Tag Archives: Faith

Willi Graf

02 Monday Jan 2017

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Today 99 years ago Willi Graf was born.  Willi was a member of the White Rose Society.  This society was a Nazi resistance group.  The core members were students Hans and Sophie Scholl, Alex Schmorrel, Christof Probst, and Willi Graf.

 

All of these core members had very interesting – if short – lives.   Hans and Sophie were Lutheran, Schmorrel was Orthodox, (He is officially an Orthodox Saint) Willi was Catholic and Christof Probst became Catholic just before he died.  I found all of these members to be inspirational.    They got together through a connection to the University of Munich.   Alex Hans and Willi were Medics and served together on the eastern front.

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Left to right: Hubert Furtwangler, Hans Scholl, Willie Graf and Alexander Schmorell on the Eastern Front (1942)

 

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Left to right: Hans Scholl, Sophie Scholl and Christoph Probst.

They published leaflets trying to change germans’ minds about the Nazis.  They would also spray paint “Down with Hitler”  And “Freedom!” throughout the city.  They would write and print out the leaflets and then they would mail them to people who they thought would be influential, or just leave them throughout different cities.  Willi was not the author of the leaflets but instead he would form contacts in other cities.  They would distribute the leaflets at the same time in different cities so it appeared to be larger than it was.

 

Before the white rose was even formed, Sophie and Hans Scholl were influenced by Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen.  There was a transcript of one of his sermons condemning the Nazis pogrom against disabled people.  They actually distributed his sermon just as they would later distribute their own work as the White Rose.

Here are some excerpts from the leaflets:

The first leaflet Said: “…Therefore every individual, conscious of his responsibility as a member of Christian and Western civilization, must defend himself against the scourges of mankind, against fascism and any similar system of totalitarianism. Offer passive resistance – resistance – wherever you may be, forestall the spread of this atheistic war machine before it is too late,..”

 

The Second leaflet said “…Why tell you these things, since you are fully aware of them – or if not of these, then of other equally grave crimes committed by this frightful sub-humanity? Because here we touch on a problem which involves us deeply and forces us all to take thought. Why do the German people behave so apathetically in the face of all these abominable crimes, crimes so unworthy of the human race? Hardly anyone thinks about that. It is accepted as fact and put out of mind. The German people slumber on in their dull, stupid sleep and encourage these fascist criminals; they give them the opportunity to carry on their depredations; and of course they do so. Is this a sign that the Germans are brutalized in their simplest human feelings, that no chord within them cries out at the sight of such deeds, that they have sunk into a fatal consciencelessness from which they will never, never awake? It seems to be so, and will certainly be so, if the German does not at last start up out of his stupor, if he does not protest wherever and whenever he can against this clique of criminals, if he shows no sympathy for these hundreds of thousands of victims. He must evidence not only sympathy; no, much more: a sense of complicity in guilt. For through his apathetic behavior he gives these evil men the opportunity to act as they do; he tolerates this government which has taken upon itself such an infinitely great burden of guilt; indeed, he himself is to blame for the fact that it came about at all! Each man wants to be exonerated of a guilt of this kind, each one continues on his way with the most placid, the calmest conscience. But he cannot be exonerated; he is guilty, guilty, guilty!”

 

The third leaflet again tried to trigger the conscience of their fellow Germans ending with  “We will not be silent. We are your bad conscience. The White Rose will not leave you in peace!”

 

The Fourth Leaflet said:

“…Every word that comes from Hitler’s mouth is a lie. When he says peace, he means war, and when he blasphemously uses the name of the Almighty, he means the power of evil, the fallen angel, Satan. His mouth is the foul-smelling maw of Hell, and his might is at bottom accursed. True, we must conduct a struggle against the National Socialist terrorist state with rational means; but whoever today still doubts the reality, the existence of demonic powers, has failed by a wide margin to understand the metaphysical background of this war. Behind the concrete, the visible events, behind all objective, logical considerations, we find the irrational element: The struggle against the demon, against the servants of the Antichrist. Everywhere and at all times demons have been lurking in the dark, waiting for the moment when man is weak; when of his own volition he leaves his place in the order of Creation as founded for him by God in freedom; when he yields to the force of evil, separates himself from the powers of a higher order; and after voluntarily taking the first step, he is driven on to the next and the next at a furiously accelerating rate. Everywhere and at all times of greatest trial men have appeared, prophets and saints who cherished their freedom, who preached the One God and who His help brought the people to a reversal of their downward course. Man is free, to be sure, but without the true God he is defenceless against the principle of evil. He is a like rudderless ship, at the mercy of the storm, an infant without his mother, a cloud dissolving into thin air….”

