Category Archives: christianity

Love Versus Envy

02 Tuesday Apr 2019

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, Catholic, christianity, Morality, philosophy, Uncategorized

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Love is the basis of Christianity and so it is only fitting that a Christian should consider what it is and what it is not.  In this blog I will compare love and what I think is the opposite of love – envy.  In the next blog I will talk about how love has important differences with empathy.

As Christians we know that craving anything before God is sin.  Wealth is one of those things that can lead to sin.   It, however, is not always intrinsically wrong to have property.  Christ wants us to give to the poor.  If giving them items caused them to be in sin, he would not ask us to do that.  Moreover, the fact that we are commanded not to steal suggests that owning property is part of God’s plan and can be healthy.

If I tell you that country A has a wider wealth gap then country B many people would say that, in itself, is reason to think country B is better.    I’m not one of them.  If people in A are all wealthier then all of those in Country B I would rather live in A, even if I was at the low end of that gap.   I would rather have more in absolute terms in country A even if relative to others in my own country I had less.

I know lots of people who have much more money than I do and I am glad they are in a situation where they can have that.  Envy has actually been one sin that has not usually been a problem for me.  But I do notice that my view is not shared by all.  Some people do think inequality of wealth is itself a problem.   Some people would rather have less themselves in absolute terms if it meant those around them had less as well.   This seems to be a lose/lose option based on envy.

Envy is specially targeted in the tenth commandment.   Envy is also a sin that is especially useful in fueling political and social movements.  Envy of the Jews has lead to antisemitism.  Socialism in particular uses envy to fuel it’s movements.  See for example the Kulaks, and the Ukrainian Holodomor.  Most politicians today do not talk about “the 1%” because they want to express how happy they are for the advantages they have.

Certainly I am not saying that all advantaged people “earned” their advantages.  That is obviously not true.  Some people are born smart or wealthy and this was obviously not “earned.”   However, being born smart or wealthy is not itself an immoral action either.   Don’t we wish we were born smart and wealthy – and good looks would have been nice too while we are at it.   Is it not due to our love that we want our children to have advantages such as good friends, wisdom, family, and yes, at least, some material possessions?

 

Christ commanded us to love our neighbor as ourselves.

One of them, an expert in the law, tested him with this question: “Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?”

Jesus replied: “’Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’[c] This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’[d] All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments.’

Matthew 22:36-40.

 

The Catechism quotes Saint Thomas Aquina’s short but effective definition of love:

To love is to will the good of another.

Now let’s look at Merriam Webster’s definition of Envy:

painful or resentful awareness of an advantage enjoyed by another joined with a desire to possess the same advantage

 

I think this helps us understand the direct opposition between the envious heart and what Jesus commands.  Instead of rejoicing that others have the advantages we also want, instead we react negatively toward others receiving the goods we want.

Again I am not saying we need to claim every advantage was earned.  And indeed we should agree that some advantages are not only unearned but are unjust.  If someone cheats someone else out of their property justice dictates they should not keep it.   But we need to make sure we are not rationalizing and fueling our resentment of others having more when they did nothing immoral to get what they have.  That would be envy, the opposite of love.

We can be envious even when someone did earn their advantage.  And as for the unearned, if some people were born lucky, like we wish we were born, do we rejoice for them, or are we resentful?  If we are resentful, obviously, we are not loving them as we love ourselves.

It seems to me that envy has as much claim to be the antithesis of love as hatred does.  I may hate many things about someone as they are now but still hope good for them.  Just as I can hate many things about myself and still hope good for myself.  But envy directly fights against willing the goods for others that we will for ourselves.

Morality: Problems with Divine Command, Subjectivism, and Anti-realism

15 Friday Mar 2019

Posted by in atheism, Catholic, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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Divine Command Theory is the view that right and wrong is simply whatever God decides it is.  As Socrates asked in the Euthyphro Dilemma:

1) is an act pleasing to the gods because it is good,

or rather

2) is an act good because it is pleasing to the gods?

 

The Divine command theory says 2 is correct.   An act is good because it is pleasing to God.   Whatever is God’s will to be good, is good.  That is what it means to be good.  Divine command theory is really a form of subjectivism where the person whose judgement is relevant is God.

 

Russ Schaefer-Landau argued against divine command theory (claim 2) along these lines:

 

  1. God either has good reason to will the way he does or he does not
  2. If God has no good reason to will the way he does then his view is arbitrary
  3. If God has good reason to will the way he does then something is good due to those reasons not due to God’s will. Therefore, we would be looking at case 1 in the Euthyphro dilemma not 2.

It follows that if divine command theory is true then morality is arbitrary.

 

I actually think the problem with divine command theory runs even deeper.  (And the problems equally apply to all forms of subjectivism/relativism)    I think that if we define moral good as whatever God (or some other person or group or entity) decide is good then the very notion of having a “good reason” to believe an act to be moral or immoral is unworkable.  The issue is dealt with by subjectivists when we consider the problems they have with moral progress.  Moral goodness on the subjectivist view is whatever the relevant person or group decides is morally good.  This decision need not accord with objective reality because under subjectivism morality itself is not based in objective morality.     Divine command theory seems to be just a particular form of moral subjectivism where the relevant person or group is God.

 

On moral subjectivism we make moral progress every time the relevant person or group changes their mind.  If they go from thinking slavery (however we want to define it) is sometimes permissible to thinking it is always wrong then it is moral progress.   Why is this moral progress?  Well they used to think wrongly and now they are correct.  They are by definition always correct in whatever they now believe about morality because their beliefs define what morality is.   They used to think slavery was sometimes permissible but since their current view defines what is moral and they now think slavery is never moral they now hold the correct view.

 

Of course, if they then change their mind again, and again start thinking slavery is sometimes morally permissible, that would again be moral progress!  Why?  Because, the current beliefs of that person (or group) defines what is moral.  So now that they believe slavery is sometimes morally permissible then it is by definition morally permissible.  Therefore they were in error, in the bad old days, when they thought slavery was always wrong.

