Tag Archives: meta-ethics.

Theism’s Role in the Roots of Political Disagreement

06 Thursday Aug 2020

Posted by in apologetics, atheism, christianity, law, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, politics, religion

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In the last few blogs I have posted about some economic data that I think is relevant to political discussions in the US. I have also commented on Eric’s blog trying to explain why some Christians may vote republican and why Jesus was not a socialist. We quickly got in the weeds about data and why we think our data is more important and why we think the facts we mention are more important etc. I think all of those arguments are important in political debate. But neither Eric nor I are really trying to run a political blog. I want my blog to be more philosophical with an aim to show why being a theist is more intellectually fulfilling and coherent than being an atheist.

That topic will necessarily cover a wide variety of subtopics from meta-ethics, morality, to free will, to science, history, scripture, and yes politics. I think Eric and I would both agree that certain political views are anti-christian. But my disagreement with him was that we shouldn’t consider people who vote for one party or the other as Christians. Each party has a wide range of policies that they adopt and rarely are you going to find a party that perfectly matches our christian views. To the extent we are going to say political views on certain policies are christian or anti-christian those policies need to be considered individually. That is why I think Christians can be Democrats or Republicans or even Socialists.

The Catholic Church I believe has done a decent job (although far from perfect) of navigating these debates in this way. It has taken specific stances on issues that it believes are anti-christian but by and large has not emphasized certain political parties as being “Christ’s party” or the “anti-christ’s party”. It should be obvious to anyone reading the Gospels that Christ was not a politician and he was not preaching a political agenda. This is a difference between Islam and Christianity.

But part of the debate between theists and atheists is more centered around which view leads to better government. This is a much more philosophical question. So you might ask if Jesus was not a politician why would we say a theistic outlook is could lead to a better government? And the answer is because the theist has a fundamentally different view of what they are and how they get rights than the atheist. And this fundamentally different view has led to various issues over the past couple of centuries.

All laws are intended to promote certain goods. So questions of about whether morals exist, what they are, and how we know them, will be foundational for any government that is enforcing laws. Most of my blog explains why I believe an atheistic worldview completely fails to establish a coherent view of morality. Without real morality debating laws is essentially the same as debating whether red or white wine is preferable (subjectivism) or whether batman would beat the silver surfer in a fight (fictionalism).

The foundational belief that all humans are made in the image of God is the great equalizer and has provided a basis to reject slavery, racism and killing humans deemed undesirable. Rejecting the idea all humans are made in the Image of God removes a massive barrier to these practices. Efforts to create any similarly sized barrier have not yet materialized.

Theism supports the belief that our rights come from God and therefore the state can violate them. Atheists will often argue that rights are a creation of the state. This is a very different view and has had catastrophic consequences throughout history.

I am not saying Atheists can not run a government or have a moral society. But since they reject the notion that we are all made in the image of God that can be a severe foundational problem. We see this foundational crack play out in many different policies from racism, life issues, free speech, animal rights versus human rights, the relationship between the government and the individual, the relationship between church and state, and many more.

I have drafted a few blogs about some of these issues and hope to post about them in the future.

But for now I would recommend a pretty interesting interview that touches on some of these concerns. Ben Shapiro is a Jewish political commentator that worked his political views back to philosophy. (Yes many of the philosophical arguments I make would also support the Jewish theism.) Whereas I think I worked out philosophy to its political implications. So I think we sort of came at it from different directions but ended up meeting on some common philosophical ground. Now my goal is not to say people should adopt Ben Shapiro’s political views. I do think he does a good job representing conservative positions but I also think people should make sure they understand the positions of democrats and socialists.

Rather I recommend this video for the more philosophical aspects of his discussion. This is mostly covered in 20:00 to about 47:20 so if you are not interested in his personal life you may want to skip there.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZETvBSlu1tg&t=3914s

Ad Hoc Reasoning Suits Moral Subjectivism and Anti-Realism

25 Tuesday Jun 2019

Posted by in apologetics, atheism, christianity, epistemology, metaethics, Morality, rationality, Uncategorized

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The subjectivists I speak with seem to treat the topic of morality as though we can have a reasoned discussion in the same way we might about facts of reality.  I think many times the moral anti-realist doesn’t fully appreciate the problems with this view.   I explain why I think the subjectivist will have trouble with the very notion of having any sort “good reason” to believe here and here.