 

 

Here is a bit from the 6th Leaflet:

“…The Hitler Youth, the SA, the SS have tried to drug us, to revolutionise us, to regiment us in the most promising young years of our lives. “Philosophical training” is the name given to the despicable method by which our budding intellectual development is muffled in a fog of empty phrases. A system of selection of leaders at once unimaginably devilish and narrow-minded trains up its future party bigwigs in the “Castles of the Knightly Order” to become Godless, impudent, and conscienceless exploiters and executioners – blind, stupid hangers-on of the Fuhrer…”

Willi Graf in Particular:

One thing I found interesting about Willi Graf, is that he did not seem to have any authority figure or other adult to lead him to his courageous life.

 

Hans and Sophie had their father who was a conscientious objector to fighting in WWI.  He did not want them participate in anything Nazi.   Hans however was initially beguiled by the Nazis and became a leader in the Hitler Youth.    Sophie, also initially joined a nazi girl’s group.  However their father seemed to have a clear head and did push them in the other direction.  Their sister Inge Scholl wrote of this later:

 

“But there was something else that drew us with mysterious power and swept us along: the closed ranks of marching youth with banners waving, eyes fixed straight ahead, keeping time to drumbeat and song. Was not this sense of fellowship overpowering? It is not surprising that all of us, Hans and Sophie and the others, joined the Hitler Youth? We entered into it with body and soul, and we could not understand why our father did not approve, why he was not happy and proud. On the contrary, he was quite displeased with us.”

— Inge Scholl, The White Rose

 

Alexander Shmorrel was half Russian and so it is no surprise he came to find Nazis revolting – considering he spent time on the Eastern front.     And Probst’s stepmother was Jewish so he presumably would have a strong counterinfluence at home as well.

 

But Willi’s youth seemed a bit different.  It appeared that his anti-nazi views came solely from his belief that it was inconsistent with his faith.  He joined catholic youth organizations and remained with them even when they were illegal.  He also refused to join Hitler youth when it was mandatory.  Not only that but he would cross his acquaintances names out of his personal address book if they joined the Hitler Youth.   In some of my reading it seemed as though his actions went against his parents wishes.  Not that his parents were  Nazis but that they just wanted the best for him and wanted him to get along.  I should point out that one source says his father was a Nazi leader but I was not able to verify this or get the fuller story.

 

When Willi was seventeen he marched in a Mayday parade.  But whereas there was a sea of brown marching in step giving “heil Hitler’s” and carrying Swastika flags, he and his friends marched purposely out of step, did not wear brown, and carried their tattered school flag.

 

A friend commented: “Willie Graf… was one of those young people who have always found it impossible to remain indifferent in the face of injustice.”  This obstinate refusal to comply would lead to fights where it was said Willi would give as good as he would get.

And all of this was before he witnessed the horrors on the eastern front.

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To his sister he wrote from the Eastern front “The war here in the East leads to things so terrible I would never have thought them possible… Some things have occurred… that have disturbed me deeply… I can’t begin to give you the details… It is simply unthinkable that such things exist… I wish I hadn’t had to see what I have seen…. I could tell you much more but do not want to trust it to a letter.”

 

Even though I live at a time where it is much easier to live a good Christian life I still can relate to him when he wrote in his journal: “To be a Christian, is perhaps the hardest thing to ever become in life.” He was devoutly Catholic and it was said he would attend mass every Sunday even as a college student.  He was interested in the liturgy and composed some alternate liturgies that could be used at mass.   He was also chess player and philosopher.

