to live a moral life.  But again I am understanding morality as a moral realist does.  That is a very different thing than what a moral subjectivist believes.  Here  and here are earlier blogs where I talk about some of the differences:

 

If you have certain goals that the belief will serve then you may have pragmatic reasons to believe.   So for example if believing you can beat cancer were to really improve your chances of beating cancer then that would be a good pragmatic reason to believe you can beat cancer.   This practical reason is independent of theoretical good reasons based on the evidence that you actually will beat cancer.

 

But it is hard to understand how this could apply in the case of subjective morality.   How would calling something moral actually lead to more rational action/belief?   I think Professor Shaffer-Landaus point comes into particular focus here.  If we say we want to believe this conduct is moral because it will lead to happiness or less pain for myself or others, why would adding the claim that therefor this is “moral” add anything?  Why not just say I want to believe I should act this way because I  want happiness and less pain.  Should the label that this action is subjectively moral motivate us to act that way more then the underlying reasons?  Certainly I would say yes if we were considering an objective morality.  But when we are well aware that morality is a label we subjectively assign then what is the point of even using that language.  To the extent it motivates beyond the underlying reasons it would seem to do nothing but distort motivation beyond the proper reasons.

 

It would seem that since we rule out evidentiary reasons and objective reality then we are only left with motivating reasons.  But then to the extent the morality label adjusts the motivation it would seem only to distort it in a way not supported by the other reasons.    The nihilist/error theorist would seem to accept the same reasons and simply cut out the morality talk as to the extent the morality label does anything it would distort the motivation beyond the underlying reasons – which would lead to less rational action not more.

 

But there are two more problems with coming up with good pragmatic reasons.  One is that saying what we want is not really in our control rationally speaking.  It would be great if it was.  But even though I know certain foods are bad for me I still want them.  The notion that our wants are driving the ship is sort of like admitting we are giving away the keys to matters beyond our control.   Although on this point I would agree the more argument is needed.  Just because I can’t control all my desires that does not mean I can’t control any of them.  But then again what is driving my will to desires some wants and not others – if not beliefs about objective morality?  Just other wants and desires?  If so then it would seem we just say we act this way for those reasons and adding the label of moral or immoral to actions seems superfluous.

 

The second problem arises because fundamentally morality involves ultimate goals.    Morality is generally understood as the end good in itself not something we do so that we can become faster stronger smarter or even pain free etc.  To the extent I wanted to do action X because it would gave me a leg up in my career or to relieve pain, does not mean action X was moral.   It might be moral or it might not.  But an action serving some alternate goal is usually seen as an independent reason to it being moral.  Yes if your boss dies you may end up in his corner office but that does not mean killing him is less immoral.  We should be motivated to do good for the sake of doing good.   So to say some ulterior motives are a good pragmatic reason to say something is moral seems contrary to our fundamental understanding of how morality works.

 

The moral person does not act morally solely because doing so will help her pursue other goals.  To be sure the same act might be moral and it may help us achieve other goals.  But that is a coincidence that can go either way.  Sometimes acting morally can defeat those other goals but we still should act morally.   Morality is the end itself it is not the means to an end.

 

Thus in the end I think Divine Command theory as well as Subjectivism and other anti-realist views of morality generally will have difficulty explaining any sort of “good reason” to believe something is moral.   The whole anti-realism view rules what we normally think of as good theoretical reasons to believe and the combination of core concepts of “anti-realism” and “morality” also rules out the possibility that there are any good pragmatic reasons to believe a moral claim.   Thus the very notion of an anti-realist having a “good reason” to believe a moral claim is ruled out.

Sam Harris and Fundamental Beliefs

06 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, religion, science, Uncategorized

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I listened to a podcast recently by Sam Harris.

 

https://samharris.org/podcasts/108702/

 

As some of you may know arguments might be sound but that does not mean they prove anything to anyone.    Why?  Because people might not believe the premises.   I blogged about the difference between a proof and sound argument here:

 

https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/11/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-gods-existence-proven/

 

The limitations on these premises presents the questions what are our ultimate goals or beliefs?  This was somewhat explored in that podcast starting around 50 minutes in.   Rebecca Goldstein I think correctly identifies some beliefs that we can’t give up without becoming incoherent – such as belief in the rules of logic.  But beyond that what fundamental beliefs would she hold?

 

She mentions belief in an external world and the laws of nature.   That was interesting to me because I have considered that one myself and rejected as not as important as the belief that a rational person can reliably find out what I am supposed to do in life.    I want to explore why I think that here.

 

They also mentioned belief in moral realism as one that is fairly fundamental.   I think this sort of belief is what religious people will often adopt.  I think non-religious people will often try to reduce the importance of morality in forming our beliefs.  I think that is error.

There is a motivational aspect as to how we shape our beliefs and consciences.     I would offer two noble goals in what we want our beliefs to be:

1) People want to believe what is true

2) People want to believe things that lead them to do the right thing

Both of these are noble motivations.  And we obviously should try to form our beliefs with both of these in mind.  But what if certain beliefs lead you to the conclusion there is no right way to act?  That is certain beliefs lead you to believe what is wrong is not wrong because nothing is wrong?  Does a rational person have a good reason to reject that belief?   I think they do.