There I argued that there are 3 general types of “good reasons” to believe something.  First are theoretical reasons, second pragmatic reasons (see this blog for a philosophical explanation of the distinction) and third we would have good reason to believe something if not believing it caused a contradiction in our beliefs.  In the earlier blog I merely said that it is simply too low a bar to only ask that the views not lead to logical contradiction.   But I want to discuss the coherency condition more fully here.

I do concede that the constructivist can at least appeal to internal coherency as a way of preferring beliefs.  Overall, I think this bar is too low but it is especially low when we understand that objective reality itself will not constrain the beliefs we do come up with.  This blog will explain how the rational quality/virtue of consistency/coherency is trivially easy for the subjectivist.

Consider the fact that many people thought Hitler had many internal inconsistencies in his thought.  A subjectivist might say this would prevent them from following his moral scheme.  But let’s consider one such inconsistency that we often hear and see how that really would not be a problem for the subjectivist.   Roughly the argument is made that Hitler was inconsistent in saying

  1. The proper German must be, blond haired, blue eyed, and have great genes for athleticism.
  2. Yet he had none of those traits

and still he thought

3.He was a proper German.

Now if these were the views he held, and for the sake of argument let’s say they were, then I would agree they are inconsistent.

So what could he do?  Well he could just add to the first claim that “…. unless that person was Adolf Hitler.”   There that takes care of that inconsistency!  You might say well there might be another Adolf Hitler that he wanted to exclude from being a proper German.  And we can just say that “…. unless that person was Adolf Hitler who was born on such and such a date and hour at such and such a place…”  We could also make these exceptions for Goering and Himmler etc.

These exceptions seem dubious because they are “ad hoc.” Ad hoc additions to a theory are those that seem irregular from the overall theory but they are included for the sole purpose of saving our theory or view.  Normally we frown on ad hoc explanations.

One of the reasons Kepler’s heliocentric theory of elliptical orbits was preferred over the Copernican system involving perfect circles (the Greeks like Ptolemy thought circular motion was more perfect) was because the Copernican system had epicycles.  Smaller circular motions of the planets were added as well as the larger orbit.     http://www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/AST101/keplers_laws.html

Epicycles are I think it is fair to say another example of ad hoc reasoning.  In that I am sure Copernicus would agree he was only including the epicycles to shoe horn his theory of perfectly circular orbits into the reality he observed. That was the sole reason to posit the existence of epicycles.   If the math and observation worked without epicycles then Copernicus would not have suggested them.   Once Kepler showed that the math works with ellipses (no epicycles needed) people tended to prefer that system.   This was all before Newton and his theories about inertia etc.

Why should we be suspicious of ad hoc reasoning?  It is because as the products of the culture of Athens and Jerusalem we tend to think A) that reality/truth is not created by our beliefs about it so it is not going to be different so it suits our beliefs, and B) Copernicus was making a claim about objective reality.

Of course, if you are subjectivist you think differently.  Subjectivists think the truth about morality is dependent on our view of it.  So in that case A is not something we accept.    To the extent you think our moral constructs are unconstrained by objective reality then you also reject B.     There is no objective reality we are trying to explain.   Rejecting either A or B seems to take all the sting out of the charge or ad hockery.   Morality is what we make it – or so they say.    So there is no reason to prefer the regularity we see in objective reality.

I mean I can’t like and dislike the taste of the same pickles at the same time in the same way, but it is just fine that it used to be those pickles tasted bad but now they are good.  No explanation is necessary.  My mental state makes it “good” and that can change in an arbitrary way.   And once we break from objective reality and its apparent regularity, it is ridiculously easy to be consistent.  It was OK for me to kill a minute ago but I wouldn’t do it now?  Ok no problem, it’s just that my relevant mental state is different now.   We are not saying our beliefs about morality corresponds with any objective reality – indeed we are saying no such objective reality exists for them to correspond with – so there is no reason to be against ad hoc views.

Do we see ad hockery in moral theories?  Yes I gave a few examples that I think are common.