 

So to that extent anything that causes the relevant person/God/group to change their mind is always good in the sense it leads to this vacuous sort of moral progress.  I hope that seems more distasteful than satisfying.  Is there any other sense that a subjectivist could have a “good reason” to hold a belief about morality?  I think the prospects are dim here is why.

 

As I explained in an earlier blog there are generally 2 different types of good reasons to believe something– theoretical reasons having to do with evidence – and pragmatic reasons which is more focused on consequences.   I agree that logic can also properly constrain a subjectivists beliefs – e.g., they should not lead logical contradiction.  So that might be a third type of good reason.  A fourth would be if it is self evident. (Do these four forms of reasons account for all good reasons for belief?  Feel free to comment below.)

But logical contradiction isn’t really going to rule out much in terms of bad reasoning about morality on its own.  Any detail of difference can be pointed to in order to avoid logical contradictions in moral views.  That killing did not happen at precisely 10:27 Am Central time at that exact location.  Therefore my believe that this killing is immoral does not logically contradict my belief this other killing was moral.   Edit: I address the problem of ad hoc logic being a good reason for subjective beliefs here.

Moral truths are certainly not self evident in the way that for example the axioms of logic are self evident.  To contradict our moral views does not need to lead us into a situation that is impossible to even imagine.   Like trying to imagine A and not A at the same time and in the same respect seems impossible to even conceive.  

To really get to the heart of the matter we need to go beyond just logical contradiction and look at whether there can be good theoretical, and/or practical reasons for an anti-realist to believe a moral claim.

Can there be good theoretical reasons to hold subjective moral beliefs?

So lets address whether there can be good theoretical reason for the subjectivist to believe something is moral.  That is, is there evidence the subjectivist might use to embrace a moral belief?   Because morality, according to the subjectivist, is not based on objective reality but rather subjective it is impossible that there is good evidence to say something is moral. Let me explain further:

 

Let’s say on the divine theory it so happens that racism displeases God.  So on this theory racism is evil.  And saying it is evil is the same as saying it is God’s will we avoid it.  Now someone might say well God has good reasons for that being his will.  Racism causes all sorts of problems and pain etc.  And we may nod along with some of those reasons.  But here is the problem.  It doesn’t matter what the reasons are if we are going to define what is good by whatever pleases God.  If they actually led God to his current view then they are all good reasons – to the extent they led to the current view which by definition is always right.  So maybe none of the reasons we think racism is wrong are the reasons it displeases God.  Maybe God used to think racism was good but then he was kicked in the head by a mule, or he believed that his stock portfolio would increase in value if he changed his tune or he did some tasseography and the tea leaves told him racism was wrong so he just went with that.

 

Now normally we would think well I am glad God now says racism is wrong but those aren’t really good reasons to reject racism.  But this notion of good or bad reasons to believe something is just our attachment to a realist view of morality.  We think racism is wrong because of things that have to do with reality outside of God’s opinion.  But that is not how it works in Divine command theory – or any form of subjectivism.  God’s opinion decides what is in fact good or bad.  So his current view is always the correct view because that is how the correct view is defined.   It is not based on objective reality so our normal notions of saying whether a reason is a “good reason” or a “bad reason” no longer apply at all.

To better understand my point let’s consider what good and bad theoretical reasons for believing an event that occurs in objective reality.  Lets use history as an example.

If someone believes Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide up Eastern Eurpope before World War II, we might agree because based on what we read about the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact it seems that is likely true.  But what if they say no that is not why they believe it.  They believe it based on tasseography. (again based on pattern the tea leaves left in their mug) Ugh another tasseographer! (blame Richard Joyce for teaching me about this craft)

 

But why is that a bad reason to believe?  We may not be able to show such a belief contradicts other views they hold.  But that is not the problem.  The problem is that reason has no connection with the reality of Russia actually having an agreement with Germany before World War II.  The information we read about the Ribbontrop Molotov pact does in fact have a connection to the objective reality of that agreement.  That is we think the history book (or Wikipedia article) traces back to information and documents used by the people actually in leadership positions in Russia and Germany and this connection with objective reality is what makes it a good reason to believe.

 

If the Wikipedia article or book was a complete fabrication made up by some crazy person who decided to write down a dream, then the Wikipedia article would not be a good reason to believe there was an agreement.  Why does the evidence or reason to believe have to track/link with objective reality?    Because the claim “that Russia and Germany reached an agreement to divide Eastern Europe before WW2” is a claim about what happened in objective reality.    If the claim we are considering is not itself one about objective reality then it is far from clear why any reasons to believe it must have any connection with objective reality.    So our normal theoretical reasoning as to what constitutes a “good reason” to believe something no longer applies when we are talking about anti-realist morality positions.

Can there Be Good Practical Reasons Supporting a Subjectivist Moral Belief?

So what about pragmatic reasons?  Are there any good pragmatic reasons that can lead a subjectivist to believe one action is moral as opposed to another?   I certainly agree that practical reasons can be a good reason to believe something.  Indeed I think there are good practical reasons to believe in God as that belief will lead us to live a moral life.  But again I am understanding morality as a moral realist does.  That is a very different thing than what a moral subjectivist believes.  Here  and here are earlier blogs where I talk about some of the differences.

 

If you have certain goals that the belief will serve then you may have pragmatic reasons to believe.   So for example if believing you can beat cancer were to really improve your chances of beating cancer then that would be a good pragmatic reason to believe you can beat cancer.   This practical reason is independent of theoretical good reasons based on the evidence that you actually will beat cancer.

 

But it is hard to understand how this could apply in the case of subjective morality.   How would calling something moral actually lead to more rational action/belief?   I think Professor Shaffer-Landaus point comes into particular focus here.  If we say we want to believe this conduct is moral because it will lead to happiness or less pain for myself or others, why would adding the claim that therefor this is “moral” add anything?  Why not just say I want to believe I should act this way because I  want happiness and less pain.  Should the label that this action is subjectively moral motivate us to act that way more then the underlying reasons?  Certainly I would say yes if we were considering an objective morality.  But when we are well aware that morality is a label we subjectively assign then what is the point of even using that language.  To the extent it motivates beyond the underlying reasons it would seem to do nothing but distort motivation beyond the proper reasons.