Now that might violate the first noble motivation.  But let’s think about that motivation just a bit and I think we will see it really is subservient to the second.

The idea that we are here to fill our heads with true beliefs and expunge false beliefs is odd.  If I just tried to memorize phone books few people would say that was really a good way to fill my head, or spend my time, even if I could fill my head with billions of true beliefs that way.    We all understand that knowing certain facts are more important than knowing others.  Just like some false beliefs are more problematic than other false beliefs.

 

But why?  Believing any true fact seems to fit the first noble purpose.   If it is a known fact then it has the quality of being true just as much as any other fact.   So why is it that truly believing some facts are more important, and why does it seem correctly believing other facts is extremely unimportant?   To the extent all the beliefs accord with reality, they are all true, and it is not as though some are “truer” than others.   So it is not the extent of “truthiness” that explains this.

I think ultimately the answer is that believing some facts leads us to live a good life and some falsehoods lead us to a bad life.   And I think this shows the second purpose is naturally more important.

What about some beliefs about morals being more important than other beliefs about morals?   Someone may view it as immoral to hunt deer.  The same person might also think it is immoral to round people up and kill them as was done in Poland at various times.   We do not treat the belief about hunting deer as important as the belief about killing people.  What explains this?  Again the person might believe both are immoral.  But the difference is the latter is more immoral.  So it is still the morality of the issue that makes us view the second belief as more important.  This I believe fairly clearly shows that morality is the more important goal that we want from our beliefs.

 

I think religious people tend to know this truth.  Certain atheists sometimes seem to miss it.  But then after they discuss their science, they tend to drift over to issues of morality and what we should be doing.   Science is great and it answers many interesting questions.  But having true beliefs about “what is” in the observable scientific realm, is not as important as knowing what we should do.  It is forever stuck with a supporting role to the star philosophical/religious question of what we should do.

 

 

The Conjunction Fallacy and the Burden of Proof

11 Thursday Jan 2018

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, christianity, logic, philosophy, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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As you know I think the philosophical burden of proof is a notion harmful to clear thinking.  My first post about it was here.  And here is a blog from someone who thinks very much the same way.  Here I will try to score some further points by undercutting common arguments used to support the view that having a burden of proof is helpful.

 

But first some background, what is the conjunction fallacy? Consider this example from Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman copied from Wikipedia:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Which is more probable?

1) Linda is a bank teller.
2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”

If you thought 2 was more probable, then you committed this fallacy.  It is a formal fallacy.  And it basically says that the probability of A+B will always lower or equal than the probability of A. As we add conditions the probability can only go down never up.

Why is this tricky to some people? (apparently most people chose option 2) Given the description of Linda many people might think she sounds like a feminist. Moreover, she does not sound like a bank teller. So the first option seems to only have what people think is unlikely.  Even though second option has what seems unlikely it also has what seem likely too. So the second option may seem preferable. But mathematically the second option will never be more likely than the first, because every time the second option holds true the first does as well.

When we add details to a claim the probability tends to drop. The probability that I am in front of my computer now, is greater than the probability that I am now in front of my computer wearing a shirt, which is greater then the probability that I am now in front of my computer wearing a brown shirt. This is just how logic works.  I think many of us know this and build this into our understanding of the world. So what does this have to do with the burden of proof?

If you go to youtube and type in burden of proof the first video to come up will be this one:

Listen to the first 20 seconds.
What is happening?  Well if you notice the person is not just asking whether “something” exists “in space” that we don’t have evidence of and whether we should believe that. Which I tend to think is true. But how would that help his case for “the burden of proof”? Of course it wouldn’t.

So he doesn’t just ask whether a general thing exists.   Instead he gets absurdly detailed with his description.  It is not something we don’t know about somewhere in space but under the surface of Pluto! And it is not just “something” its not even just some form of life, but a walrus. And of course even that is not enough. It is a “tiny” “were” walrus. But not only that it is a “psychic” tiny “wer”walrus. But no only that it is a tiny psychic werewalrus that “sends them psychic messages.” But not only that the messages come “every midnight.” And not only that but it does this while juggling skulls…..

 

Ok. So by now if you understand the conjunction fallacy  then you will know that amount of detail alone will drastically drive down the probability. There is no need to appeal any “burden of proof” to not believe in this creature. The probability is naturally driven down just by understanding the fallacy of conjunction.

It’s amazing that this video received 13,000 likes when it is really just an obvious play on this formal fallacy. Now if you are like me you will see this quite often from atheists. The other day when I said there is no philosophical burden of proof I was asked whether I believe “that there is an imperceptible penguin named “Percival” standing right across the room from me, wearing his imperceptible tuxedo and his imperceptible monocle and his imperceptible derby hat, holding his imperceptible pocket-watch.”