We should care about well being of all sentient creatures except when we don’t.  See animal rights 

In suffering being the key – except when it is not.  Oral Surgeon case. 

Empathy is great even though it seems to add suffering – well we like it anyway!

Of course, people, especially anti-realists, can have all sorts of views on morality so it is hard to explain any case that will apply to everyone.  But for me it was just a matter of really thinking through moral issues and being honest with myself about the grounds I claimed to have as a basis.  I think most people try to be honest with themselves, but I don’t think people often try to think through moral issues that frequently.

In law school we study a huge number of cases involving difficult moral issues. How much the students tried to understand the reasoning as opposed to just learn the law seemed to vary.  Moreover, law school and legal cases do not usually dive into the deep understanding of moral concepts but rather just tends to refer to vaguely worded values.     And, of course, most people have not gone to law school or had any similar exposure to the variety of moral cases that are involved.    Coming to this realization (that creating your own morality with no objective anchor is extremely arbitrary) requires both an inclination and experience that are both uncommon.   So I am not surprised that many people think the amount of ad hoc reasoning might be rare.

When what we decide defines a very concept like “pickles are good” means, such and such fact about my view toward them, then we hardly need to come to any principled reasons for why pickles were “bad” before but now they are “good.”    If I didn’t like pickles yesterday but do today, it’s no big deal.

I see no reason for the subjectivist to reject ad hoc explanations.  But for me it made this whole exercise of supposedly “deliberating” about morality in order “decide for myself what matters” too much of a charade.  I am constantly reminded of the people in allegory of the cave who keep insisting to the philosopher who saw reality that what they are doing with the shadows is important.  I simply have no interest in playing.  My missing out on this involves extremely low stakes.

So yes it may be correct that there is no objective moral realism.  So I don’t discount that possibility.    And if I live my life based on a false belief in moral realism then I agree it was in vain.  But if I just missed out on this big charade, I am perfectly at peace taking that risk.   In fact, I am not sure I can fully express how much at peace I am about taking that risk.

Morality: Problems with Divine Command, Subjectivism, and Anti-realism

15 Friday Mar 2019

Posted by in atheism, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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Divine Command Theory is the view that right and wrong is simply whatever God decides it is.  As Socrates asked in the Euthyphro Dilemma:

1) is an act pleasing to the gods because it is good,

or rather

2) is an act good because it is pleasing to the gods?

 

The Divine command theory says 2 is correct.   An act is good because it is pleasing to God.   Whatever is God’s will to be good, is good.  That is what it means to be good.  Divine command theory is really a form of subjectivism where the person whose judgement is relevant is God.

 

Russ Schaefer-Landau argued against divine command theory (claim 2) along these lines:

 

  1. God either has good reason to will the way he does or he does not
  2. If God has no good reason to will the way he does then his view is arbitrary
  3. If God has good reason to will the way he does then something is good due to those reasons not due to God’s will. Therefore, we would be looking at case 1 in the Euthyphro dilemma not 2.

It follows that if divine command theory is true then morality is arbitrary.

 

I actually think the problem with divine command theory runs even deeper.  (And the problems equally apply to all forms of subjectivism/relativism)    I think that if we define moral good as whatever God (or some other person or group or entity) decide is good then the very notion of having a “good reason” to believe an act to be moral or immoral is unworkable.  The issue is dealt with by subjectivists when we consider the problems they have with moral progress.  Moral goodness on the subjectivist view is whatever the relevant person or group decides is morally good.  This decision need not accord with objective reality because under subjectivism morality itself is not based in objective morality.     Divine command theory seems to be just a particular form of moral subjectivism where the relevant person or group is God.

 

On moral subjectivism we make moral progress every time the relevant person or group changes their mind.  If they go from thinking slavery (however we want to define it) is sometimes permissible to thinking it is always wrong then it is moral progress.   Why is this moral progress?  Well they used to think wrongly and now they are correct.  They are by definition always correct in whatever they now believe about morality because their beliefs define what morality is.   They used to think slavery was sometimes permissible but since their current view defines what is moral and they now think slavery is never moral they now hold the correct view.