 

It would seem that since we rule out evidentiary reasons and objective reality then we are only left with motivating reasons.  But then to the extent the morality label adjusts the motivation it would seem only to distort it in a way not supported by the reasons.    The nihilist/error theorist would seem to accept the same reasons and simply cut out the morality talk as to the extent the morality label does anything it would distort the motivation beyond the underlying reasons – which would lead to less rational action not more.

 

But there are two more problems with coming up with good pragmatic reasons.  One is that saying what we want is not really in our control rationally speaking.  It would be great if it was.  But even though I know certain foods are bad for me I still want them.  The notion that our wants are driving the ship is sort of like admitting we are giving away the keys to matters beyond our control.   Although on this point I would agree the more argument is needed.  Just because I can’t control all my desires that does not mean I can’t control any of them.  But then again what is driving my will to desires some wants and not others – if not beliefs about objective morality?  Just other wants and desires?  If so then it would seem we just say we act this way for those reasons and adding the label of moral or immoral to actions seems superfluous.

 

The second problem arises because fundamentally morality involves ultimate goals.    Morality is generally understood as the end good in itself not something we do so that we can become faster stronger smarter or even pain free etc.  To the extent I wanted to do action X because it would gave me a leg up in my career or to relieve pain, does not mean action X was moral.   It might be moral or it might not.  But an action serving some alternate goal is usually seen as an independent reason to it being moral.  Yes if your boss dies you may end up in his corner office but that does not mean killing him is less immoral.  We should be motivated to do good for the sake of doing good.   So to say some ulterior motives are a good pragmatic reason to say something is moral seems contrary to our fundamental understanding of how morality works.

 

The moral person does not act morally solely because doing so will help her pursue other goals.  To be sure the same act might be moral and it may help us achieve other goals.  But that is a coincidence that can go either way.  Sometimes acting morally can defeat those other goals but we still should act morally.   Morality is the end itself it is not the means to an end.

 

Thus in the end I think Divine Command theory as well as Subjectivism and other anti-realist views of morality generally will have difficulty explaining any sort of “good reason” to believe something is moral.   The whole anti-realism view rules out what we normally think of as good theoretical reasons to believe and the combination of core concepts of “anti-realism” and “morality” also rules out the possibility that there are any good pragmatic reasons to believe a moral claim.   Thus the very notion of an anti-realist having a “good reason” to believe a moral claim is ruled out.

Mens Rea and Moral Realism

12 Monday Nov 2018

Posted by in atheism, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, Uncategorized

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In my blog I try to use terms in a way that fairly closely tracks with how philosophers in meta-ethics use the terms.  I want the readers of this blog to be able to join in the conversation.  Thus one of my earlier blogs sets out to explain what I still consider the basic 4 meta-ethical beliefs as understood by most philosophers.

The way I use terms there and elsewhere in my blog  will be in agreement with what I consider main stream meta-ethicist’s like Russ Shaefer Landau, who among other things is the founder and editor of the periodical Oxford Studies in Metaethics,  and Richard Joyce whose clear writings on meta-ethics has likely lead to Stanford wanting him to author several articles in their online encyclopedia regarding meta-ethics.

But often times the edges of these philosophical terms can get a bit frayed.  This is the nature of philosophy.  The issue I want to discuss here is one that I find often causes some confusion regarding the moral realist position.  To quote Richard Joyce

“Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to hold that X exists in a mind-independent manner (in the relevant sense of “mind-independence”)”

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/

I want to discuss that issue of the “relevant sense of ‘mind independence’” and suggest that some legal terms may actually help us understand what “the relevant sense” is.  Joyce briefly discusses this issue in the above article and I agree with what he says, but I also think using some legal terms can help people understand the issue.    So lets introduce the problem by considering two cases:

Case 1) During a play someone thought they were firing blanks when they aimed a gun and fired at an innocent person. But there were real bullets in the gun and the innocent person died.

Case 2) During a play a person believed there were real bullets in the gun and there were real bullets in the gun. The person shot an innocent person intentionally causing her death.

Certainly, we draw moral distinctions between situation 1 and situation 2.  In the law we traditionally call this mens rea. Which can be translated from the Latin as “guilty mind.”  Traditionally in order to be culpable of a crime we need to prove two things, Actus Reus (a guilty act) and Mens Rea (guilty mind).

“Actus Reus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea”  “The act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intent.”

http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/A/ActusReusNonFacitReumNisiMensSitRea.aspx

Now this common sense position is something moral realists certainly can agree with.  Certainly Christian moral realists would take this view.   Moral realists who reject free will  (like Sam Harris)  may have some difficulty here, but that is for a different blog.  For now I want to discuss how a moral realist can believe an accident is not as culpable/immoral as intentional actions.

However, we should recognize that these cases do demonstrate the morality of an action is not completely mind independent – in all senses.    So the mind of the person committing the action being considered moral (or not) can be relevant to the question of whether it is moral or not moral.  Then in what sense is the morality of the action a mind independent fact?

Consider that the state of mind of the person who did the shooting was itself a fact.  In the law prosecutors must prove intent and it is considered an issue of fact.   If the after the second case occurred the shooter said “at the time I fired I believed the gun had blanks in it.”  His statement about his belief would be factually incorrect.   He did believe it had real bullets and he is likely lying about what he believed at the time.   It would still be factually incorrect if he later somehow really came to believe he always believed they were blanks – say through a brain injury or however.  Even if everyone believed that at the time of the murder he thought the gun had blanks – it would not change the fact that he did believe they were real bullets and he did intentionally kill the person.  In the second scenario he believed the gun had real bullets and that is an objective fact that will not change depending on people’s later points of view.  The fact that he knew there were real bullets in the gun and he intended to kill the victim are relevant facts in our consideration of whether his action was in fact immoral.