Now I want to point out that the proponents of a burden of proof who use these examples are not themselves committing the conjunction fallacy. But rather they just seem oblivious to its logic. It is the logic that makes the conjunction fallacy a formal fallacy that makes the probability of their examples quite low. So when you see these examples the response is not that they are committing a fallacy. Rather the response is more like yes the conjunction fallacy is indeed a fallacy so the probability of your extremely detailed scenario is low.

If you express doubts about “the philosophical burden of proof” you can expect this sort of thing. They won’t ask whether you can believe there is something somewhere we do not have evidence for. No, they will not even ask whether there is some species of life we have no evidence of yet. Rather they will ask about a particular horse that we have no evidence of. But not just a horse, but a horned horse, but not just a horned horse, but a horned horse with exactly one straight long horn coming out of its head. And often even that won’t be enough the horned horse will have to be pink.

And you might respond explaining this fallacy and ask them whether they believe there is something somewhere he/she does not yet have evidence of. I certainly believe there are things that exist that I have no evidence of. For example there very well may be a particular cricket in the southwest United States that I have no evidence of.

Which brings me to another point here. There is more than just the conjunction fallacy at work here. There are also background beliefs. There are probably crickets in the southwest United States. But when and how did a walrus get to Pluto? (forget the whole juggling psychic were bit)

Perhaps the classic example of this sort of argument is Russel’s Teapot. Russel said:
“ … nobody can prove that there is not between the Earth and Mars a china teapot revolving in an elliptical orbit, but nobody thinks this sufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice. I think the Christian God just as unlikely.”

So again, its not just something in space we don’t have evidence of.  It is something between the Earth and Mars and revolving in an elliptical orbit. It is not just something but a piece of China. And it is not just China but a China teapot. So we can see the logic of  conjunction fallacy at work reducing the probability.

But we also have background beliefs and evidence at work as well. Plantinga wrote:
“Clearly we have a great deal of evidence against teapotism. For example, as far as we know, the only way a teapot could have gotten into orbit around the sun would be if some country with sufficiently developed space-shot capabilities had shot this pot into orbit. No country with such capabilities is sufficiently frivolous to waste its resources by trying to send a teapot into orbit. Furthermore, if some country had done so, it would have been all over the news; we would certainly have heard about it. But we haven’t. And so on. There is plenty of evidence against teapotism.”

Another example might be if I say if we randomly pick a house in a New York suburb will there be three black horses in the Garage? You might say no. One reason would be conjunction fallacy. But also you would have back ground beliefs about what suburban houses likely have in their garage. If I asked does that house have light fixtures in it, well then you might say yes.

So Plantinga brings up evidence. And I think that may be a good way to describe what he is doing. But sometimes there are things that just don’t accord with our background beliefs. Now maybe these background beliefs are rational maybe they are not. Sometimes it may be difficult to completely understand or articulate why a certain claim seems true or untrue. Is there something beyond the known universe? In any case we have far more beliefs than we may even consciously realize.

For example, I never realized I believe plaid cats do not exist until last month. But I suppose I always believed it. (that is I was inclined to act in a way that accorded with the statement “there are no plaid cats”) This may be a sad fact of this kluge we call our brains. But it does not justify erecting some imagined burden of proof.  That is just piling error on top of error. When we consider 1) our background beliefs, 2) evidence and 3) the logic of the conjunction fallacy there is no reason to appeal to the burden of proof.

If you are so inclined I would love it if people would post a link to this blog in the comments of the above youtube video. Perhaps we can get a discussion going and deepen everyone’s understanding of this issue.

In Support of Religious Extremism

30 Tuesday May 2017

Posted by in Catholic, christianity, Islam, Morality, philosophy, religion

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No I don’t want to be violent.  And of course, there is no logical reason to think religious extremism means violence.

Many in religious orders give away everything they own and dedicate their lives to Christ including an oath of celibacy.  That’s extreme.   Some monks and sisters dedicate their lives to prayer, and some even take a vow of silence.  That’s extreme.  Those many martyrs present and past could avoid death by simply saying words that would run counter to their religion.  That’s Extreme.   People like Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., chose to be arrested and put their lives in jeopardy in order to act as they believed their religion required.  (Anyone who thinks his actions were not religiously motivated should listen to A Knock at Midnight.)   What about Jainism?  Some practitioners are so non-violent that they were a mask so as not to kill any bugs through breathing and sweep the floor before they walk so as not to tread on any insects.   All of this is extreme religion and has nothing to do with violence.   I could go on with examples but hopefully by now you can see that it is odd to equate religious extremism with violence.

 

So why has our language developed as if “religious extremism” is violent when obviously this does not fit?  There are at least two reasons.

 

  • It diverts attention away from Islam for the violence perpetrated in it’s name.
  • It sends the message that religion is fine just don’t take it too seriously.

Of course, these goals fit well with different agendas people have.  What’s my point?  My point is mainly that people recognize how language is being manipulated.  Hopefully, now when you read my title you will have a different and truer impression of what I am saying.

 

Finally, I will say that this post was inspired by a you tube video by Sam Harris.  Yes, I have been critical of him in many places but I think he made a good point here.