 

But perhaps what I admire most about him is that despite harboring doubts he made a decision as to how to live and stuck to it even when it meant death.  He wrote in his journal: “Sometimes, I am certain of the rightness of my course. Sometimes I doubt it. But I take it upon myself nevertheless, no matter how burdensome it may be.”, and  “Sometimes you can’t just go where favoring winds send you. Sometimes one must take a direction which isn’t that easy. You can’t allow yourself to be continually blown about.”

 

He was not as eloquent at his trial as Sophie or Hans Scholl.   However, despite being interrogated the longest he never gave additional names of any his contacts.   All of the members of the white rose remained loyal to each other throughout their interrogations.  This reminds me of John 15:13  “ There is no greater love than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.”

In the movie Sophie Scholl last days they make it appear that Willi was very vocal against the actions Sophie and Hans took, which lead to all the arrests.  But even, if this is true, nothing I have read suggests he ever held it against them.   I think they all decided it was just a matter of time before they were caught and killed.

We must remember that Willi and his friends were still quite young during this time.  They died at ages ranging from 21 to 25.  I think as I am older and wiser, not only from an age perspective but a historical one,  I can see how what they did was necessary.  But when I consider the inevitable doubts of the moment to go against all of society, at such a young age, and with full knowledge of the dire consequences, I can only marvel at the dedication of these young men and women.

 

I have been pondering their lives for a few months now and I am still looking for more information – especially on Willi Graf.  I know there has been a book written on him but it is in German.  I would love to get a translation.

 

My thoughts here were based on a 2 books,  “A Noble treason” by Richard Hasner and “At the Heart of the White Rose: Letters and Diaries of Hans and Sophie Scholl”  Hardcover – August, 1987 by Hans Scholl  (Author), Sophie Scholl (Author), as well as the movie The last days of Sophie Scholl and the White Rose.

 

There are also numerouse webpages that I read as well including the following:

 

http://spartacus-educational.com/GERprobst.htm

http://spartacus-educational.com/GERschmorell.htm

http://spartacus-educational.com/GERschollH.htm

http://spartacus-educational.com/GERgraf.htm

https://libcom.org/library/white-rose-documents

http://www.bls.org/downloads/MFL/White%20Rose.pdf

Thoughts on Pragmatic Encroachment

30 Sunday Mar 2014

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Can beliefs be justified by anything other than evidence that they are true?   I think allot of people would want to say “No” to that question at some time in their lives, myself included.  Any other justification for beliefs seems somehow wrong and intellectually dishonest.   But because

1 ) Beliefs have  a causal connection with how we act,

2)  Often we have to act on uncertainty about the actual state of affairs and

3) When rational people decide how to act based on uncertainty they must weigh the likelihood and the consequences of being right or wrong as to the state of affairs

 

it may be irrational to only consider the likelihood of being right or wrong and not considering the consequences.

In this blog I would like to offer some of my thoughts on pragmatic encroachment.   But first let’s start with some observations of the traditional definition of knowledge.

There are various ways that philosophers have tried to define what Knowledge is.  The most traditional is to say that a subject S knows a proposition P if and only if:

 

1)            S believes P,

2)            P is true,

and

3)            S has sufficient reason for believing P

 

Now the third condition might be phrased differently.  For example it might be stated as “3) S is justified in believing  p.”  Or “3) S’s belief in P is properly warranted.” [1]

As it turns out I think this 3rd conditions is ambiguous in a few respects.  One way is that we often think someone might be “justified” in believing something even when we don’t think their justification is sufficient to call that belief “knowledge.”   I might have believed the Seahawks would beat the Broncos in the Super Bowl.    That belief might have been a “justified” belief based on different things I have learned about the two teams.   Hence in that sense we can call that a “justified true belief.”  We might say my belief was a rational belief.    But I don’t think most people would say I “knew” the Seahawks would win the Super Bowl – at least not before the game started.   So we can see there is “justified true belief” and there is “justified true belief.”  The “justification” required for knowledge is greater than the “justification” needed to hold mere “justified belief.”

Notice that this ambiguity remains regardless of whether we use the formulation of “justified” belief or “sufficient reason” or “proper warrant.”  What is “sufficient reason” to rationally believe something is less than the “sufficient reason” required to know something.