Let me introduce two more legal terms that I think can help clarify this matter.  One is called the “totality of circumstances” and the other is “all relevant facts.”   These terms help us to envision a set of facts as they occurred in history.   Here the actor’s state of mind (mens rea) is a relevant fact that makes up part of the totality of circumstances that should be considered when we decide if his action was moral or not.  But once the totality of circumstances relevant to the question of morality is established the moral realist would say they determine whether the action was moral or not and our opinions about whether that totality of facts does not effect the truth of the matter.

I think it is helpful to think of this in terms of “after the fact” opinions on the morality of the situation.  Whether an action is moral may depend on the mental states of the people involved but after the moral action in question happens and the consequences play out then our later opinions will not effect whether it was moral or not.   This would not only include people removed by time but also otherwise removed from the actual action in question.

Can moral realists have disputes about what is a relevant fact?  Yes.  Do you have all of the relevant facts that would make up the totality of circumstances necessary to answer whether something is moral or not?  Sometimes.  I would point out that morality is very much like tallness.  We tend to acknowledge that some things are more evil or good than others. (Just like some things are taller than others)  Nevertheless, I doubt we as humans ever have the full knowledge we need to accurately determine the exact culpability of any action.  How immoral is someone who kills someone due to an accident while negligently driving a car while drunk?  Is it more immoral then when someone negligently drives drunk but luckily makes it home without killing anyone?  Etc.   A moral realist may not be able to fully sort out the exact degree of moral culpability here but they can still say the person who deliberately ran an innocent person over with their car is likely more culpable.    Just because I think the mental states of the people involved effects the morality in ways I can’t exactly sort out, does not mean I can’t be a moral realist.  Just like the fact that I can not say exactly how many millimeters tall my grandfather was at the time he died means I do not think he was at least three feet tall or taller at the time he died.   And, of course, it doesn’t mean he was as many millimeters tall as we decide he was by virtue of our deciding that.

So in sum, when we consider all the relevant facts in the totality of circumstances, we can try to judge whether an action is immoral (or not) but we do not think our judgement after the event actually effects whether the action was in fact moral.   No persons “after the fact” judgments will ever effect whether an action was in fact moral or not at the time it occurred.  Unlike the subjectivist the moral realist thinks these “after the fact” judgments are irrelevant to the truth.

Now let’s talk about what are the “relevant facts.”   Of course, there are many disagreements here.  But one in particular really ties in with this topic.  Is it relevant that the person really thought he was acting morally?  So lets say a person really thought there was nothing wrong with owning slaves, or bestiality etc.  Lots of times people are mistaken about the morality of their actions.  Does this influence the morality/culpability of their actions?  In a sense it would seem that a moral realist could not agree to this, as it would seem to directly contradict his view that whether something is moral or not is “independent of our or anyone’s beliefs about it being moral.”  But I think the moral realist can even say the actor’s beliefs about whether he or she is acting morally can effect their culpability.

How can I do this and maintain my moral realism?  By explaining that at least arguably that would be part of the mens rea.  And as part of the mens rea it is a relevant fact in the totality of circumstances considered.    But, of course, our after the fact views of the morality of the situation is not part of the mens rea. (assuming we had nothing to do with the actions, or let’s say beliefs of people “removed from the action in question”)  So it is not the case that the beliefs of anyone trying to judge the situation after the fact is a relevant fact.  For the subjectivist the key to what is moral is what does a certain person or group doing the judging think.

Moreover just because the person who committed the crime thought it was moral at the time, that does not, per se, mean it was moral.    That would not be a view a moral realist could hold IMO. (edit: I think when we consider this as a form of mens rea then perhaps the better view is that the moral realist could hold that view.   As this would make this more of “first order” ethical concern rather than “second order” i.e., a meta-ethical issue, but this is where the boundries between first and second order concerns start to blur.)  Rather the moral realist believes that given all the relevant facts, including whatever the mens rea of the person was at the time, an action was either moral or not.  An acter’s view of what was moral or immoral at the time can influence how immoral their action was but it is certainly not always dispositive.

To be sure I think there can be a bit more argument along this extreme edge of understanding what moral realism means.  But hopefully, this blog helped explain the basics of  “relevant sense of mind-independence” for those who are new to the subject.  A moral realist can properly account for mens rea, without buying into a moral subjectivism by believing that morality is entirely determined by the judgements of some person or group.

Sam Harris and Fundamental Beliefs

06 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, christianity, logic, metaethics, Morality, philosophy, rationality, religion, science, Uncategorized

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I listened to a podcast recently by Sam Harris.

 

https://samharris.org/podcasts/108702/

 

As some of you may know arguments might be sound but that does not mean they prove anything to anyone.    Why?  Because people might not believe the premises.   I blogged about the difference between a proof and sound argument here:

 

Extra! Extra! Read All About It! God’s Existence Proven!!

 

The limitations on these premises presents the questions what are our ultimate goals or beliefs?  This was somewhat explored in that podcast starting around 50 minutes in.   Rebecca Goldstein I think correctly identifies some beliefs that we can’t give up without becoming incoherent – such as belief in the rules of logic.  But beyond that what fundamental beliefs would she hold?

 

She mentions belief in an external world and the laws of nature.   That was interesting to me because I have considered that one myself and rejected as not as important as the belief that a rational person can reliably find out what I am supposed to do in life.    I want to explore why I think that here.

 

They also mentioned belief in moral realism as one that is fairly fundamental.   I think this sort of belief is what religious people will often adopt.  I think non-religious people will often try to reduce the importance of morality in forming our beliefs.  I think that is error.

There is a motivational aspect as to how we shape our beliefs and consciences.     I would offer two noble goals in what we want our beliefs to be:

1) People want to believe what is true

2) People want to believe things that lead them to do the right thing

Both of these are noble motivations.  And we obviously should try to form our beliefs with both of these in mind.  But what if certain beliefs lead you to the conclusion there is no right way to act?  That is certain beliefs lead you to believe what is wrong is not wrong because nothing is wrong?  Does a rational person have a good reason to reject that belief?   I think they do.