 

Of course, if they then change their mind again, and again start thinking slavery is sometimes morally permissible, that would again be moral progress!  Why?  Because, the current beliefs of that person (or group) defines what is moral.  So now that they believe slavery is sometimes morally permissible then it is by definition morally permissible.  Therefore they were in error, in the bad old days, when they thought slavery was always wrong.

 

So to that extent anything that causes the relevant person/God/group to change their mind is always good in the sense it leads to this vacuous sort of moral progress.  I hope that seems more distasteful than satisfying.  Is there any other sense that a subjectivist could have a “good reason” to hold a belief about morality?  I think the prospects are dim here is why.

 

As I explained in an earlier blog there are generally 2 different types of good reasons to believe something– theoretical reasons having to do with evidence – and pragmatic reasons which is more focused on consequences.   I agree that logic can also properly constrain a subjectivists beliefs – e.g., they should not lead logical contradiction.  So that might be a third type of good reason.  A fourth would be if it is self evident. (Do these four forms of reasons account for all good reasons for belief?  Feel free to comment below.)

But logical contradiction isn’t really going to rule out much in terms of bad reasoning about morality on its own.  Any detail of difference can be pointed to in order to avoid logical contradictions in moral views.  That killing did not happen at precisely 10:27 Am Central time at that exact location.  Therefore my believe that this killing is immoral does not logically contradict my belief this other killing was moral.   Edit: I address the problem of ad hoc logic being a good reason for subjective beliefs here.

Moral truths are certainly not self evident in the way that for example the axioms of logic are self evident.  To contradict our moral views does not need to lead us into a situation that is impossible to even imagine.   Like trying to imagine A and not A at the same time and in the same respect seems impossible to even conceive.  

To really get to the heart of the matter we need to go beyond just logical contradiction and look at whether there can be good theoretical, and/or practical reasons for an anti-realist to believe a moral claim.

Can there be good theoretical reasons to hold subjective moral beliefs?

So lets address whether there can be good theoretical reason for the subjectivist to believe something is moral.  That is, is there evidence the subjectivist might use to embrace a moral belief?   Because morality, according to the subjectivist, is not based on objective reality but rather subjective it is impossible that there is good evidence to say something is moral. Let me explain further:

 

Let’s say on the divine theory it so happens that racism displeases God.  So on this theory racism is evil.  And saying it is evil is the same as saying it is God’s will we avoid it.  Now someone might say well God has good reasons for that being his will.  Racism causes all sorts of problems and pain etc.  And we may nod along with some of those reasons.  But here is the problem.  It doesn’t matter what the reasons are if we are going to define what is good by whatever pleases God.  If they actually led God to his current view then they are all good reasons – to the extent they led to the current view which by definition is always right.  So maybe none of the reasons we think racism is wrong are the reasons it displeases God.  Maybe God used to think racism was good but then he was kicked in the head by a mule, or he believed that his stock portfolio would increase in value if he changed his tune or he did some tasseography and the tea leaves told him racism was wrong so he just went with that.

 

Now normally we would think well I am glad God now says racism is wrong but those aren’t really good reasons to reject racism.  But this notion of good or bad reasons to believe something is just our attachment to a realist view of morality.  We think racism is wrong because of things that have to do with reality outside of God’s opinion.  But that is not how it works in Divine command theory – or any form of subjectivism.  God’s opinion decides what is in fact good or bad.  So his current view is always the correct view because that is how the correct view is defined.   It is not based on objective reality so our normal notions of saying whether a reason is a “good reason” or a “bad reason” no longer apply at all.

To better understand my point let’s consider what good and bad theoretical reasons for believing an event that occurs in objective reality.  Lets use history as an example.

If someone believes Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide up Eastern Eurpope before World War II, we might agree because based on what we read about the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact it seems that is likely true.  But what if they say no that is not why they believe it.  They believe it based on tasseography. (again based on pattern the tea leaves left in their mug) Ugh another tasseographer! (blame Richard Joyce for teaching me about this craft)

 

But why is that a bad reason to believe?  We may not be able to show such a belief contradicts other views they hold.  But that is not the problem.  The problem is that reason has no connection with the reality of Russia actually having an agreement with Germany before World War II.  The information we read about the Ribbontrop Molotov pact does in fact have a connection to the objective reality of that agreement.  That is we think the history book (or Wikipedia article) traces back to information and documents used by the people actually in leadership positions in Russia and Germany and this connection with objective reality is what makes it a good reason to believe.