 

The justification that yields knowledge is stronger than the justification that allows us to simply say we are justified in believing something.   This raises a few questions:

1)            How much justification do you need to” know” something?

2)            How much, if any, justification do you need to be “justified in believing” something?

3)            Is there any difference in the forms of justification that can relate to “knowledge” versus the forms of justification that can relate to mere “rational belief.”

 

I think those questions are bit vague, and even if clarified, somewhat difficult to answer.  But here are some thoughts.    The justification for “knowledge” might require something close to 100% certainty.  We might be inclined to say mere “rational belief” would require something like a preponderance of evidence.  That is, that it is more likely than not true.   But I think the cases presented by those who consider pragmatic encroachment shows “justification” (or “sufficient reason” or “proper warrant”) can get a bit more complicated than just looking at the certainty/probability that your belief is true.

 

Let’s consider theDeRose’s “bank cases” as set forth and explained by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath in their paper “Pragmatic Encroachment”:

Some of our intuitions about specific cases seem to support the claim that knowledge can depend on practical factors   Consider DeRose’s famous (1992) “Bank Cases”:

‘Bank Case A (Low Stakes).  My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon.  We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks.  But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons.  Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning.  My wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow.  Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.”  I reply, “No, I know it’ll be open.  I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday.  It’s open until noon.”

 

Bank Case B (High Stakes).  My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines.  I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon.  But in this case, we have just written a very large and important check.  If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation.  And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday.  My wife reminds me of these facts.  She then says, “Banks do change their hours.  Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?”  Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no.  I’d better go in and make sure.” (913)’

 

It looks like Keith speaks truly in Case A in attributing knowledge to himself that the bank will be open tomorrow, while he also speaks truly in Case B in denying himself knowledge.  The only thing that changes in the two cases is how important it is for Keith to be right about whether the bank will be open tomorrow.  Therefore, it looks like how important it is for Keith to be right about whether the bank will be open tomorrow is relevant to whether Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.  And relevant in a clear way: holding fixed Keith’s evidence concerning whether the bank will be open tomorrow, whether he knows it will be open varies with variations in how important it is for him to be right about this.

But here we find some odd consequences.  If this is the proper lesson to draw from the Bank Cases, it would appear to follow that two subjects can have the same evidence concerning whether the bank will be open tomorrow, even though one of them knows it’ll open tomorrow and the other doesn’t.  ……What makes the difference in knowledge has nothing to do with these traditional factors.  In fact, one subject might have more evidence than another that the bank will be open tomorrow – be better informed, have done more checking, etc. – but because much more is at stake for the more well-informed subject, the more well-informed subject can fail to know that the bank will be open tomorrow while the less-informed subject knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.  All this is hard to swallow.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDQQFjAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fweb.missouri.edu%2F~mcgrathma%2Fpubs-papers%2FPragmaticEncroachment.doc&ei=UJD-UoDjCoHm2AWag4D4Ag&usg=AFQjCNGMBYTohUuRYmF0oT6BsV0dlx0gCQ&sig2=YyCPP25IPEfzLjAsoyYfIA&bvm=bv.61535280,d.b2I

 

I think these cases can illustrate few different ambiguities about what it means to “know” something or be “justified” in believing something.    The first ambiguity is the one I already mentioned.   It seems to me that having gone to a bank a few weeks back and having it be open on a Saturday is pretty good justification for the belief it will be open next Saturday.  Is it certain enough that we would say we “know” it will be open this Saturday?  I think so, but it’s getting pretty close and some might disagree.   If he went there 2 years ago we probably would say it’s not enough certainty to count as “knowing” whether it will be open this Saturday.  So I think these examples are playing on that gray area of what amount of certainty we need before we call something knowledge.    Accordingly this example tends to open the door to look at other ways Keith might or might not be “justified in believing” it is open on Saturday.

 

The bank cases clearly isolate the role of justification in our beliefs that deals not with the probability of our beliefs being true, but with the consequences of their being true or false.  Let’s consider how that is working here.

First, saying that as “the stakes” increase, better evidence is required for knowledge, is not quite what this shows.  It’s not just that “the” stakes are increased, but only certain stakes.  Specifically the stakes are increased in such a way that if he acts on his belief and he is wrong he will suffer greater consequences.