Now that might violate the first noble motivation.  But let’s think about that motivation just a bit and I think we will see it really is subservient to the second.

The idea that we are here to fill our heads with true beliefs and expunge false beliefs is odd.  If I just tried to memorize phone books few people would say that was really a good way to fill my head, or spend my time, even if I could fill my head with billions of true beliefs that way.    We all understand that knowing certain facts are more important than knowing others.  Just like some false beliefs are more problematic than other false beliefs.

 

But why?  Believing any true fact seems to fit the first noble purpose.   If it is a known fact then it has the quality of being true just as much as any other fact.   So why is it that truly believing some facts are more important, and why does it seem correctly believing other facts is extremely unimportant?   To the extent all the beliefs accord with reality, they are all true, and it is not as though some are “truer” than others.   So it is not the extent of “truthiness” that explains this.

I think ultimately the answer is that believing some facts leads us to live a good life and some falsehoods lead us to a bad life.   And I think this shows the second purpose is naturally more important.

What about some beliefs about morals being more important than other beliefs about morals?   Someone may view it as immoral to hunt deer.  The same person might also think it is immoral to round people up and kill them as was done in Poland at various times.   We do not treat the belief about hunting deer as important as the belief about killing people.  What explains this?  Again the person might believe both are immoral.  But the difference is the latter is more immoral.  So it is still the morality of the issue that makes us view the second belief as more important.  This I believe fairly clearly shows that morality is the more important goal that we want from our beliefs.

 

I think religious people tend to know this truth.  Certain atheists sometimes seem to miss it.  But then after they discuss their science, they tend to drift over to issues of morality and what we should be doing.   Science is great and it answers many interesting questions.  But having true beliefs about “what is” in the observable scientific realm, is not as important as knowing what we should do.  It is forever stuck with a supporting role to the star philosophical/religious question of what we should do.

 

 

Faith defined

23 Monday Jul 2018

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, Catholic, christianity, philosophy, Uncategorized

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What does Faith mean?   Of course many people say “faith” is the same thing as what I would call “blind faith.”  Believing something with no evidence or even despite of the evidence to the contrary.  As a Christian we want to know what God wants us to do when he says we should “have faith” or “believe”.  So I have investigated what the New Testament authors/Holy Spirit would have meant by “faith” when they enjoin us to believe and/or have faith.   The conclusion I have reached is a fairly straightforward definition.  Faith is belief and trust in God.   It might be blind faith but that is not the expected variety of faith.  In acts we see Paul would normally reason with people to try to help them become Christian.

“As was his custom, Paul went into the synagogue, and on three Sabbath days he reasoned with them from the Scriptures, explaining and proving that the Messiah had to suffer and rise from the dead. “This Jesus I am proclaiming to you is the Messiah,” he said. Some of the Jews were persuaded and joined Paul and Silas, as did a large number of God-fearing Greeks and quite a few prominent women.” (emphasis added)

Acts 17, 2-4

Of course, there are places where it appears Paul worked miracles and people gained faith through witness of those miracles.  Which, of course, seems a perfectly rational way to gain faith and would likely be more convincing.  But as the above passage states his “custom” was to spread the faith through reason.

 

Why is there this misunderstanding of faith?   Well there are various reasons.  Obviously Christian detractors would like to label everyone of faith as being irrational so their motivation can be obvious.  But that clearly is not even close to the whole story.  Although most early church fathers and apostles were in favor or reason, some early church fathers emphasized a sort of rejection of reason such as Tertullian.  During the protestant reformation protestant churches seemed to take a hard turn against faith and reason coexisting.  Eg.,  Martin Luther “Faith must trample underfoot all reason, sense, and understanding,…”  Calvin seemed to have them operating as two completely different types of belief.  The Catholic Church has clearly emphasized that they work together and are never in conflict.  Pope John Paul II even described them as two wings for the human spirit.  It is obvious that certain evangelical faiths also want to embrace reason.

 

But lets get to scripture and what was meant.  The word that was translated as “faith” in Paul’s writing is the Greek word “Pistis”.   The word “believe” in John’s Gospel is the word Greek word  pisteuō.” I don’t intend to dive into that too much here but it is worth noting that these words had meanings and were not completely made up when the new testament was written.

 

Now I would like to look at scripture and address one interpretation that of a verse that I think is the most often cited by those who would claim Faith is irrational.  It comes from Hebrews 11:

“Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” King James version.

 

No doubt this is a rather odd wording.  And if we just examine this phrase without the context it may lead people to think the author is saying our belief itself is the evidence for our belief in God.  But in context I think it is pretty clear (albeit still admitting the passage could be more clear) that the author is saying that the faith of the people who came before, and Gods treatment of them, is evidence for us.   To understand my point ask yourself “whose faith?” is the author referring to?  If you read the entire chapter you will see he is referring to the faith of the ancient Jews and describing how they were rewarded by God.  The fact that God was trustworthy to them is evidence that he will be trustworthy for us.

 

The overall tenure of the Hebrews seems to be one of a spiritual pep talk.    In Chapter 11 the author explains how many of the earlier Jews were rewarded by God by taking his word.  Moses, Abraham, Elijah etc.  These people all had faith in God and were rewarded.  Accordingly their faith is evidence for us that God is and God can be trusted.  This is actually quite reasonable.  If someone has proven to be trustworthy time and again and several people trust (have faith in) that person, well their trust is evidence for us.  The author makes this explicit when he says:

“Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, let us throw off everything that hinders and the sin that so easily entangles. And let us run with perseverance the race marked out for us,  fixing our eyes on Jesus, the pioneer and perfecter of faith. For the joy set before him he endured the cross, scorning its shame, and sat down at the right hand of the throne of God.  Consider him who endured such opposition from sinners, so that you will not grow weary and lose heart.”  Hebrews 12.