 

If the Wikipedia article or book was a complete fabrication made up by some crazy person who decided to write down a dream, then the Wikipedia article would not be a good reason to believe there was an agreement.  Why does the evidence or reason to believe have to track/link with objective reality?    Because the claim “that Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide Eastern Europe before WW2” is a claim about what happened in objective reality.    If the claim we are considering is not itself one about objective reality then it is far from clear why any reasons to believe it must have any connection with objective reality.    So our normal theoretical reasoning as to what constitutes a “good reason” to believe something no longer applies when we are talking about anti-realist morality positions.

Can there Be Good Practical Reasons Supporting a Subjectivist Moral Belief?

So what about pragmatic reasons?  Are there any good pragmatic reasons that can lead a subjectivist to believe one action is moral as opposed to another?   I certainly agree that practical reasons can be a good reason to believe something.  Indeed I think there are good practical reasons to believe in God as that belief will lead us to live a moral life.  But again I am understanding morality as a moral realist does.  That is a very different thing than what a moral subjectivist believes.  Here  and here are earlier blogs where I talk about some of the differences.

 

If you have certain goals that the belief will serve then you may have pragmatic reasons to believe.   So for example if believing you can beat cancer were to really improve your chances of beating cancer then that would be a good pragmatic reason to believe you can beat cancer.   This practical reason is independent of theoretical good reasons based on the evidence that you actually will beat cancer.

 

But it is hard to understand how this could apply in the case of subjective morality.   How would calling something moral actually lead to more rational action/belief?   I think Professor Shaffer-Landaus point comes into particular focus here.  If we say we want to believe this conduct is moral because it will lead to happiness or less pain for myself or others, why would adding the claim that therefor this is “moral” add anything?  Why not just say I want to believe I should act this way because I  want happiness and less pain.  Should the label that this action is subjectively moral motivate us to act that way more then the underlying reasons?  Certainly I would say yes if we were considering an objective morality.  But when we are well aware that morality is a label we subjectively assign then what is the point of even using that language.  To the extent it motivates beyond the underlying reasons it would seem to do nothing but distort motivation beyond the proper reasons.

 

It would seem that since we rule out evidentiary reasons and objective reality then we are only left with motivating reasons.  But then to the extent the morality label adjusts the motivation it would seem only to distort it in a way not supported by the reasons.    The nihilist/error theorist would seem to accept the same reasons and simply cut out the morality talk as to the extent the morality label does anything it would distort the motivation beyond the underlying reasons – which would lead to less rational action not more.

 

But there are two more problems with coming up with good pragmatic reasons.  One is that saying what we want is not really in our control rationally speaking.  It would be great if it was.  But even though I know certain foods are bad for me I still want them.  The notion that our wants are driving the ship is sort of like admitting we are giving away the keys to matters beyond our control.   Although on this point I would agree the more argument is needed.  Just because I can’t control all my desires that does not mean I can’t control any of them.  But then again what is driving my will to desires some wants and not others – if not beliefs about objective morality?  Just other wants and desires?  If so then it would seem we just say we act this way for those reasons and adding the label of moral or immoral to actions seems superfluous.

 

The second problem arises because fundamentally morality involves ultimate goals.    Morality is generally understood as the end good in itself not something we do so that we can become faster stronger smarter or even pain free etc.  To the extent I wanted to do action X because it would gave me a leg up in my career or to relieve pain, does not mean action X was moral.   It might be moral or it might not.  But an action serving some alternate goal is usually seen as an independent reason to it being moral.  Yes if your boss dies you may end up in his corner office but that does not mean killing him is less immoral.  We should be motivated to do good for the sake of doing good.   So to say some ulterior motives are a good pragmatic reason to say something is moral seems contrary to our fundamental understanding of how morality works.

 

The moral person does not act morally solely because doing so will help her pursue other goals.  To be sure the same act might be moral and it may help us achieve other goals.  But that is a coincidence that can go either way.  Sometimes acting morally can defeat those other goals but we still should act morally.   Morality is the end itself it is not the means to an end.