 

Consider case C (another high stakes case).  This case is just like case A as far as it goes.  It is not the case that any important checks will bounce as in case B.  There is nothing else that would cause any urgency for Keith to deposit that check before Monday.    But let’s add a few other facts that increase the stakes.   Keith is on his way to a very important interview.  He is sure he will get this job if he is on time, because a decision maker told him that everyone was so impressed with his credentials and past interview that so long as he shows up, on time, for this interview they will probably make him an offer.  This would be the offer of a lifetime.  And he is not sure with parking and the odd traffic around the bank, whether he will be on time for that interview if he stopped to deposit that check.

 

It seems to me the stakes are just as high in case C as they are in case B.  And I think we would still agree that Keith’s knowledge claim is just as valid as in case A.    So it’s not just that “the” stakes went up in Case B.  The stakes went up in a way that made his being wrong in his belief yield harsh consequences.  Case C increases the stakes concerning his belief as well but it increases the stakes in a way that reinforces acting on his belief.   Could we still say he knows the bank will be open on Saturday due to his going a few weeks ago?  What about 2 years ago?

 

Rather than get bogged down on how much certainty we need for “knowledge” I would rather explore how this second view of “justification” works with our belief.  The distinction is whether we are justified due to the probability of our belief being true or due to the consequences of our belief being true.

 

In an earlier blog I explained what a belief is so that we perhaps better understand how they might be “justified.”   I accepted that “[a belief] is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises.”  From W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian’s  book The Web of Belief.     This description helps us make sense of the bank cases.  Case B demands more “justification” to “respond” as if the bank will be open on Saturday.  The way we would “respond” if the bank is open on Saturday, is to simply drive past the bank on Friday night.   But that response is less justified if there is some doubt in our belief about the bank being open and we risk having an important check to bounce.

 

However the “response” of driving past the bank is not less justified if the stakes are raised in such a way that supports driving past the bank.  Should our “disposition to respond in certain ways” (i.e., our belief) be effected by the stakes we have for responding a certain way?  I think they should.   That is, I think our beliefs should be effected by the stakes we have for responding a certain way.

 

Some people will recoil from this.  They will think our beliefs should only be effected by the probabilities that they are true.    I think that view will usually work out ok for them.  However in certain circumstances this approach may lead to irrational behavior.  But we are skipping ahead too fast.  Let’s back up and think about a few things.

 

First in case C the inherent importance of holding a “true belief” seems to be overshadowed.  Since there is no urgency to have the check deposited on Saturday, the belief “that the bank will be open on Saturday” being true seems relatively unimportant.   Adding the fact that you might be late for a very important interview further decreases the concern whether that belief is actually true or false.  The consequences of your “responding a certain way” is determining your “disposition to respond in certain ways” as much as, if not more than, any inherent importance of holding true beliefs about bank hours.     The probabilities that the bank will actually be open on Saturday becomes relatively less important in Case C, because the decision is really hinging on the consequences of missing the interview.

When we look at the “justification for believing” that the bank is open on Saturday, in case A and C we tend to think he has more justification to than in Case B.  And clearly he does have more justification to be “disposed to respond” by driving past the bank.

 

In sum I think these cases do indeed indicate not only that the probability of our beliefs being true is not the only consideration to holding true beliefs.   In fact, I think we can see that given certain circumstances the probability of our beliefs being true can be relatively unimportant in whether we should hold them.

 

Now I think allot of what I said depends on how we understand “belief.”  Some might not agree with my analysis.  They might say that the belief is not better justified depending on the consequences.  Remember the definition “[a belief] is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises.” (emphasis mine)   They might say that the belief has the same justification regardless of the consequences, but the “appropriate issues” change leading to the action of Keith driving past the bank in Case A and C but not driving past in Case B.

 

They might argue that the belief should not be held more or less strongly dependent on the consequences but your actions should be change as the consequences change.  This seems a sensible way to view things.   If we were a computer program or robot that might be the best approach.  But sometimes I think we know we should act a certain way but our doubts about probabilities prevent us from following through.    But I wonder what people think of what I said so far so I will end here.