 

Relying on the witnesses that God is trustworthy is not unreasonable and relying on witnesses is not believing with no evidence.

 

But what about my definition.  Well that definition is actually in Hebrews as well.  We see the two elements (belief and trust in God) spelled out in Hebrews 11 verse 6.

“But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.”

 

So the author identifies two beliefs both of which must be held in order to have faith.  1. “that he (God) is” and 2. “that he (God) is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.”    If you believe in God and diligently seek him,  I think this is tantamount to saying you believe he exists and trust him.

The Conjunction Fallacy and the Burden of Proof

11 Thursday Jan 2018

Posted by in atheism, Athesism Christianity, christianity, logic, philosophy, rationality, religion, Uncategorized

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As you know I think the philosophical burden of proof is a notion harmful to clear thinking.  My first post about it was here.  And here is a blog from someone who thinks very much the same way.  Here I will try to score some further points by undercutting common arguments used to support the view that having a burden of proof is helpful.

But first some background, what is the conjunction fallacy? Consider this example from Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman copied from Wikipedia:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Which is more probable?

1) Linda is a bank teller.
2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”

If you thought 2 was more probable, then you committed this fallacy.  It is a formal fallacy.  And it basically says that the probability of A+B will always lower or equal than the probability of A. As we add conditions the probability can only go down never up.

Why is this tricky to some people? (apparently most people chose option 2) Given the description of Linda many people might think she sounds like a feminist. Moreover, she does not sound like a bank teller. So the first option seems to only have what people think is unlikely.  Even though second option has what seems unlikely it also has what seem likely too. So the second option may seem preferable. But mathematically the second option will never be more likely than the first, because every time the second option holds true the first does as well.

When we add details to a claim the probability tends to drop. The probability that I am in front of my computer now, is greater than the probability that I am now in front of my computer wearing a shirt, which is greater then the probability that I am now in front of my computer wearing a brown shirt. This is just how logic works.  I think many of us know this and build this into our understanding of the world. So what does this have to do with the burden of proof?

If you go to youtube and type in burden of proof the first video to come up will be this one:

Listen to the first 20 seconds.
What is happening?  Well if you notice the person is not just asking whether “something” exists “in space” that we don’t have evidence of and whether we should believe that. Which I tend to think is true – that is I do think there is something in space that we do not currently have evidence of.  So how would that help his case for “the burden of proof”? Of course it wouldn’t.

So he doesn’t just ask whether a general thing exists.   Instead he gets absurdly detailed with his description.  It is not something we don’t know about somewhere in space but under the surface of Pluto! And it is not just “something” its not even just some form of life, but a walrus. And of course even that is not enough. It is a “tiny” “were” walrus. But not only that it is a “psychic” tiny “wer”walrus. But no tonly that!  It is a tiny psychic werewalrus that “sends them psychic messages.” But not only that, the messages come “every midnight.” And not only that but it does this while juggling skulls…..

Ok. So by now if you understand the conjunction fallacy  then you will know that amount of detail alone will drastically drive down the probability. There is no need to appeal any “burden of proof” to not believe in this creature. The probability is naturally driven down just by understanding the conjunction fallacy.

It’s amazing that this video received 13,000 likes when it is really just an obvious play on this formal fallacy. Now if you are like me you will see this quite often from atheists. The other day when I said there is no philosophical burden of proof I was asked whether I believe “that there is an imperceptible penguin named “Percival” standing right across the room from me, wearing his imperceptible tuxedo and his imperceptible monocle and his imperceptible derby hat, holding his imperceptible pocket-watch.”

Now I want to point out that the proponents of a burden of proof who use these examples are not themselves committing the conjunction fallacy. But rather they just seem oblivious to its logic. It is the logic that makes the conjunction fallacy a formal fallacy that makes the probability of their examples quite low. So when you see these examples the response is not that they are committing a fallacy. Rather the response is more like yes the conjunction fallacy is indeed a fallacy so the probability of your extremely detailed scenario is low.

If you express doubts about “the philosophical burden of proof” you can expect this sort of thing. They won’t ask whether you can believe there is something somewhere we do not have evidence for. No, they will not even ask whether there is some species of life we have no evidence of yet. Rather they will ask about a particular horse that we have no evidence of. But not just a horse, but a horned horse, but not just a horned horse, but a horned horse with exactly one straight long horn coming out of its head. And often even that won’t be enough the horned horse will have to be pink.

And you might respond explaining this fallacy and ask them whether they believe there is something somewhere he/she does not yet have evidence of. I certainly believe there are things that exist that I have no evidence of. For example there very well may be a particular cricket in the southwest United States that I have no evidence of.

Which brings me to another point here. There is more than just the conjunction fallacy at work here. There are also background beliefs. There are probably crickets in the southwest United States. But when and how did a walrus get to Pluto? (forget the whole juggling psychic were bit)

Perhaps the classic example of this sort of argument is Russel’s Teapot. Russel said:
“ … nobody can prove that there is not between the Earth and Mars a china teapot revolving in an elliptical orbit, but nobody thinks this sufficiently likely to be taken into account in practice. I think the Christian God just as unlikely.”

So again, its not just something in space we don’t have evidence of.  It is something between the Earth and Mars and revolving in an elliptical orbit. It is not just something but a piece of China. And it is not just China but a China teapot. So we can see the logic of  conjunction fallacy at work reducing the probability.

But we also have background beliefs and evidence at work as well. Plantinga wrote:
“Clearly we have a great deal of evidence against teapotism. For example, as far as we know, the only way a teapot could have gotten into orbit around the sun would be if some country with sufficiently developed space-shot capabilities had shot this pot into orbit. No country with such capabilities is sufficiently frivolous to waste its resources by trying to send a teapot into orbit. Furthermore, if some country had done so, it would have been all over the news; we would certainly have heard about it. But we haven’t. And so on. There is plenty of evidence against teapotism.”