 

Thus in the end I think Divine Command theory as well as Subjectivism and other anti-realist views of morality generally will have difficulty explaining any sort of “good reason” to believe something is moral.   The whole anti-realism view rules out what we normally think of as good theoretical reasons to believe and the combination of core concepts of “anti-realism” and “morality” also rules out the possibility that there are any good pragmatic reasons to believe a moral claim.   Thus the very notion of an anti-realist having a “good reason” to believe a moral claim is ruled out.

Evidence of Objective Moral Realism

10 Tuesday May 2016

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, Uncategorized

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A fellow blogger and sometime commentator here, Howie, asks some questions for theists.

https://truthiselusive.wordpress.com/2016/04/22/meaningful-sadness/

He wonders what effect would it have on our morals if we suddenly found out God did not exist.  It’s a great question and I found I could spend allot of time answering this.

 

In my response I indicate that “I would highly doubt any objective morality exists in reality, and if it did exist I would not believe we had any reliable way of knowing what it was.”

 

I have blogged extensively about the second part of that statement:

https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/02/24/a-problem-with-the-reliability-of-moral-beliefs/

Here I want to address the first part.  I want to explain why “I would I highly doubt any objective morality exists in reality” if I found out God did not exist.

 

But first, I want to reiterate that I do not think there is any logical inconsistency with atheism and belief in objective morality.   That said I am unaware of any actual evidence that an atheist would have for believing in objective morality.    That is, if we were to know there is no God then all the evidence we have for objective morality goes out the window.   It’s one thing to say objective morality is logically possible, it’s another to say we have some evidence that it is true.

 

To understand my position let’s start with a reverse question for atheists.   Let’s say you suddenly find out that the Christian God exists.  What would that mean for your views on morality?

 

I would think most people would agree that if the Christian God exists, then it’s very likely that objective moral realism is true.    God orchestrated our existence and reality so that we might be ultimately judged and this judgment will be just.  Reality would have been built with this moral feature.

 

From that, it follows that evidence that the Christian creator God exists is also evidence that objective morality is a feature of reality.   The evidence that the Christian God exists would be things like the miracles recorded in scripture.  Again people can debate whether this is strong evidence or weak evidence, and what if any burden of proof there is, but it is “some evidence.”  This also happens to be the only evidence that our objective reality contains moral characteristics. (I don’t mean to exclude other religions that teach of a Creator God who had a hand in creating a moral reality.  So yes evidence for Islam, or Judaism would also be evidence for objective moral realism but here for simplicity sake I am just taking Christianity versus atheism.)   So the logic is exhibit A suggest exhibit B.  Exhibit B Suggests exhibit C.  A = miracles B=Christian God exists and C = Objective moral realism is true.

 

Do we have other evidence that objective morals are actually a feature of reality?  I really don’t think so.  Again because “wrongness” cannot be detected by our 5 senses it seems impossible to have evidence of it outside of testimonial evidence from someone who is not bound by our 5 senses.

 

The fact that we feel strong guttural emotional responses when we see certain “good” or “bad” actions is not, to my mind, evidence that there is actually a real objective truth to moral claims.  However, if something with a supernatural understanding designed us then of course we might think our emotions are properly cued to these real moral truths.

 

So the Christian God existing would be strong evidence that real objective morals would exist.  If we were to eliminate that evidence of objective moral reality existing (Say because we “find out” no God exists) then we are hard pressed to find *any* evidence of objective moral reality.   That’s not to say its logically impossible for objective moral reality to exist without God.  Nonetheless, it would be a huge blow to objective moral realism’s case to lose – exhibit B – the existence of God.

A Life of Make Believe

24 Monday Mar 2014

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I generally spend more time reading and commenting on atheist blogs than I do posting my own blogs.   Since a lack of a satisfactory morality is, to my mind, a real problem for the atheistic belief system, I frequently ask atheists what they make of morality.