 

[1] “  A philosopher named Gettier provided some important counter examples to this definition which ends up being the subject of other important philosophical developments on this topic.  However, I don’t mean to address that now.  This idea of knowledge being “justified true belief” remains a sort of default view and its good enough for our purposes.

Do you BELIEEEEVE!

09 Thursday Jan 2014

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Christianity focuses allot on beliefs.  Faith is belief and trust in God.    It’s important to “believe in Jesus” but before we get to what that might mean (another blog)  let’s consider what it means to “believe” anything?

Although it is not a definition, IMO the best description of what it means to believe something was given by W.V. Quine and J.S. Ullian in their book “The Web of Belief.”

“Let us consider, to begin with.  What we are up to when
we believe.  Just what are we doing? Nothing in particular.
For all the liveliness of fluctuation of beliefs, believing is
not an activity.  It is not like scansion or long division. We
may scan a verse quickly or slowly. We may perform a
division quickly or slowly. We may even be quick or slow
about coming to believe something, and quick or slow
about giving a belief up. But there is nothing quick or slow
about the believing itself; it is not a job to get on with. Nor
is it a fit or mood, like joy or grief or astonishment. It is
not something that we feel while it lasts.  Rather, believ­
ing is a disposition that can linger latent and unobserved.
It is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the
appropriate issue arises. To believe that Hannibal crossed
the Alps is to be disposed, among other things, to say “Yes”
when asked. To believe that frozen foods will thaw on the
table is to be disposed, among other things, to leave such
foods on the table only when one wants them thawed.
Inculcating a belief is like charging a battery. The bat­
tery is thenceforward disposed to give a spark or shock,
when suitably approached, as long as the charge lasts.
Similarly the believer is disposed to respond in character­
istic ways, when suitably approached, as long as the belief
lasts. The belief, like the charge, may last long or briefly.
Some beliefs, like the one about Hannibal, we shall proba­
bly retain while we live. Some, like our belief in the
dependability of our neighborhood cobbler, we may abandon
tomorrow in the face of adverse evidence. And some,
like the belief that a bird chirped within earshot, will
simply die of unimportance forthwith. The belief that the
cobbler is dependable gives way tomorrow to a contrary
belief, while the belief in the bird is just forgotten. A
disposition has ceased in both cases, though in different
ways.

In this quote, we can see what the authors say, “[belief] is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises.”  I read this description of belief early in my studies in philosophy and never felt the need to stray from it.  As Quine and Ullian explain through their examples, the response can be an action or an utterance on our behalf.   Sometimes I don’t think there is an actual action but our response might be internal/mental.  E.g., when you hear something that doesn’t sound right.  You will tend to think through your beliefs to check why that doesn’t sound right.  But you still have the reaction.

To be sure, there are, perhaps some controversies which can arises in a definition that links belief so closely with action, especially in the field of morals where we talk about beliefs of what we should or shouldn’t do.  I think it is clear that we can imagine examples where people do wrong even though they will correctly say they’ve always believed they should do otherwise.  For example, someone may believe they should return library books on time.  Their failure to return the book on time does not necessarily mean they did not believe they should return it on time.  That said, their failure to return the book might indeed be an indicator that the strength of their belief was quite weak.  To use the battery analogy, the charge that that belief holds is not very strong.

Despite some difficulties when we are dealing with moral beliefs about what we should do and whether someone can hold those beliefs and still not act appropriately, I still believe that a person’s actions can often be a better indicator of what they believe than their claims.  For example, someone may say  that they believe they will go to hell if they do not go to church every Sunday.  If that person does not go to church every Sunday, I believe we are entitled to question whether they truly hold that belief.  Actions often reveal beliefs better than words.

The other issue that can come up with beliefs is whether we have the capacity to change our beliefs.  There is no question whether our beliefs can change.  But what amount of control do we have over our beliefs?  I don’t think we need to really delve into this question more than to state we have some control over our beliefs.

Whether that control is direct or indirect and the extent of the control is somewhat irrelevant to our task.  If it were true that we had absolutely no control over our beliefs, then it would be wrong to assign culpability to people who have stubborn, irrational beliefs.  At least if we believe that it is wrong to blame them for something that they have no control over.