Another example might be if I say if we randomly pick a house in a New York suburb will there be three black horses in the Garage? You might say no. One reason would be conjunction fallacy. But also you would have back ground beliefs about what suburban houses likely have in their garage. If I asked does that house have light fixtures in it, well then you might say yes.

So Plantinga brings up evidence. And I think that may be a good way to describe what he is doing. But sometimes there are things that just don’t accord with our background beliefs. Now maybe these background beliefs are rational maybe they are not. Sometimes it may be difficult to completely understand or articulate why a certain claim seems true or untrue. Is there something beyond the known universe? In any case we have far more beliefs than we may even consciously realize.

For example, I never realized I believe plaid cats do not exist until last month. But I suppose I always believed it. (that is I was inclined to act in a way that accorded with the statement “there are no plaid cats”) This may be a sad fact of this kluge we call our brains. But it does not justify erecting some imagined burden of proof.  That is just piling error on top of error. When we consider 1) our background beliefs, 2) evidence and 3) the logic of the conjunction fallacy there is no reason to appeal to the burden of proof.

If you are so inclined I would love it if people would post a link to this blog in the comments of the above youtube video. Perhaps we can get a discussion going and deepen everyone’s understanding of this issue.

In Support of Religious Extremism

30 Tuesday May 2017

Posted by in Catholic, christianity, Islam, Morality, philosophy, religion

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No I don’t want to be violent.  And of course, there is no logical reason to think religious extremism means violence.

Many in religious orders give away everything they own and dedicate their lives to Christ including an oath of celibacy.  That’s extreme.   Some monks and sisters dedicate their lives to prayer, and some even take a vow of silence.  That’s extreme.  Those many martyrs present and past could avoid death by simply saying words that would run counter to their religion.  That’s Extreme.   People like Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., chose to be arrested and put their lives in jeopardy in order to act as they believed their religion required.  (Anyone who thinks his actions were not religiously motivated should listen to A Knock at Midnight.)   What about Jainism?  Some practitioners are so non-violent that they were a mask so as not to kill any bugs through breathing and sweep the floor before they walk so as not to tread on any insects.   All of this is extreme religion and has nothing to do with violence.   I could go on with examples but hopefully by now you can see that it is odd to equate religious extremism with violence.

 

So why has our language developed as if “religious extremism” is violent when obviously this does not fit?  There are at least two reasons.

 

  • It diverts attention away from Islam for the violence perpetrated in it’s name.
  • It sends the message that religion is fine just don’t take it too seriously.

Of course, these goals fit well with different agendas people have.  What’s my point?  My point is mainly that people recognize how language is being manipulated.  Hopefully, now when you read my title you will have a different and truer impression of what I am saying.

 

Finally, I will say that this post was inspired by a you tube video by Sam Harris.  Yes, I have been critical of him in many places but I think he made a good point here.

Scientific Imperialism:  What is a “fact”?

24 Monday Apr 2017

Posted by in atheism, christianity, logic, philosophy, science, Uncategorized

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I was listening to a BBC report on “The March for Science.”  And I was wondering what message they were trying to convey.  It apparently had a tie in with “earth day” and global warming.  But anyway one of the people interviewed by the BBC said that to them an important message was that a “fact” is something that is verifiable and testable.  Now I have heard this definition by quite a few others who might say it is verifiable by observation etc.   So I thought I would address the problems with that definition in this blog.

Now this may be the way scientists view what a “fact” is but I would say that is a change from what it traditionally means.   Moreover, I think adopting that definition in a more general sense means all facts are scientific facts.  And that is problematic.  I would point out that I have nothing against science and indeed I always had a higher aptitude for science than any other subject.  But I admit being somewhat annoyed by scientists who seem to know nothing other than science telling the world how everything should be.  Science is not the answer to every question.

Now before we go into analyzing her definition. (I will call it the “scientific definition” for simplicity sake).  I would like to give some idea as to a traditional and legal definition of a fact.  So for just a dictionary definition we can see this:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fact

The Blacks Law definition offers this:

“A thing done; an action performed or an incident transpiring; and event or circumstance; an actual occurrence; an actual happening in time or space or an event or mental or physical; that which has taken pace…. A fact is either a state of things, that is, an existence, or a motion , that is, an event.  The quality of being actual; actual existence or occurrence….” (citations omitted)

 

So you can see that the legal definition and the traditional definition have a focus on what actually happened or what actually is the case.  It is not dependent on whether this can be proven or verified or not.    So even if everyone agrees the evidence verifies that Martin Luther said “here I stand, I can do no other” in 1521.    If he did not actually say that then it is not a fact.   In other words facts are not dependent on what we can verify.

 

It was a fact that Jupiter had moons in 1510 just like it was a fact that Jupiter had moons in 1610 after Galileo saw them with his telescope.  If someone in 1510 said it is not a fact that Jupiter has moons, then I would say he got his facts wrong.  Because the moons were actually existing, they in fact existed.

 

To make facts dependent on verification actually makes them subjective.  This is because often what will be a proof (or verification) to one person will not be a proof or verification to another.  What is a proof will depend on what premises each of us accepts. (If you not sure on this check out my earlier blog here: https://trueandreasonable.co/2014/01/11/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-gods-existence-proven/?iframe=true&theme_preview=true)  But I think we all want facts to be objective.  So its unclear that she sees how badly she and others are botching the idea of a fact.

 

But I would point out another issue.  Not because I have a strong view on it, but just because I think it’s interesting.  Typically, in the law, a fact is something that is in the present or in the past.  Future events are not facts.   Some scientists want say certain theories are “facts” – like lets say gravity is a fact.  That might mean different things.  That gravity caused apples to fall in the past is a fact.  That gravity is causing my book to remain on my desk is a fact.  But that gravity will cause my book to stay on my desk tomorrow – is not a fact.  It would seem that is not a fact under any definition.  And in my opinion that is how it should be.  We can say with lots of certainty that certain things will happen in the future.  But they are not facts.