On one atheist’s blog, the author was comparing being Christian to be being like John Nash as portrayed in the movie A Beautiful Mind. Just like John Nash believed in people who weren’t real, he argued that Christians believed in an unreal God.   He also compared Christianity to Buzz Light Year’s belief that he was really on a mission from mission control.   The author thought he could relate to Buzz Lightyear because, when he was a Christian, he thought he was on a mission from mission control and had to face the hard realization he really was not.      The blogger was hoping that he could disabuse Christians of their “make believe” ideas.

As it turns out this blogger replaced the idea of mission control, with the idea that when it comes to morality we create our own meaning.    I found this interesting.  He was trying to help people stop believing “make believe” but he thinks he “creates” his own meaning when it comes to morality, and presumably lives his life based on these creations.    It became clear to me that this author and perhaps a few people who follow his blog did not see the irony.   So I explained the difference between moral realism and relativism.  He clearly indicated he is a subjectivist.   That is, he is some who thinks right and wrong is dependent on our own view of what is right or wrong.  In other words morality is a creation of our mind – just like those imaginary people John Nash believed in.

I am aware meta-ethical views and their implications are really not all that well known outside of philosophers interested in the field.   I did a brief introductory blog on it here https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/20/what-do-you-mean-im-wrong/  So I am not trying to be critical of the blogger, or any of the other commentators, defending him.  They were all pretty intelligent and reasonable people.   I think this is an important illustration of why gaining an understanding of these issues is critical if you want to discuss the reasonableness of believing in Christianity.  Here the blogger assumed we shouldn’t live our lives based on make believe.  Yet this person admitted he lives by a morality he made up.

Russ Shaefer-Landau said it best:

“Nihilists believe that there are no moral truths.  Subjectivists believe that moral truth is created by each individual.  Relativists believe that moral truth is a social construct.  These three theories share the view that, in ethics, we make it all up. ”  Page 11 Whatever Happened to Good and Evil.

But don’t take his, or my word for it, think it through yourself.  If your morality is based on creating your own meaning you are indeed “making it up.”  Now there are several reasons people might not believe in God.  But if you reject belief in God because you fear God might be “made up”, it seems you would be contradicting this principle, to then accept some sort of relativist theory of morality.  Because there you know you are living your life based on make believe.

In the end if a rational person really wants to keep close contact with reality then rejecting a view that might be made up for one that you know is made up seems a poor approach.

What Do You Mean, I’m Wrong?

20 Monday Jan 2014

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I have started talking about morality and I will continue to talk about morality so I should probably explain a bit about what I mean.   By morals I mean what we should do, and what is right and wrong, good and evil.  I generally don’t distinguish between these different terms.     I am a moral realist so I will usually mean the first category, I describe below.

There are several different notions that people have about what morals are and what we mean when we say something is “wrong” immoral etc.  I think the explanations I give match pretty well with how philosophers generally understand these terms.    Here are what I consider the big 4 general ideas of meta-ethics.  That is if we step really far back from any ethical debate I think these 4 concepts can help us understand what we mean when we call something right or wrong:

Objective Moral Realism:  People in this group believe that when we say something is wrong we are making a positive claim about reality that is true or false regardless of what anyone believes about it.

There are several  types of realists but one distinction is between,  Non naturalists and naturalists.  Moral non-naturalists believe that rightness or wrongness is a property of reality that attaches to certain morally relevant occurrences.

Moral Naturalists think that that the rightness and wrongness simply is the set of facts that make up certain occurrences.     For the moral naturalist there is no additional property of wrongness.    But the naturalist still believes certain events are wrong.  Just like they believe some things are water.  Water happens to be those things that are h2o.  They are not, H2O plus another “water property.” Our understanding of water supervenes on anything that has the chemical composition H2O.  Likewise wrongness supervenes on certain occurrences.

Both are realists.  Moral realists include Russ Schaefer Landau (moral realist of the non-naturalist variety) and Nicholas Sturgeon (moral realist and naturalist)  The best introduction to meta-ethics I have found is Russ Schaefer landau’s “whatever happened to good and evil?”

I am a moral realist.  I don’t really have a strong view on moral naturalism versus moral non naturalism.

Error theorists, Nihilists:    This group believes there is no such thing as morality.    So arguing about whether something is right or wrong is like arguing about whether male unicorns have 38 or 42 teeth.   It’s all based on an erroneous understanding of the world.  JL Mackie’s excellent book “Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong” is a great book that sets forth this understanding.  He is a very good writer and should be read on his own.  Among the points he makes is that if ethical properties were to exist in reality they would be queer things.   And even if they did exist how would we know what they are?

Another error theorist is Richard Joyce.   He argues that even if moral properties did exist what we know about evolution makes it extremely unlikely that we would know what they are.  He wrote an excellent book covering this theory called “The Evolution of Morality.”    He has also written several papers many of which can be accessed on his website.  Both are good writers Mackie’s book might be a bit easier for someone new to the meta-ethics to digest.

Note that although Richard Joyce argues that evolution makes our moral beliefs (if they were to exist) unreliable that in itself does not really make him a nihilist.  Richard Joyce, Sharon Street, and Mark Linville are 3 philosophers who have published papers explaining how our understanding of evolution debunks the notion that we can have reliable moral beliefs.    That is if we assume naturalism is true it debunks them.  Here btw “naturalism” just means not believing in anything supernatural.  So no God(s) or spirits or anything of the sort.  “Naturalism” is related to “moral naturalism” but not the same term.   It’s pretty clear that Richard Joyce and Sharon Street are naturalists and Mark Linville is a Christian.   I think Sharon Street is a relativist, Mark Linville is a realist and Richard Joyce is a nihilist.  So Mark Linville is making the argument based on the assumption that naturalism is true, where as the other two really think naturalism is true.

Relativism/constructivism/subjectivism:   Generally speaking this group thinks that moral claims can be true or false by comparing it with reality but it’s not independent of what people believe.    Subjectivists might think what is right and wrong is up to each individual. Here morals are like tastes in food.   Asking if giving to the poor is good is like asking if chocolate is good.  Most will agree it is but it’s up to each individual.

More commonly relativists tend to base morals on a relevant community.  They believe that there is some relevant community (sometimes a hypothetical community which to some extent can make it like realism) that decides what is right or wrong.    Currency is a common analogy.  A $10 bill is a piece of paper.  But it is worth $10.  It would be false to hold a $10 bill up and say “this is worth $14 dollars.”  But that statement is true or false due to the beliefs of the relevant community.   Gilbert Harman is a well-known relativist.

My own view on relativism:  Ok this is where we get the problems along the lines of what if the Nazis killed everyone who disagreed with them so all that was left were Nazis who thought Jews should be killed.  Would it then be right to kill Jews?  That seems a problem with this position.  Russ Shaefer Landau asks if the same event can take place in several different societies.   For example a member of the mafia might kill a victim who is also in the mafia’s cultural community and it is not wrong in that set of circumstances according to that community.  But it also occurred in New York and according to that society it is wrong.   If it can occur in 2 societies, then the same exact event might be wrong and not wrong at the same time.

But beyond that I think I have another deeper problem.  This is taking the position that when it comes to morals we make it all up.   Do we want to believe in make believe?  It is essentially adopting the position that we are staring at the shadows on the cave and we are fine with structuring our lives around that.  For me, I can’t really get behind it.  If that is all we mean by truth when it comes to morals then moral truths lose too much significance.  I don’t really care if I live my life wrongly if all that means is I lived my life wrong according to some group or other.

Noncognitivists:   This group denies that moral claims are the sorts of claims that can be considered true or false.    Thus if I were to say “it’s wrong to stick babies with bayonets” they think this is only my expressing disapproval.  In essence they think I am saying “boo to sticking babies with bayonets!”   Now is “boo to sticking babies with bayonets” true or false?  What about “yay! 49ers” or “Boo!  seahawks”?  These utterances are really neither true or false.  They are not making a claim about reality but instead are just expressions of approval or disapproval.   According to noncognitivists moral statements are really just these sorts of utterances and should not be interpreted as propositions that can be either true or false.

These are what I consider 4 corners of what people people mean by morals.  There are many different theories and terminology involved, and these theories are not always exclusive of each other.   But I think just getting an understanding of these 4 basic ideas is helpful to navigate.

Like I said I am an objective moral realist.  So when I refer to morals that is typically the brand I am referring to.