 

The bottom line with all of this is that certain scientists want people to place more importance on scientific views.  So what they co-opt language so they and only they can have “facts” on their side.  Changing what words mean to support your agenda almost always leads to more heat than light.  I like science and appreciate its method, but there is no need to butcher what words mean on its altar.

Is Religious Discrimination Different?

20 Tuesday Dec 2016

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Generally I think our United States Supreme Court is overly concerned with laws establishing religion and too little concerned with laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion.  A study of the history of the establishment clause demonstrates the Supreme Court has basically turned the establishment clause on it’s head. (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/03pdf/02-1624.pdf see Scalia’s concurring opinion)  But that is another discussion.  For now, I don’t want to get involved with how the amendment is interpreted but rather the more basic question of when certain distinctions may be warranted.

 

If we consider discrimination against race, gender or disability we can see that it is irrational because, it is wrong to blame someone for something they didn’t choose.  Moreover, the mere fact of a difference in race gender or disability does not seem to effect whether someone will act morally – however we want to define morality.

 

But what about religion?  It seems that it is both chosen and it does, at least potentially, effect how people will act.  This difference is indicated by the different cultures that develop based on different religious beliefs.     Is cultural discrimination a bad thing?  I would agree that someone would have to be narrow minded to not like anything about a culture – even Nazi or Soviet culture –  but on the whole it would seem ok if your dislikes of a culture outweigh what you do like about it.

 

While it might be nice if there were clear lines to draw about religious beliefs and how they should be treated by the state and individuals, it seems reality is a bit more complicated.  I will probably post more on this in the future but for right now the question remains whether religious discrimination should be treated differently then, say, race, gender or disability discrimination.

Gates of Hell and Protestant Church History

07 Wednesday Dec 2016

Posted by in Catholic, christianity, Uncategorized

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Generally speaking I enjoy the topics surrounding Atheism versus Theism and spend most of my time on those.  I will say that I am quite happy with the discussions with non-believers and have found many to be quite cordial despite the topics.  I consider many to be my friends.

 

I also enjoy discussing the issues surrounding Catholic versus Protestant versus Orthodox.   And this will be the first of what I hope are many posts I will make on this topic.  I am a Catholic and a fairly committed one at that.    But just as I do not think theism is an intellectual slam dunk I do not think Catholicism is a slam dunk either.  In other words, I think there are some good reasons to be atheist, protestant and/or orthodox.     My children go to a Lutheran School.  One that I love.  But sometimes when I see what they are taught I think many protestants must wonder what is he thinking!?  Why is he Catholic?  Well here I would like to offer some insights.  There are few other fairly large reasons but this is a big one.  Lets call this the historical argument.

 

Ok so let us start with a passage that I believe does lead me to be Catholic or Orthodox.  Actually, I will freely admit that the reasons I prefer Catholicism over Orthodoxy are fairly minor.    I think it’s well past time to end the schism.   But anyway today I want to poke at my fellow protestant readers.

 

“…I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.”

 

Now before this quote Peter says something to Jesus and Jesus says he is Peter an “on this rock” I will build my church.  A lot has already been written on what “this rock” is.  I want to focus on the second part.  Did he build a church?   If so when?    What sort of Church did Christ build?  And finally, have the gates of hell prevailed against his church?

 

 

Ok so I think most Christians would agree Christ did in fact found a church.  Moreover, he did it before the New Testament was written.  We see references to the Church in Paul’s letters which are believed to be the earliest NT scriptures.   So it would seem the Church Christ founded could not have been a “biblical church” i.e., one that claims its only authority comes from the bible.  Right?

 

The Church founded by Christ had to have some other authority beyond “scripture alone.”  If the church Christ founded, is now limited to the bible alone when did this change happen? Did this change right after the scriptures were written?  Or was it after they were considered to be the bible by …I don’t know, someone, a church, Martin Luther  – again I don’t know.

The bible does not say what books are supposed to be in the bible.  Would you agree that Christ’s church has the authority to decide this issue? Or is there some other way to determine what books were inspired by the Holy Spirit and should be in the bible?    There is a dispute, as many of you likely know, between Protestants Catholics and even Orthodox (each bible growing larger) as to which books belong in the bible.  Although this dispute only involves the Old Testament, we do have different bibles.

How can anyone maintain it is “the bible alone” when the bible does not even say what books belong in it and there is a dispute?

Now some maintain that the church is invisible.  If the Church was/is entirely hidden then how would this passage make sense?

 

“If they still refuse to listen, tell it to the church; and if they refuse to listen even to the church, treat them as you would a pagan or a tax collector.” Matthew 18:17

 

If we follow this advice what church should we go to?  Who can tell us, for example, what books belong in the bible?  Do we ask the Jews?  Nothing against the Jews but that seems odd as that is really a different religion and not surprisingly they did not include the New Testament.  Why would we ask the Jews instead of Christ’s Church?   So which of the 33,000 plus churches is Christ’s Church?

 

Did the Gates of Hell prevail?

 

The problem I have here is that it seems the protestants took such a hard line against the Catholic Church and sort of forced this issue.  If Martin Luther (and just about every other early protestant church reformer) was right and the Bishopric of Rome was indeed the seat of the anti-christ, it is hard to see how we can deny that the Gates of hell prevailed against the Catholic Church.   If you don’t think the gates of hell prevailed then what happened to Christs Church before the reformation?  Was the bishopric of Rome always the seat of the anti-christ?   I have read some protestants claim all the heretics who were persecuted by the Catholic Church were the actual true church.   Is that still a viable position among rational Christians today?  That seems a bit of stretch, but what would the alternative view be?

Of course, the Orthodox Church has an easy answer here.  Although relations have not always been rainbows and lollipops, I don’t think the Orthodox Church ever taught that the Bishopric of Rome was the seat of the Anti-Christ.  But if protestants think the Orthodox Church is a contender for being the Church founded by Christ, which the gates of Hell never prevailed against, why reject Orthodoxy?   It seems to offer a historically coherent view without requiring commitment to as many different Doctrines as Catholicism.